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At the origin of Narrative, desire.
—Roland Barthes, S/Z
The wind, in the opening scene of Ann Petry’s 1946
 
novel, The Street, is a November gale that assaults the
 residents of Harlem with a barrage of paper, bones,
 and 
garbage.
 It does “everything it [can] to discour ­
age the people walking along
 
the street” (2). It push ­
es dirt “into their noses, making it difficult to
 breathe” (2). It thrusts dust into their eyes, 
lacerates their skin, entangles their feet, gr bs th ir throats,
 and fingers their necks, bodies, and eyeballs. The
 wind is so 
forceful
 that Lutie Johnson, the novel’s  
protagonist, finds it almost impossible to read the
 sign for which she has been searching (an advertise
­ment for a vacant apartment). When 
she
 blinks back  
the grime and attempts to focus, the wind twists the
 sign away from her.
The wind, of course, symbolizes the ubiquitous
 
forces of economic oppression in Harlem that doom
 African Americans to poverty, degradation, and
 despair. Taking their cue from the wind, critics such
 as Bernard 
Bell
 have argued that Petry’s text is “a  
conventional novel of economic determinism in
 which the environment is the dominant force against
 which the characters must struggle to survive” (107).
 At first glance, this reading of The Street is 
largely persuasive. Petry shares the philosophical 
view
 of  
naturalism to the extent that she insists that human
 existence takes root and makes meaning in material
 conditions. Indeed, in an oft-quoted interview, Petry
 stated, “In The Street my aim is to show how simply
6
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 However, The Street also articulates a political  critique  that is absent  
from and inimical to the forms of economic determinism found in turn-of-the
 century naturalistic novels by authors such as Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, and
 Theodore Dreiser. Rather than viewing social conditions as natural and
 inevitable, Petry represents the streets of
 
Harlem as the product of a specific  
history of white supremacism, patriarchy, and class oppression.  If we read
 Petry’s emphasis on the importance of environment as an acknowledgment of
 the centrality of embodied 
experience
 in shaping human life, her attention to  
economic conditions can be seen as a
 
strength  rather  than a crippling limitation  
of The Street,
After the novel’s opening section depicts the role of economics in deter
­
mining fife’s course, the narrative
 
urges  us to search fo  truths that reach beyond  
economics and environment. When
 
Lutie  is swept  along by the wind (the  force  
of her economic environment), her ability to read informative signs posted
 along the street
 
is disrupted. To get where she  wants to go, she must backtrack  
and reread. Similarly, Petry’s text, when reread, can be seen to exceed her stat
­ed intention by proposing complexities surpassing naturalism’s philosophical
 dead-end. The importance of reading beyond the constraints of economic
 determinism is illustrated in the way that critics who focus on determinism
 underread two of
 
The Street's most original characters, Mrs. Hedges and Junto.
Mrs. Hedges is a black woman of mythic stature who first encounters a
 white man named Mr.
 
Junto on a cold hopeless night when they are both dig-  
ging through garbage cans in an alley. By joining forces in creative, pragmatic,
 and criminal activities, this unlikely pair
 
builds an economic empire in Harlem.  
In physical appearance, Junto looks something like Dracula’s dwarfed assistant
 and Mrs. Hedges like Frankenstein’s creature. Despite appearances, however,
 Junto’s love for Mrs. Hedges is the book’s only example of enduring, soulful
 passion. “A wonderful woman, a
 
wonderful woman!” Junto exclaims with pro ­
found admiration
 
every time  anyone mentions Mrs.  Hedges. Despite the  fresh ­
ness, originality, and gothic dimensions of characters such as Mrs. Hedges and
 Junto, Mary Helen
 
Washington argues that Petry simply manipulates “charac ­
ters to serve an ideological 
f
unction” (299-300).1 In a similar vein, Bell stereo ­
types Junto as “the Jewish owner of
 
the major clubs and whorehouses in the  
black community” (109), although the book never characterizes
 
Junto as Jew ­
ish. Indeed, as Marjorie Pryse explains, “the name Junto is ... a direct allusion
 to the first significant men’s club in American colonial history, the name [Ben
­jamin] Franklin gave his secret group of friends” (118). Keith Clark implicitly
 acknowledges this connection by describing Junto as part of “the powerful
 white male hegemony” 
(498),
 but he oversimplifies Petry’s social analysis when  
he refers to “the omnipotent Junto-police axis” (499). Ascribing “omnipotence”
 to Junto and the police not only
 
exaggerates their  power  but diminishes impor ­
tant nuances, complexities, and humor in Petry’s vision.
Reading The Street as a reductive picture of how the economics of one’s
 
environment determine the course of one’s life 
leads
 Washington to discount  
the novel’s importance. Washington expresses disappointment with Petry’s
 “insistence on environmental determinism as an explanation for her characters’
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dead-end lives” (298). 
She
 classifies determinism as a central feature of social  
protest fiction, which, in Washingtons view, is preoccupied with men and
 “inimical
 
to women.” She explains: “Petry’s fiction engages us, in most unplea-  
surable ways, in the violence and brutality that result from poverty and dis
­crimination. But I think our discomfort is also caused by the ‘circumscribed
 possibilities’ of the text
 
itself, its lack of subtlety and  flexibility, its manipulation  
of characters to serve 
an
 ideological function, its refusal to give women a pow ­
erful point of view” (300).
Dissatisfied by
 
the “bleakness of [Petry’s] work,” Washington complains in  
an interview, “I don’t get a lot of pleasure out of a novel that cuts off every pos
­sible avenue of triumph. And I think part of the bleakness comes from the fact
 [that The Street] was written very much from the outside. [Petry] does not
 come from the street” (quoted in Diamant 25). Embedded in Washington’s
 criticism is a statement of her readerly desires: she wants stories that give
 women a powerful viewpoint and allow them to triumph. Nellie McKay shares
 Washington’s desire for black women writers to provide her with inspiring
 models of heroic triumph, yet she finds significant value in The Street. In
 McKay’s view, “although Lutie loses the fight to transcend the limitations of
 her environment, she is an interesting heroine” (130). McKay concludes that
 Petry’s “black women ... do not always win, but they are heroic figures” (139).
 Because I see the readerly desire for heroism as, in part, a product of the very
 genre of autobiography that Petry sets out to critique in The Street, I would 
like to reexamine the novel 
by
 taking seriously the cautionary opening that high ­
lights the wind in Lutie Johnson’s eyes, her difficulty in reading, and the decep
­tive nature of the sign itself. Following Roland Barthes’s insight that rereading
 “alone saves the text from repetition (those who fail to reread are obliged
 
to read  
the 
same
 story everywhere)” (quoted in Felman 41), I will reread The Street  
focusing on two questions: “What
 
do characters in this novel want? What nar ­
rative desires does Petry arouse, reproduce, or frustrate for her readers?” In  
part, I will suggest that if, as Barthes observes, desire is “[a]t the origin of Nar
­rative” (S/Z 88), The Street taps into a desire more powerful than the readerly
 wish for a happy ending (which 
early
 feminism often figured as a triumphant  
woman in the Bildungsroman tradition). In short, The Street unveils a primary,
 painful longing for the mother in a patriarchal environment that deprives peo
­ple, especially black women, of the ability to have and to become mothers suf
­ficiently empowered to nourish their offspring.
As
 Washington noted, Petry was not describing her own experience in The  
Street. Lutie Johnson is a protagonist significantly different from Petry,
 although both author and character are black and female. Petry was raised in a
 comfortable home in a predominantly white New England town. Her parents
 were well-educated professionals. After earning a degree in pharmacy, Petry
 worked as a pharmacist in her family’s drugstore for seven years. In 1938, at
 the age of twenty-nine, she married and 
moved
 to New York to become a  
writer. 
She
 worked as a journalist, wrote short stories, and took creative writ ­
ing courses at Columbia University. The Street, her first novel, was published in
 1946. It won high praise from influential critics such as Arna Bontemps and
 Alain Locke and sold over a million copies.
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In contrast, Lutie Johnson struggles in The Street to 
rise
 from poverty to  
middle-class comfort, while preserving a solitary individual virtue that isolates
 her from most people in Harlem. Lutie’s mother is dead, and her father is an
 alcoholic, bootlegging womanizer. After discovering her husband with anoth
­er woman, Lutie takes her son Bub in hand and ventures into what Petry explic
­itly figures as the master narrative of American 
autobiography.
 “You and Ben  
Franklin,” Lutie grins to herself, walking down the street with her arms 
full
 of  
brown crusty bread rolls just as Franklin walked down a Philadelphia street in
 his autobiography (63). Inspired by Franklins growth from a poor country
 bumpkin to a wealthy founder of America, Lutie decides to follow in his foot
­steps. She declares to herself, “I’m
 
young and strong, there isn’t anything I can’t  
do” (63). Believing that the American Dream is an attainable plot for her, she
 is confident that she will triumph over racism, sexism, and poverty through
 hard work, virtue, and frugality.2 This scene demonstrates that rather than
 writing autobiographically, Petry was consciously developing a multifaceted cri
­tique of dominant myths in American autobiography. As Marjorie Pryse notes,
 “The 
precise
 nature of the social criticism Petry offers in The Street relies on the  
reader’s recognition of Lutie’s references to Franklin and, even more, on our
 ability to place these references
 
within  the context of American idealism” (117).
Attempting to explain why Lutie is unable to succeed, Pryse argues that
 Lutie “fails to recognize the stigma of her race and sex and her consequent dis
­qualifications 
for
 achieving her particular version of the American Dream.”  
Similarly, McKay suggests that “Lutie may well have had greater success in
 achieving her goals had she been less innocent of the politics of race, class, and
 gender” (135). I would contend that daily life makes Lutie inescapably aware
 of the power of racism, sexism, and poverty. Although Petry represents Lutie
 as naively optimistic, the novel suggests that hope for a better future is essen
­tial to Lutie’s survival. Innocence about politics is not the primary barrier to
 Lutie’s goals; rather, innocence about her goals is a primary barrier to the new
 consciousness that might enable Lutie to wrench her life out of predetermined
 plots. In other words, The Street
 
not only exposes the power of race, class, and  
gender oppression; it also, profoundly, questions the value of the patriarchal,
 materialistic, and individualistic “American Dream” that Lutie unswervingly
 pursues.
In What Does a Woman Want? Shoshana Felman asserts that “none of us, as
 
women, has as yet, precisely, an autobiography. . . . Trained to see ourselves as
 objects and to be positioned as the Other, estranged to ourselves, we have a
 story that by definition cannot be self-present to us, a story that,
 
in other words,  
is not a story, but must become a story” (14). Felman argues that in order to
 author a new autobiographical plot — to make our own stories self-present to
 us — we must name and call into being our own desire. Writing within and
 against a society dominated by father figures and ideologically mandated to
 manufacture desire for the Father, Ann Petry suggests that those desires that
 are ideologically unaddressed, unsatiated, or alienated, especially hunger for the
 mother, are the (shifting, dangerous, but potent) sites from which new 
subjec­tivities may be 
created. Lutie’s existential dilemma is this: she is sitting as it were in a dream over
­looking the streets of America. No matter where she looks she can see noth
­
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ing she
 
wants without hesitation or qualification. On the one side looms a vast  
hopelessness that feels, paradoxically, both empty and claustrophobic. 
She thinks that “she couldn’t possibly go on living here with nothing to look for
­ward to. As she sat there, it seemed to her that time stretched away in front of
 her so far that it couldn’t be measured; it couldn’t
 
be encompassed or even visu ­
alized if it meant living in this 
place
 for years and years” (82). Then she asks  
herself, “What else [is] there?” The novel replies: on the other side of despair
 is a hunger so 
large
 and ravenous that it is virtually  unnameable. Petry’s figure  
of hunger incarnate is Jones, the supervisor of the apartment building that
 Lutie enters in the
 
beginning of the novel. Filled with “a hunger so urgent that  
[Lutie] was instantly afraid
 
of him and afraid to show her fear,” Jones represents  
a desire that goes “up and up into darkness. . . . [T]he hot, choking awfulness
 of 
his
 desire for her pinioned her so that she couldn’t move. It was an aching  
yearning that filled the apartment, pushed against the walls, plucked at her
 arms” (15). Jones’s desire horrifies Lutie to the extent that when she leaves the




is hardly surprising  that Lutie would  prefer the wind of oppression to the  
hunger of Jones. Jones is a terrifying character. Born into economic hardship
 and forced to spend his life underground in cellars, furnace-rooms, and dingy
 apartments, Jones has been read as a revision of Richard Wright’s Bigger
 Thomas3 and could be read as a twisted prototype of
 
Ralph Ellison’s invisible  
man. Throughout the novel, Jones kicks, punches, and starves his dog, treats
 
his
 nearly invisible live-in woman  like a dog, and spins dog-like sexual  fantasies  
about Lutie. His obsessions lead him to attempt to rape Lutie. Yet, hideous as
 he is, Jones the Super is propelled by a hunger that, Petry suggests, could repel
 the winds of social determinism. Let
 me 
be clear. Jones is not a Romantic hero  
or antihero. He is 
no
 rebel, no militant, no deliberate subversive. He repro ­
duces patriarchy 
by
 viewing women as consumable objects, and he discusses  
racism only when so doing enables him to avoid taking responsibility for his
 own violence, particularly his attempt to rape Lutie. Unlike Ellison’s invisible
 man, Jones is not interested in political struggle and intellectual analysis.
 Whereas the invisible man learns how “painful and empty” it feels “to 
be
 free of  
illusion” — to have suffered what Ellison 
images
 as castration (Invisible Man  
569) —Jones has 
never
 held the invisible man’s illusions: faith in the rebel, the  
Brotherhood, and the phallus. What Jones hungers for is the mother. Like a
 starving infant, he has 
an 
uncontrollable urge to consume female flesh. Where ­
as a Romantic hero suffers from overweening pride, Jones suffers from unwean-
 able
 
hunger. “Half-mad with a frenzied kind  of hunger that [drives] the women  
away from him” (86), Jones consumes woman after woman. “It didn’t worry
 him that they left him after a few days because he could always find others to
 take their places.” No matter how many women he consumes, his hunger
 remains insatiable. He grows “gaunter and lonelier as the years [creep] past
 him.” Age makes it difficult to find women who will put up
 
with  his “slobberin’  
over” them (87). When
 
he sees Lutie Johnson, he wants her “worse than  he had  
ever wanted anything in his life.”
From Frederick Douglass to Richard Wright, hunger has been a central
 
motif in African-American literature. Petry adds feminist insight to the tradi
­
10





 showing how Jones’s hunger threatens the lives and well-being of other  
members of the community, particularly women. At the same time, Petry
 
rep ­
resents hunger-driven Jones as an artist manqué whose creations are proto
­visions of a world freed from the strictures of color and caste. Petry’s 
vision here is bleak; indeed, it is almost sinister. The force that runs counter to the
 wind of
 
economic determinism is a hunger so deep that it appears mad or, as  
Lutie puts it, "unusual, extraordinary, abnormal” (25). Although Jones’s
 hunger, like the rage of Bigger Thomas and countless other figures in African-
 American literature, 
springs
 from the deprivation of his environment and  
enslaves him in some ways to predatory instincts, it is so immense that it can
­not ultimately be contained by the oppressive forces that cause it. Sexual and
 other primal desires always threaten ideological control 
because
 of their insta ­
bility, irrationality, and potency
 
—  point Petry, perhaps unconsciously, drives  
home through her gothic representations of Jones’s hunger haunting the street.
Within minutes of their first encounter, Lutie feels Jones’s eyes "eating her
 
up” (25). Later she has a nightmare in
 
which Jones appears as




gaunt, silent. The same man, but with  the dog’s wolfish mouth and  
the dog’s teeth — white, sharp, pointed, in the redness of 
his
 mouth. His  
throat worked 
like
 the dog’s throat. He made a whining noise deep inside  
it. He panted and strained to get free and run through the block, but the  
building was chained to his shoulders 
like
 an enormous doll’s house made  
of brick. ... [He had] a painful, slow, horrible crawl of a walk. . . . He
 fawned on people in the street, dragged himself close to them, stood in
 front of
 
them, pointing to the building and to the chains. "Unloose me!  
Unloose me!” he begged.
(191-2)
At first glance, this passage appears to be a classic instance of naturalistic
 
imagery; Jones is dehumanized by his environment. However, Jones exceeds
 images of bestiality to assume a mythic stature similar to that of an enslaved
 Hercules carrying a building in Harlem in place of the world on his back.
 Lutie’s nightmare image of Jones fawning on people and begging them to
 "unloose” him, when read in conjunction with images of Jones fawning on
 women, suggests that Jones’s insatiable sexual hunger unconsciously reveals his
 desire for the community to emancipate itself and free him.
Although Lutie is terrified of being eaten, raped, or killed by Jones, at a
 
more profound level she is afraid of becoming Jones. Her antipathy is partly a
defense to block recognition of their kinship in hunger. In her nightmare, she
 screams and screams while she witnesses thousands and millions of people on
 the street turning into rats. They swarm around her, crying, "‘Unloose me!
 Unloose me!”’ (193). If the image of people as rats derives from naturalism, the
 cry for freedom connects Petry’s text to the slave narrative tradition, a tradition
 that endorses not the narrative trajectory of economic determinism but rather
 the trajectory of collective action leading to social transformation. Rather than
 following the triumphant path of individual growth that characterizes novels
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and autobiographies in the Bildungsroman genre, Lutie moves away from con
­
fidence in her individual particularity toward recognition of herself as part of a
 collective. Near the end of the novel, Lutie reflects on “the animals at the Zoo.
 ... They 
were
 weaving back and forth, growling, roaring, raging at the  bars that  
kept them from the meat, until the entire building was 
filled
 with the sound,  
until the people watching drew back from the cages, feeling 
insecure,
 fright ­
ened at the sight and the sound of such uncontrolled savagery. She was becom
­ing something like that" (325). Although this self-image is not a happy one, it
 is empowering in the sense that Lutie has moved from seeing herself as a
 frightened individual watching the 
animals
 toward seeing herself as a raging  
animal who has the ability to frighten and to loosen the control of the (white)
 people who created and maintain the “zoo” — that is, the dehumanizing con
­ditions of Harlem.
An earlier incident in the novel connects the politics of hunger and food to
 
the problematics of reading. Walking along Lenox Avenue on a spring day,
 “thinking that the sun transformed everything it shone on,” Lutie is halted by
 a crowd gathered around the emaciated corpse of a black
 
man stabbed to death  
by a white man in a bakery. Stricken by the sight of the murdered man s shoes,  
Lutie reflects, “for weeks he must
 
have  walked practically barefoot on the pave ­
ment” (196). The mans shoes signify a terrifying hunger. Soon Lutie observes
 a sister approach the dead
 
body. The sister  passively  accepts her brother’s death  
with the comment, “I always thought it’
d
 happen” (197). To Lutie this girl  
symbolizes the living dead, the person she herself 
could
 become if she were to  
lose hope and silence her rage. Angered by the resignation she reads every
­where around her, Lutie vows never to accept the predetermined fate of racism
 and poverty
. The day after the murder Lutie learns a lesson about (mis)reading. The
 newspaper
said that a “burly Negro” had 
failed
 in his effort to hold up a bakery shop,  
for the proprietor had surprised him by resisting and stabbed him with a
 bread knife. 
She
 held the paper in her hand for a long time, trying to fol ­
low the reasoning by which that thin ragged boy had become in the eyes of  
a reporter a “burly
 
Negro.” And she decided that it all depended on where  
you sat how these things looked. If you looked at them from inside the
 framework of a fat weekly salary, and you thought of colored people as nat
­urally criminal, then you didn’t really see what any Negro looked like. You
 couldn’t, because the Negro
 
was never an individual. He was a  threat, or an  
animal, or a curse, or a blight, or a joke.
(198-9)
Lutie connects the reporter’s (mis)reading of the murder to wealthy white peo
­
ple’s (mis)readings of her. The Chandlers, who had employed her as a maid,
 “looked at her and didn’t see her, but saw instead a wench with no morals who
 would be easy to come 
by
” (199).
This passage places us at the heart of Lutie’s predicament. On the 
one hand, Lutie is determined to rebel against the Chandlers’ reading of her and to
12
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resist the resignation of the living dead. On the other hand, she is terrified of
 
the hunger that fuels rebellion and resistance. While heroines in naturalistic
 novels such as Stephen Cranes Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893) are driven
 by sexual instincts they cannot in any sense control, Lutie is highly conscious
 of the 
(racialized)
 politics of sexuality, and she makes choices about sexuality  
that she judges to be in her best interest. She believes that desire — especially
 sexual desire — would transform her into the "wench with no morals” that the
 Chandlers already believe her to be. Embracing the ruling-class definition of
 virtuous femininity, she represses every inkling of her sexuality. (I would argue
 that
 
the Freudian concept of "repression” implies a different lack of control than  
the naturalistic notion of uncontrollable instinctual drive.) Petry repeatedly
 calls attention to Lutie's chastity. Since Lutie cannot afford a divorce, she can
­not get married, and since she cannot get married, she will permit neither sex
­ual desire nor activity in her life. It is no accident that Lutie kills the man
 (Boots, a black man who stands in for the white Junto, ""The Man”) who mis
­reads her availability and attempts to violate her.




the oppressed, Lutie is trapped in no-man 's land. She devotes her  
energy to a vague notion of ""fighting back” and attaining a better life. 
She defines ""better” as a 
way 
to bring up her son "so that he would be a fine, strong  
man” (72), which she believes depends on earning enough money to live on a
 better street in an apartment with a better kitchen. The problem is that her
 goals are both mutually dependent and mutually exclusive. Lutie's preoccupa
­tion with earning money leads her
 
to neglect and mistreat her son. When Lutie  
tries to think through her predicament, she concludes, "She didn’t know what
 happened 
next,
 but they’ d never catch her in their dirty trap. She’ d fight her  
way out. She and Bub would fight their way out together” (74).
These thoughts are circular. Where is Lutie to go if she cannot 
envision
 a  
place where she wants to be? What
 
would happen if she attained the ""miracle  
of a kitchen” that she fantasizes 
about?
 The kitchen she dreams of has a  white  
porcelain sink. "The faucets looked like silver. The linoleum floor of the
 kitchen was a crisp black-and-white pattern that pointed 
up
 the sparkle of the  
room. Casement windows. Red geraniums in yellow pots” (28). A clean,
 orderly kitchen dominated by white and tidily containing tokens of black, red,
 and yellow — this is the kitchen of a house on the most beautiful street Lutie
 has ever seen. Just such a kitchen, Lutie reflects, ""was what had wrecked her
 and Jim” because "[t]he sink had belonged to someone else — she’
d
 been wash ­
ing someone else’s 
dishes
 when she should have been home with Jim and Bub”  
(30).
The owners of the kitchen are the Chandlers, wealthy members of New
 
England’s ruling class who mistreat Lutie in many ways. The most damning
 evidence of their moral, emotional, and intellectual bankruptcy comes on
 Christmas Day, when one of the Chandler brothers commits suicide. The fam
­ily shows no grief at his demise; they are concerned only to cover up the scan
­dal of a suicide. The Chandlers, then, offer Lutie no 
goal
 worth striving for.  
While Lutie looks at the street in Harlem and thinks, ""No one 
could
 live on a  
street like this and stay decent. It would get them sooner or later, for it sucked
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the humanity out of people -— slowly, surely, inevitably” (229), the novel as a
 
whole suggests that every street in America has the capacity to suck the
 
human ­
ity out of people. Lutie is certainly trapped by her race, gender, and class, and
 a change in environment is crucial to her survival, but changing her environ
­ment would not, by
 
itself, enable her  to escape oppression. In one possible sce ­
nario, if Lutie were able to move from serving the Chandlers in the Chandler
 kitchen to serving her husband and 
son
 in the Johnson kitchen, she would still  
be a woman in service. More seriously, the white kitchen of Lutie’s dreams
 appears accessible only to those people who share the Chandlers’ class values.
 The transformation of Lutie’s life hinges on the articulation of a new desire.
In many
 
of Petry’s images and metaphors, Lutie  views her life as a text, and  
she does her best to control not only what this text says but also how it is read.
 One of Lutie’s persistent
 
problems, however, is that she is not a wise reader. In  
addition to misreading the text of her own life, including her needs and desires,
 she misreads the significant people around her. For example, she sees Jones
 precisely as the newspaper reporter sees the murdered man: as “a threat, or an
 animal, or a curse, or a blight” (199). Lutie reads Jones and his partner
 
Min in  
terms parallel to those she applied to the murdered brother and his apathetic
 sister. Lutie concludes,“the street had pushed [Jones] into basements away
 from light and air until he was being eaten up by some horrible obsession; and
 still other streets had turned Min, the woman who lived with him, into a drab
 drudge — so spineless and so limp she was like a soggy
 
dishrag. None of those  
things would happen to her, Lutie decided, 
because
 she would fight back and  
never stop fighting back” (57). In this passage, Lutie underreads Min more  
seriously than she 
misreads
 Jones. Although she appears to be a spineless  
drudge, Min becomes a working-class hero in Petry’s Bildungsroman subplot.
 Extending her critique of the Bildungsroman narrative trajectory of Franklin-
 esque autobiography, Petry parodies the frank physicality of Franklin’s prose in
 her telling of Min’s story. Min’s desires center on false teeth, protection from
 Jones, and a safer home. Unlike Lutie, Min grows to the point that she 
can name and attain her desires. In a moment of Afrocentric “magical realism”
 completely at 
odds
 with naturalism’s philosophical denial of a spiritual dimen ­
sion, Petry represents Min as drawing power spiritually and psychologically
 from her encounters with a root doctor called the Prophet. By encouraging
 Min to tell her story, listening attentively, and prescribing Hoodoo charms, the
 Prophet functions effectively as “the subject presumed to know” of psycho
­analysis at
 
the same time that he provides concrete  physical “protections.” Hav ­
ing found her voice and a cure she believes in, Min is empowered to attain her
 goals. Thus, in the midst of all the bleakness, the “uncontrolled savagery” of
 Harlem, Petry shows her readers an unexpected 
site
 of hope.
Nonetheless, the reader might feel that Min’s desires are so meager that
 their fulfillment will have little social impact. In the behavior of Jones the
 Super, Petry
 
gives us a glimpse (as through a glass, darkly) of ways that hunger  
might motivate new, more empowering narratives. Jones’s first strategy for
 wooing Lutie is a meditation on color. Lutie asks him to paint her apartment
 white. Wanting to give her something more special than uniform white, Jones
 “put green in the living room, yellow in the kitchen, deep rose color in the bed-
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room, and dark blue in the bathroom. When it was finished, he was
 
very proud  
of it, for it was the best paint
 
job he’ d ever done” (100). Jones risks his position  
as building supervisor
 
by performing this special paint  job, but Lutie is angered  
by his dismissal of her expressed desire for whiteness and his violation of her
 understanding of color. Nonetheless, one could say
 
that Jones has envisioned a  
use of color that defies the tidy, hierarchical ordering of color that has trapped
 Lutie in white people’s kitchens.4
Jones’s second strategy is to cultivate friendship
 
with  her son, Bub. In addi ­
tion to giving Bub attention, advice, and money, Jones helps Bub 
create
 and  
decorate a shoeshine box. When Lutie sees the box, she slaps her 
son
 several  
times “sharply across the face” (66) and speaks in a voice “thick with rage. 'I'm
 working to look after you and you out here in the street shining shoes just like
 the rest of these little niggers’” (67). This incident
 
painfully  illuminates Lutie’s  
discomfort with and detachment from the other residents of Harlem. Rather
 than fostering her son’s sense of community, she violently disrupts Bub’s plea
­sure in 
his
 own industry and creativity, whereas Jones has encouraged in Bub a  
concept of creative labor. Lutie’s anger springs from her understanding that
 racism traps many black boys and men in jobs as shoe-shiners and that Bub’s
 creativity could be used by white society to destroy him. In fact, Lutie’s own
 creative efforts at singing set the 
stage
 for her destruction in the racist-sexist  
context of Harlem. Nonetheless, Jones’s efforts to cultivate Bub’s creativity
 reinforce the book’s motif of Jones as a would-be artist with no constructive
 outlet.
After Jones’s courtship strategies fail and Mrs. Hedges prevents him from
 
raping Lutie, Jones authors a plot worthy of a master storyteller. The narrative
 challenge for Petry is this: how can she have Jones entice Bub to engage in
 criminal activities that threaten society without compromising the young boy’s
 innocence in the reader’s mind? The plot that Jones, as a stand-in for Petry,
 invents is one that writers are particularly sensitive to: messing with the mail.
 Fostering Bub’s love of detective fiction, Jones asks the young boy to help the
 police find a criminal who is committing mail fraud. Bub’s assignment is to
 wander through the neighborhood clandestinely stealing mail out of people’s
 boxes. In this, his final, 
scheme,
 Jones is successful. He has imagined and  
implemented a plot that controls the behavior of the police as well as of Bub
 and Lutie. Bub gets caught and jailed. Trying to rescue her son, Lutie com
­mits murder in a desperate rage and reaches the conclusion that Bub would be
 better off without her. 
She
 abandons him. In this tragic conclusion, Petry  
impresses upon readers the pain of the mother’s absence, an absence that has in
 fact haunted the entire novel.
The character who most consistently displays a raw, uncontrollable longing
 
for the mother is, of course, Jones. If
 
in the final analysis Jones’s potentially  
subversive desires are captured and reharnessed 
by
 the wind (the force of  
oppression), it is perhaps because Jones is unable or unwilling to couple his
 hunger with the truth of self-analysis. Nonetheless, The Street suggests that
 hunger is the force that compels human beings to combat economic determin
­
ism
. Lutie cannot get what she wants, primarily because she is thoroughly  
oppressed by
 
American racism, sexism, and classism, but also because she can ­
15
Editors: Vol. 4, No. 2 (2000): Full issue




not read and claim ownership of her own hunger. She focuses her struggle
 
exclusively on accumulating enough money to escape “the street,” which is pre
­cisely where the combined forces of economic, racial, and sexual oppression
 keep her imprisoned. Alienated from sexuality and disenfranchised as a moth
­er, she is trapped in the compulsive repetition of master narratives and forced
 to read the same story everywhere. If she could learn to name and own her
 deepest hungers — for the erased mother, for self-possession, for the blurring
 of individual boundaries that is expressed variously as sex, motherhood, and/or
 community — Lutie might develop a sense of self and community that would
 mitigate (somewhat) the dominance of economics over her life. She might, for
 example, be able to sing for the love of the music, for the triumph of intermin
­gling her voice with other voices in Harlem’s polyphony, rather than selling her
 voice solely for money and repressing her pleasure in 
it.Near the end of
 
the novel Lutie grows to understand and identify with a  
multicultural
 
group of poor women huddled in a  lawyer’s office. Petry explains,  
“[Lutie] knew now why they sat like that. Because we’re like animals trying to
 pull all the soft, quivering tissue deep inside of us away from the danger that
 lurks in a room like this” (409). Instead of dismissing this animal imagery as
 the standard fare of naturalism, 
we
 can reread Petry’s attentiveness to women’s  
“soft, quivering tissue” as a significant form of writing the maternal body into
 a
 
political analysis of the  “danger  that lurks”  in the ideological compartments of  
America. Lutie’s flesh — her animalistic, vulnerable flesh — is threatened by
 social disease, but that same motherly flesh is the source of hope for the re-cre
­ation of humanity.
The novel closes as Lutie moves her finger over the dusty glass of a train
 
window and wonders, “What possible good has it done to teach people like me
 to write?” The answer lies not in Lutie’s world but in Petry’s world. Writing
 The Street earned Petry 
fame
 and fortune — a Ben Franklin success after all,  
with this supplement: Petry
 
named the problems in Franklinesque myth. Like  
Ralph Ellison, Petry understands the power of patriarchy and white suprema-
 cism. Both Lutie Johnson and the invisible man recognize their capacity to kill
 “The Man.” Both also grow to understand the futility
 
of the Oedipal narrative,  
a compulsively repeated struggle in which the rebellious offspring kills the
 father only to end up taking 
his
 place. Lutie and the invisible man suffer from  
the existential angst of having
 
to make choices when they are alienated from all  
the options that they can read in 
l
ife. Neither Lutie nor the invisible man  
knows what s/he
 
wants, but  both know that the time has come to move beyond  
Oedipus. Although father
 
figures abound in The Street, our narrative gaze must  
ultimately 
seek
 out the mothers (some of whom,  like the Prophet, are male). As  
Pryse observes, the only alternative to oppression suggested by the novel is
 motherhood, “a motherhood not of biology but of human connection” (129).
 Unable to be mothered or to give birth to her own story, Lutie leaves her son
 motherless. In the 
novel
’s desperate conclusion, Ann Petry forces the reader to  
contemplate a world in which large classes of people cannot triumph by the
 rules of Benjamin Franklin’s individualistic self-construction. The master nar
­rative does not work on the streets of everyday life. Inviting new imaginings of
 narrative desire, Petry whets our hunger and our rage.
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A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the American Studies
 
Association annual meeting in Nashville in October 1994. I am grateful to the
 sessions other participants, Ann Allen Shockley, Arlene Clift-Pellow, Laura
 Quinn, and John Sekora, for their astute comments. John Sekora’s sudden
 death on February 2,
 
1997 was a blow to us all and a significant  loss to the field  
of African-American studies. This paper is dedicated to his memory.
1.
 
In an insightful reading, Pryse describes Mrs. Hedges as a virtually  
omniscient, godlike genius who nonetheless is fallible and human.
2.
 
For a different but illuminating reading of Lutie’s pursuit of the Amer ­
ican Dream, see Clark.
3.
 
See Pryse 130n. 3.
4.
 
Perhaps Ellison was inspired by Petry’s meditation on paint colors to  
write the invisible mans famous lessons in white paint.
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 that “Donne’s verse epistles have not  
received much notice from the awesome critical
 industry centered on his work” (138); and today,
 despite 
an
 almost exponential increase in critical  pro ­
duction, the situation has not radically altered.1 In
 particular, the so-called “early” verse letters, a group
 of some fourteen shorter poems addressed to Donne’s
 male contemporaries, continue to be passed over
 almost entirely.2 Moreover, when these texts do
 receive professional scrutiny, they are generally dis
­paraged as aesthetically inferior productions or dis
­missed as thoroughly orthodox in sentiment. In fact,
 these two responses are frequently run together: the
 poems are held to be artistically weak precisely
 because of their designation as transparently conven
­tional.3 Even Arthur Marotti, who has probably
 done more than 
any
 other single commentator of the  
past few years to underline the significance of
 Donne’s verse letters, gives these particular texts sur
­prisingly short shrift; racing through eleven different
 poems in a page and half of cursory discussion,
 Marotti finally allows that they express “affection,”
 but only within “the formulas proper to . . . polite
 social relations” (37).
Recently, however, George Klawitter has chal
­
lenged this apparent critical consensus by insisting
 that, in the case of those poems addressed to Mr. T.
 W. at least, Donne expresses a form of same-sex
 desire that cannot be written off as conventional.
 Instead, Klawitter argues, this short sequence of four
 poems depicts Donne’s intensely passionate homo-
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erotic feelings for one
 
Thomas Woodward, younger brother of Donne’s under ­
graduate friend, Rowland Woodward (making Thomas sixteen or seventeen
 years old at the time of writing, according to Bald’s dates). Thus, for example,
 in their respective readings of "All haile sweet Poet,” where Marotti discovers
 nothing more than a polite “acknowledg[ment of] the reception of some verse
 from 
his
 addressee” (36), Klawitter finds playfully risqué puns praising  Wood ­
ward’s penis (Enigmatic Narrator 6). Klawitter sees other poems in the
 sequence as nothing less than "fervent,” reflecting "an obsession with the loved
 one” (11) and revealing Donne "trying to seduce the younger man” (12). As
 might be expected, Klawitter also suggests an alternative explanation for the
 critical neglect of these texts; for him, the interpretive lacuna does not reflect
 upon the aesthetic quality of the poems (which he clearly 
admires)
 so much as  
it does upon the prejudicially heteronormative ideology of their readers (16; see
 also 4).




to displace, raising an obvious question: who are we to believe?  
Over the course of the next few pages I will attempt to answer this question; in
 the process I hope to demonstrate not only that Donne’s early verse epistles are
 worthy of closer critical attention than they have hitherto received but also that
 these poems, and their interpretive history 
(such
 as it is), can shed some light  
upon several issues central to current debates about the nature of early modern
 sexuality, including the status of the so-called "literature of friendship.”
Indeed, the mere existence of this generic category 
may
 suggest to some  
that, at one level, the traditional argument concerning the formulaic 
or
 conven ­
tional quality of Donne’s verse letters is well founded. The poems indisputably
 belong to a historical milieu in which the category of humanist prose epistle
 known as the familiar
 
letter stood chief among institutional  literary vehicles for  
the expression of what Donne himself called the "second religion [of] friend
­ship” (Selected Prose 125), a public discourse of affection that regularly adopted
 the register of intense emotion.4 Donne wrote many such familiar letters,5 and,
 as Margaret Maurer has demonstrated,
 
the theory and conventions of that prose  
genre almost certainly provided the 
basic
 literary model for his verse letters  
(235-6). But even if Donne had not found the familiar prose letter so "conge
­nial” a form, the existence of the larger tradition of friendship literature, in
 either its classical or early modern incarnations, appears to present a funda
­mental challenge to Klawitter’s reading: for
 
who is to say that the poems to  T.  
W. are not simply versified examples of a conventional epistolary idiom that
 almost everybody seems to have practiced at some time during the period, and
 that they therefore tell us nothing about Donne’s sexual desires?
It must be admitted from the outset that Klawitter does not really address
 
this question adequately. Although he nods in the direction of recent work in
 the history of sexuality, his basic critical methodology only reverses the earlier
 reading strategies that he rejects: he simply declares present 
an
 erotic cathexis  
that Grierson, Bald, Marotti, and others 
declare
 absent. Lacking a coherent  
alternative framework upon which to ground his interpretation, therefore,
 Klawitter has no means to persuade his readers of the "intense personalism”
 (Enigmatic Narrator 2) in these poems beyond 
his
 own conviction that the  
poems are, indeed, intensely personal.6
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s article has several merits. Original, and acutely  
sensitive to the possibility of erotic nuance, it also subjects the textual history
 of the
 
T. W. poems to a previously unprecedented level of scrutiny.7 His essay  
is most noteworthy for its consideration of a verse epistle by Mr. T. W. proba
­bly written
 
in response to Donne, a poem reproduced (without  comment) in the  
apparatus of both Grierson and Milgate’s editions, and (again) almost entirely
 ignored by subsequent critics. T. W.’s witty reply would seem to provide strong
 ‘circumstantial” support for Klawitter’s general position, to the extent that it
 unquestionably eroticizes the notion of poetic exchange between men. For
 example, after commenting in a mock-serious fashion upon Donne’s tendency
 to “skourge [and] . . . torment” lesser versifiers (itself
 
probably a reference to  
Donne’s coruscating attack on plagiarist poets in 
his
 second satire), T. W.  
adopts a submissive pose before his putative rhetorical superior:
Have mercy on me & my sinfull Muse
Wc rub’d & tickled wth thyne could not chuse
But spend some of her pithe . . .




 that the only other reader  to have commented upon  T. W.’s  
reply to Donne is no less an authority than William Empson; in typically bluff
 style, Empson recorded that the poem “would leave a scandalmonger in no
 doubt that the two lads had been up to something together” (Empson, Essays
 187), an observation that on the face of
 
it lends some support to Klawitter’s  
interpretation.8
Framed as they are, then, we have two interpretive perspectives that appear
 
to be irreconcilable: on the one hand, the verse letters are “formulaic” and tell
 us nothing about Donne’s actual emotional disposition, let alone his sexuality;
 and on the other hand, the letters are “intensely
 
personal,” revealing a passion ­
ate homoerotic desire for a historically identifiable younger man. To paraphrase
 the old song, the question is whether Donne’s verse letters are “straight” or
 “from the heart.” A commitment to one position would seem necessarily to
 constitute a rejection of the other; thus, the logic of noncontradiction forces us
 to 
chose
 between them, although neither reading seems entirely satisfactory.
How, then, may
 we
 refuse this unhappy either/or that the present state of  
criticism seems to demand? It may be possible to locate the excluded middle,
 as it 
were,
 by turning again to the texts themselves; and given the focus of my  
discussion so far, I will therefore embark upon a close reading of the poem




Hast thee harsh verse, as fast as thy
 
lame measure
Will give thee leave, to him, my pain and pleasure.
I’have given thee, and yet thou art too weake,
Feete, and a reasoning soule and tongue to speake.
Plead for me, ’and so by thine and my labour,
 
Earn thy Creator, thou my Saviour.
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Tell him, all questions, which men have defended
Both of the place and paines of hell, are ended;
And ’tis decreed our hell is but privation
Of him, at least in this earths habitation:
And ’tis where I am, where in every street
Infections follow, overtake, and 
meete:
Live I or die, by you my love is sent,
And you’are my
 




 perhaps the first thing I notice about this poem is not its  
extreme difference from others of Donne’s poems, but rather the many ele
­ments that it has in common with them, and particularly
 
with other verse let ­
ters. For example, from his
 
very first line Donne makes a reflexive turn  into the  
rhetoric of self-deprecation, addressing himself not to Mr. T. W. but to his own
 poem, which he then 
names
 Tame” and “weake.” In another verse letter,  
addressed to 
one
 “Mr. B. B.” (“If thou unto thy Muse be married”), Donne  
takes up the same posture, dismissing his own “rhymes” as
. . . prophane, imperfect, oh, too bad
To be counted Children of Poetry
Except confirm’d and Bishoped by thee.
(Satires 68)
The same modest pose is again adopted in “All haile sweet poet” (which,
 
according to Klawitter, is the preceding poem in Donne’s sequence addressed to
 T. W.):
Now if this song be too harsh for rime, yet, as
 
The Painters bad god made a good devill,
 ’Twill be good prose, although the verse be evill,
If thou forget the rime as thou dost passe.
{Satires 60)
And the idea is expressed again, rather more succinctly, in “The Storme,” when
 
Donne tells Christopher Brook: “by
 
thy judgement. . . [my  lines are] . . . dig ­
nified” (Satires 55). Indeed, once
 we
 begin to look,  we discover Donne deploy ­
ing the topoi of humility repeatedly throughout this group of verse letters.9 I
 
shall
 return to the possible consequences of this rhetorical posture in my con ­
clusion, but for  now I only wish  to note the sheer repetition of the device. Any ­
one familiar with a few of these works, and perhaps even somebody who had
 only received one, might be forgiven for thinking him or herself in thoroughly
 familiar (that is, thoroughly conventional) territory on approaching “Hast thee
 harsh verse.”
Nevertheless, if the first quatrain 
works
 to produce a sense of familiarity —  
as if to say “this is just Donne doing as Donne does” — then that sensation
 evaporates with the 
second
 line of the second quatrain, when the language of  
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self-deprecation is suddenly reversed. For
 
where we might reasonably expect a  
further gesture towards the dignifying gaze of the reader (a compliment to Mr.
 T. W. and his taste, perhaps) Donne switches gears and offers instead a fairly
 outrageous compliment to himself and his creativity, explicitly identifying him
­self with God, and 
his
 poem with the Son: "I'a m thy Creator,” he says, and  
“thou 
[my
 poem] my Saviour.” This authorial appropriation of agency and  
power is striking enough to rattle even a twentieth-century editor such as Mil
­gate, who points out somewhat indignantly in 
his
 gloss that “[t]he analogy . . .  
breaks down a  soon as it has begun, since God’s Son is not God’s Saviour and
 does not plead for his Father
 
with a third party” (see Donne, Satires 213). But  
Milgate’s literal-minded response, which seems intended to undercut Donne’s
 self-aggrandizing project, only highlights the audacity of the image. Even the
 grammatical structure of the verse underscores Donne’s presumption, for the
 line functions syntactically as an aside or parenthesis, as if to suggest that his
 blasphemy were a casual matter.




to his putative addressee. Developing the religious  
conceit of the second quatrain into 
an
 oblique commentary on scholastic dis ­
putation (“questions . . . men have defended / Both of the paines and place of
 hell”), Donne suggests that such questions are now quite literally academic,
 because, separated from
 
T. W., he already knows what hell is like: “Hell is but  
privation / Of him.” The full, extravagant force of this flattery will be heard
 only if we also recognize Donne’s allusion to a specifically doctrinal conception
 of hell, not as a
 
burning sulfurous pit  but as the absence of God, the total depri ­
vation of His love. The theologically orthodox version of this idea is powerful
­
ly
 expressed by Donne himself in one of his most famous sermons:
[W]hen all is done, the hell of hels, the torment of torments is the ever
­
lasting absence of God. . . . [T]o fall out of the hands of the living God, is
 a horror beyond our expression, beyond our imagination. . . . [W]hat
 Tophet
 
is not Paradise, what Brimstone is not Amber, what  gnashing  is not  
a comfort, what gnawing
 
of the worme is not a tickling, what torment is not  
a marriage bed to this damnation, to be secluded eternally, eternally, eter
­
nall
y from the sight of God?
(Sermons 266-7)
The unmistakable implication of Donne’s argument at this point in his poem,
 
then, is that T. W. is also God; in other words, Donne bestows upon T. W. the
 name of Creator that, moments earlier, he had applied to himself.
Klawitter notes some of these aspects of the poem in his own interpreta
­
tion, but while he sees them as singular and unusual, and so as evidence of
 Donne’s profound emotional involvement
 
with his subject, it is hard for me to  
see them as anything other than what an older criticism once called “typically
 Donnean.” The contracted world of the octet in which Donne plays the King
 of kings momentarily dilates in the sestet to include the object of address, in a
 rhetorical movement of expansion and contraction that is thoroughly recogniz
­able from more famous hetero-amorous lyrics like “The Sunne Rising,” “The
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Anniversarie,” “The Canonization,” and “The Good Morrow.”10 As in those
 
more familiar texts, a rhetoric that purports to be centripetal, spinning an out
­wardly
 
directed message of affection to another, actually begins by turning cen ­
trifugally, becoming an inward-looking hymn to the independent and creative
 Donnean self, before it expands outward again to include the other as part of a
 restructured 
universe
 that nevertheless continues to place Donne at its center.  





revolution, is enabled here by the insistently reflexive motion of  
a poem that actually 
never 
makes  Mr. T. W. a direct  object of address. The  inti ­
macy of the second-person pronoun is reserved throughout by the poet for the
 poem itself.
Moreover, coming as it does only after the position of the Godhead has
 
already been ascribed to Donne and his works, T. W.’s deification seems more
 of a power-sharing scheme than a total abdication of omnipotence — as if
 Donne were suggesting that he and his loved one could run the entire universe
 together. Certainly, by the end of the poem, Donne cannot be said to have
 completely relinquished the position of the Almighty, for he concludes with
 another potentially blasphemous self-aggrandizing image. The application of
 the word “Testament” to 
his
 verse in the final line is glossed by most editors as  
a suggestion that the poem might function as Donne’s legal will in the event of
 his death,
 
but it  is hard not to hear an echo of the Biblical sense of “Testament”  
as well. In fact, in the context of his earlier blasphemies, Donne 
may
 be hint ­
ing that his verse could serve as a kind of “New (lover’s) Testament” for future
 generations, or, indeed, that
 his
 love for Mr. T. W. might  inspire a new religion,  
an earthly love that can adequately imitate or
 
perhaps even substitute for divine  
love.
Once again, these suggestions are by 
any
 conventional standard quite out ­
rageous, but they have also been described as typically Donnean; for example,
 similar arguments were traced long ago in “The Relic” and “A Valediction: Of
 the Book.”11 Nor is Donne done with turning
 
familiar  poetic convention on its  
head, for in these final lines he takes the cliched claim that love poetry confers
 immortality upon its subject — a claim perhaps most familiar to us from
 Shakespeare’s sonnets — and applies it
 
to the poem itself: “Live I or die, by you  
[my poem] my love is sent.” Stunningly, it seems that the only immortality
 conferred by Donne’s poetic tribute will be his own; but once again, even this
 final solipsism could appear almost conventionally Donnean, at least to his
 more hostile critics.
To summarize, then, at least one of Donne’s “conventionally affectionate”
 
letters of friendship can 
actually
 be seen to employ extravagant conceits and  
rhetorical devices of a type associated with many of the “Songs and Sonets” —
 poems traditionally identified as being among the most sincere, intimate, and
 loving in the canon of English literature.12 However, by
 
sketching these affini ­
ties I do not mean simply
 
to argue that the verse letters are therefore also “sin ­
cerely” erotic poems; nor do I intend to suggest a reverse, corollary argument,
 that the “Songs and Sonets” are only “conventionally” affectionate. (Obvious
­ly, the extent to which the latter group of poems can be said to draw upon the
 actual life experience of the author remains contested, and the interpretive
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principles upon which such arguments are based have been strongly challenged
 
by poststructuralist theories of the decentered authorial subject. From this
 point of view, the reality of the “Songs and Sonets” cannot be naively assumed,
 
any
 more than that of the verse letters.) Instead, by demonstrating that  
Donne’s ostensibly “sincere” heteroerotic love poems and the apparently “con
­ventional” letters of friendship both draw upon a remarkably similar image
 repertoire, and share numerous stylistic devices, I am attempting to offer an
 argument that cuts in both directions, as it were, placing a question mark over
 both the presumptive “sincerity” of the first category and the “conventionality”
 of the second.
We can draw out this argument by developing an apparent paradox that
 
arises from the comparison between the Donne of the verse letters and the
 Donne of the amorous poems. For, in declaring “Hast thee harsh verse” to
be “conventionally Donnean,” I am of course appealing to a long-standing critical
 commonplace that already defines “Donnean” as synonymous with 
extrava­gance, literal or
 
figural conceit, and the disruption or reversal of convention. In  
other words, to say that “Hast thee harsh verse” is conventionally Donnean is
 also — or only — to say that it is conventionally unconventional, which ulti
­mately suggests a distinction that cannot be maintained.
The
 
paradox  is only apparent, as I will show;  but a version of it lurks behind  
the difference of opinion
 
with  which I began, between Klawitter and the tradi ­
tional critics he repudiates. For the very question of whether the verse letters
 are “formulaic” or
 
“sincere” proceeds from the mistaken assumption that, in the  
final analysis, a distinction
 
between the formulaic and the sincere can always be  
maintained. In other words, both sides of the interpretive dispute err in pre
­suming the validity of an opposition between “conventional” meanings on the
 one hand and “unconventional” or “sincere” meanings on the other, and this




 the interpretive stance adopted by those critics who would  
dismiss the affective content of Donne’s verse letters to T. W. (and others) as
 “merely conventional” provokes at least two theoretical objections. The first
 objection is to an initial presumption about the process through which literary
 conventions are identified. For example, Marotti’s casual remarks about
 
“prop ­
er  social formulas” suggests that the form of the poem, the language  from which  
it is constructed, 
can
 be separated from the emotional significances — that is,  
the affective content — without too much difficulty. It is as if the convention
­al elements of the verse in question were available as self-declaring critical
 guidelines prior to any act of interpretation. But this cannot be the case,
 because to describe something as conventional is already to have interpreted it.
 This is not to say that Marotti, or anyone else for that matter, may not have
 good reasons for declaring a passage formulaic. It is simply a reminder of the
 fact that formulas and conventions do not float upon the surface of texts like so
 much social precipitate; they are not preestablished
 
facts, but  are themselves the  
result of interpretive reconstruction, and, as Klawitter’s very different reading
 attests, their transparency cannot be assumed.
A second and more telling objection follows from the first, because even if
 
conventional “formulas” were available as a priori interpretive guides, the ques
­
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tion of exactly what they 
were
 formulas for would remain. After all, to say  that  
these poems contain “conventional” or formulaic expressions of affection
 between men does not ultimately leave us any the wiser as to the order, inten
­sity, social function, or Emits of those expressions of affection.13
Similar objections can be put to Klawitter from the other side. Klawitter’s
 
error is to believe that the sincerity of a text must be measured in terms of its
 distance from convention; that is, he seems to think that the less conventional
 something 
appears
 to be, the more “real” it must be. But as a rhetorician of  
Donne’s stature would have known from any number of textbooks, sincerity
 itself is a rhetorical posture that comes armed with its own repertoire of con
­ventions. To this extent, sincerity is always performed. To put the point in the
 now familiar vocabulary of poststructuralism, language is always already con
­ventional, which is simply
 
to say that  we canonly convince one another of our  
sincerity, or indeed, of anything at all,
 
by deploying  a sign system, the  meanings  
of which have been previously (that is, conventionally) established.
In
 
the mistaken belief that he has discerned, or, more accurately, that  he can  
discern the “real”
 
Donne in the poems to T. W., and in an effort to persuade us  
to his vision, Klawitter makes a series of anachronistic commitments. Among
 these we can include his notion that Donne’s verse letters are somehow more
 “private” than his other poems (and hence more persuasive as autobiographical
 records of genuine feeling). There are numerous problems with this position,
 perhaps the most
 
elementary being  that  almost all  of Donne’s poetic  output  can  
quite reasonably
 
be described as “not intended for a general public” (Enigmatic  
Narrator 7). As an argument it hardly distinguishes the verse letters, which
 therefore cannot be held to have any more “credibility as autobiographical
 material” (3) than anything else by Donne that circulated in manuscript. The
 necessary association of private writing
 
with manuscript production is not one  
that Donne would
 
have  understood. Indeed, such a presumption begs the ques ­
tion of whether and how it makes sense even to speak of a “general” public for
 poetry
 
in the late sixteenth century.14
Still more problematically, the argument that Donne deliberately chose a
 more “private” genre to express his homoerotic desires could be said to reify,
 inadvertently, the public/private
 
binary as conterminous with the binary  of het ­
erosexuality
 
and homosexuality. In other words, Klawitter  is here presupposing  
the existence of a Renaissance 
closet,
 as if some stigma  would have necessarily  
attached itself to all such expressions of desire during the period. This pre
­sumption also risks anachronism, for while it
 
would be incorrect to claim that  
the English sixteenth century was characterized by the enlightened toleration
 of alternative sexualities,15 there are good reasons to be hesitant before apply
­ing post-Enlightenment
 
conceptions of sexuality to Renaissance  texts. As Alan  
Bray has repeatedly 
observed,
 Elizabethan society does not seem to have con ­
ceptualized homosexuality as the province of a distinct minority. Expressions
 of revulsion against
 
sodomy were common  enough, but, significantly “it was not  
part of the individual’s nature: it was a part of all human nature and could sur
­face
 
when the mind  was dulled or sleeping” (40). Thus,  while the metaphor of  
the closet forms a central part of present-day conceptions of sexuality, lying
 behind the notion that any
 
expression of homoerotic desire must always violate  
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some social taboo, it may not accurately reflect the way in which Renaissance
 
individuals conceptualized their own erotic practices.16
These ideas have significant implications for our understanding of the early
 
modern context in which Donne’s verse letters circulated, and for our under
­standing of the interpretive difficulties they present today. Most importantly
 for my
 
purposes here, the question of whether these poems embody a “sincere”  
or a “conventional” desire is rendered doubly meaningless, both to the extent
 that it is based upon a theoretically untenable opposition, and because it
 anachronistically presumes the existence of a Renaissance closet. The interpre
­tive paradigm in which the very opposition of “sincere” and “conventional” is
 framed only recognizes homoerotic desire if it is accompanied by the signs of
 transgression. Conversely, it follows that if there is no sign of transgression,
 then there 
can
 be no genuine desire. Because discussions of Donne’s verse let ­
ters have traditionally taken 
place
 within this intellectual framework, those on  
the “merely
 
conventional” side are able to presume that, since the writing, man ­
uscript circulation and eventual publication of Donne’s verse letters prompted
 no homophobic outcry, the desires they express cannot be taken as “sincere”;
 while 
Klawitter,
 on the “sincere” side, discovers “evidence” that the verse letters  
did provoke some measure of homophobic anxiety after all. But if the notion
 of a Renaissance closet is anachronistic, then it becomes possible to imagine
 many
 
activities, signs, gestures, and forms of social exchange normatively imag ­
ined by our own culture as trangressively erotic that may have seemed devoid of
 such transgressive content in an early modern setting.17 Thus, for example,
 what the post-Enlightenment 
era
 always calls pederasty might occasionally  
have taken that name in certain Renaissance contexts; but, in other contexts, it
 might simply have been called part of the education process — or part of the
 legitimate courtly exchange between a gentleman poet and a younger man
 beginning to take his 
place
 in the adult world.
It may be helpful at this juncture to make absolutely
 
clear what I think can  
and cannot be gleaned from these extraordinary documents. It seems to me
 that the one thing that must remain beyond our reach is positive knowledge as
 to whether or not genital contact either occurred or was sought
 
by either of the  
parties in this exchange of letters. 
As
 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has observed 
with reference to Shakespeare’s sonnets, “the sexual context of the period is too
 far irrecoverable for us to
 
be able to disentangle boasts, confessions,  undertones,  
overtones, jokes, the unthinkable, the taken-for-granted, the unmentionable-
 but-often-done-anyway” (35), and so on, with any degree of certainty.18 What
 can be said with certainty, however, is that while most of the manuscript ver
­sions of “Hast thee harsh verse” omit line 6 of the Westmoreland version, and
 while the first
 
printed version of 1633 also omits line 5, and while in the West ­
moreland text itself, as we know from Klawitter, these same lines, along with
 most of line 2 and 
lines
 8-10 are crossed out —  in short, while  “Hast  thee harsh  
verse” seems to have an unusually troubled textual history19 — poems like the
 following were generally reproduced entire:
To Mr. R. W.
If, as mine is, thy
 
life a slumber be,
Seeme, when thou readst these lines, to dreame of me,
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Never did Morpheus nor his brother weare
Shapes soe like those Shapes, whom they would appeare,
As this my letter is like me, for it
Hath my name, words, hand, feet, heart, minde and wit;
It is my deed of gift from mee to thee,
It is my Will, my selfe the Legacie.
So thy retyrings I love, yea envie,
Bred in thee by a
 
wise melancholy,
That I rejoyce, that unto where thou art,
Though I stay here, I can thus send my
 
heart,
As kindly’as any enamored Patient
His picture 
to
 his absent Love hath sent.
(Satires 64-5)
This poem, presumed to be addressed to Thomas Woodward’s elder brother
 
Rowland, is the first sonnet in a verse letter made up of two sonnets and a four-
 line envoi; and, even without taking the time for an exhaustive analysis, it is
 possible to identify numerous similarities between it and “Hast thee harsh
 verse.” The witty equation of the poet’s physical and spiritual essence with the
 material and formal properties of the verse is common to both, for example —
 right down to a repetition of the Sidney-esque pun on
 
poetic  “feet.” The image  
of the text as a legal testament also reappears, and the general argument of both
 poems — that they figuratively, legally, and, in the case of the portrait, visually
 represent
 
their author and  his feelings —  is the same. Even the  grandiose anal ­
ogy between Donne’s creative powers and those of a God can be found in both
 poems, albeit translated from a Christian to a pagan register.
By pointing out these more than superficial resemblances, I would not be
 
misunderstood as saying that Donne felt similar desires for both brothers, as if
 such knowledge of Donne’s emotional experience, 
were
 actually available  
(although I don’t think there is anything inherently unreasonable about such an
 assumption — after all, the theme of siblings as rivals in desire is common
 enough). At the same time, it is obviously not my
 
intention to foreclose issues  
of affective content either. Instead I believe that it is precisely in order to
 address such issues that we must first answer the bibliographic and historical
 questions that emerge most forcefully from the juxtaposition of these two
 ostensibly similar poems: why does the first have a seemingly troubled textual
 history, while the second does not? What is the content of this scribal anxiety,
 if it is indeed anxiety 
we
 are seeing? Just what is the matter with Donne’s “Hast  
thee harsh verse”?
At this point contemporary scholarship on the relation of “friendship” lit
­
erature to questions of sexuality proves extremely helpful. Returning again to
 the work of Alan Bray, for example, one might consider the
 
relevance of his dis ­
cussion of the “uncanny” symmetry between the image of the masculine friend
 and the image of the sodomite. According to Bray,
The distinction between the two kinds of intimacy was apparently sharp
 
and clearly marked: the one was expressed in orderly “civil” relations, the
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other in subversive. . . . But . . . [o]n 
occasion
 one can also come across a  
document that appears ... to be putting the two together and reading a
 sodomitical
 
meaning . .. into just those conventions of friendship that else ­
where seemed protected from that interpretation.
(47)
Bray concludes that the “shadow” of sodomy “was never far from the flower
 
strewn world of Elizabethan friendship and . . . 
could
 never be fully distin ­
guished from it” (57); but he also suggests that the potentiality
 
for some scenes  
or expressions of friendship to be read sodomitically depended on the absence
 or presence of additional social signs and conventions that “a contemporary
 would have seen far more readily than
 
we do” (50). For example, “true” friend ­
ships, as distinguished from sodomitical relationships, 
were
 generally thought  
possible only between men of the same social status 
because
 any suggestion that  
the affective bond in question was based on the desire for economic or social
 advantage rather than personal loyalty could mark a relationship as potentially
 sodomitical.20 At the same time, according to Bray, the category of sodomy
 itself was 
never
 exclusively  linked to the incidence of sexual acts but also carried  
with it 
associations
 of political and theological transgression; thus, the “taint”  
of sodomy might cling to a friendship if one or more
 
parties were also to be sus ­
pected of condoning or practicing Catholicism, for example. In addition, as Jeff
 Masten has recently pointed out in work building upon Bray’s initial founda
­tions, “what 
we
 normatively now call homosexuality is in English Renaissance  
culture dispersed into a number of discourses” besides that of sodomy, “
each
 of  
which differently negotiates power relations” (36). Thus, for example
 
“pederasty  
emphasized an age difference . . . [where] . . . sodomy . . . often suggested sexu
­al relations between men of differing social class.”
Rereading the verse letters with these ideas in mind, even ostensibly (or
 
“conventionally”?) similar poems like “Hast thee harsh verse” and “If, as mine
 is” start to look quite different. According to Bray’s elaboration of the semi
­otics of
 
Renaissance friendship, the first poem seems far more likely than the  
second to blur the line separating the literature of friendship from a represen ­
tation of sodomitical desire. After all, “Hast thee harsh verse” is not only
 apparently addressed to a much younger man
 
but  is also by far the more naked ­
ly blasphemous of the two poems. Indeed, as my earlier close reading of that
 poem implies, it stands among the more theologically daring works of Donne’s
 oeuvre. Further evidence of this interpretation may be seen in that fact that, as
 I have already noted, line 6 is the most regularly “omitted” part of the poem —
 that is, the line that specifically introduces the notion of Donne as a Godlike
 creator (“Fam thy Creator, thou my Saviour”). It is therefore possible to accept
 Klawitter’s suggestion that “Hast thee harsh verse’” may have been thought
 “compromising,” even in a Renaissance context, but only in a
 
far more qualified  
sense than he intends — 
because
 this “compromising” content is almost cer ­
tainly not reducible to the text’s apparent articulation of
 
desire. Instead, that  
articulation registers as shocking only
 
insofar as it occurs in conjunction  with a  
display of 
irreverence
 and/or a transgression of boundaries such as age and  
class.
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Thus, while previous commentators have inevitably located a correct or
 
proper response to Donne’s early verse letters in a correct or proper conception
 of Donne’s sexuality, I would 
argue
 that, on the contrary, there is no sexual  
“truth” to be told by these poems, at
 
least insofar as they belong  to an interpre ­
tive economy prior
 
to the disciplinary  subjection of sexuality. Instead,  I suggest 
that they bespeak the special affect of friendship — a socio-affective bond that
 relates to the literary and educative discourses of Renaissance humanism, and
 to modern regimes of sexuality, in ways that our history and our literary criti
­cism are only now
 
beginning to explicate. For this reason, of course, the range  
of
 
social and interpretive effects of that affect — and any further conclusions  
that we might wish to draw about the structure of
 
Donne’s own thinking on 
these matters — remain highly contestable. However, before suggesting some
 ways in which further investigations of these complex discursive relationships
 might proceed, I would like to note what is perhaps the most radical implica
­tion of Donne’s idealized conception of friendship, as it pertains to the humil
­ity topos
 




 of Donne’s humble (im)posture is to make the perspec ­
tive of his addressee central to the aesthetic success of the poems. Indeed, we
 might say that Donne’s self-deprecations are part of a rhetorical strategy that
 constructs or positions the ideal reader precisely as a “friend” — someone who
 will always “impute excellence,” or provide the confirmatory blessing that
 
makes
 the poems worthy  of the name.21 In an interesting anticipation of read ­
er-response theory, the production/recognition of a “good” poem — in this
 case, a verse letter — is explicitly figured as a collaborative activity between
 author and reader; Donne repeatedly claims that he cannot produce good
 poems without good friends to read them. In other
 
words, for Donne, friend ­
ship is an affect that cements the bonds within an interpretive community
 wherein his “imperfect” and “prophane” verse will be “bishoped.” One conse
­quence of this conception is that, for Donne, between friends, there really is no
 such thing as bad
 
poetry; and, it appears, no such thing as blasphemy either. It  
is surely just a short step to imagine that for Donne, between friends, there
 could be no imputation of sodomy — no matter what form that friendship
 took.
In conclusion, then, the fascinating effects of 
affect 
produced by these verse  
letters confirm Donne’s place among the list of canonical
 
figures whose work as  
a whole
 
—  and not only in  the much cited example of “Sappho to Philaenis” —  
might be productively reread in the fight of recent developments within the
 study of sexuality, and in the critical field of queer theory.22 Perhaps more
 importantly, however, the interpretive questions raised by these neglected
 poems have implications for our understanding not only of other 
works
 by  
Donne but also of the Renaissance amatory lyric in general; not the least of
 which might be to undermine the artificial borders between
 
poetic  genres, such  
as those separating the amatory and the epistolary, or the elegiac and the satir
­ic.23 Finally, however, I should reiterate that it has not been my
 
purpose here  
to “out” Donne — an anachronistic project, as I have indicated — but to raise
 questions about the processes whereby critical discussion of “the greatest love
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poet of them all”24 has been constituted in relentlessly heteronormative terms
 
that are in all probability no less anachronistic. If Donne’s early verse letters
 teach us anything, they teach a 
lesson
 concerning both the necessity and the  




Given the "awesomeness” of the Donne industry any neglect is, of  
course, relative. For some discussions of the verse letters prior to that of Aers
 and Kress, see Cameron, Hunt, Leishman, Lewalski, Maurer, Stapleton,
 Storhoff, and Thomson. Hunt
'
s analysis is the least substantive in its treatment  
of what at one point are called Donne’s “generally feeble and listlessly written
 commendatory epistles to Noble Ladies” (182). Thomson’s and Leishman’s
 analyses focus on issues of compliment, patronage and sincerity, with Thomson
 emerging as the more hostile critic (“the desire to please brought out the worst
 in Donne”[280-1]); Stapleton’s source study reads certain letters in the light of
 Plato and Paracelsus; Lewalski argues that the verse letters addressed to female
 patrons can be productively read as poetic blueprints for the Anniversaries;
 Maurer grounds a sensitive exposition of
 
the letters as a whole in humanistic  
epistolary theory; and both Storhoff and Cameron attempt to 
describe
 the  
social context and rhetorical techniques of the deliberative or morally didactic
 poems addressed to men. None of these authors discusses the so-called “early”
 verse letters — that is, the nondidactic poems addressed to men
 
— in any detail.  
Since Aers and Kress
 
wrote, three book-length studies of Donne have appeared  
that devote a substantial number of pages to the verse letters, by Arthur Marot-
 ti, George Parfitt and George Klawitter, respectively. Three articles have also
 been published: DeStefano’s, which largely recapitulates Lewalski’s earlier
 argument; Summer’s and Pebworth’s, an interesting attempt to read some of
 Donne’s “classically” didactic verse back into its immediate social context; and
 Klawitter’s, a slightly different version of the first chapter of his book. Again,
 none of these 
books
 or articles discuss  the so-called  “early” verse letters in any  
detail, with the exception of Klawitter, whose work I engage in this essay.
2.
 
The “early” chronological designation of Donne’s nondidactic verse let ­
ters addressed to men derives from Bald (“Verse Letters”). Following Bald,
 Storhoff, Maurer, Cameron, and DeStefano place the composition of the verse
 letters in a progressive narrative: the nondidactic poems addressed to male
 friends come 
first;
 the didactic or moralized poems to those same friends are  
seen as belonging to a
 
“middle” phase; and the poems to female patrons — cer ­
tainly the most discussed, if not the most admired of these texts — belong to a
 “later” period. However, although much of Bald’s original article remains plau
­sible, the “early” assignment of a significant number of poems is based entirely
 upon 
his
 conviction that their “crudity [and] conventionality” (283) indicate the  
inexperience of the author
 
— that is, upon  what Bald later admits are “grounds  
of style” alone (287). The larger chronology should therefore be regarded
 
with  
suspicion, at least to the extent that it reinscribes a conservative narrative
 wherein the frivolous productions of youth give 
way
 to a more explicitly mor-
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alized sensibility. Such a narrative also risks heterosexism by associating the
 
notion of Donne’s artistic development with an equally notional "progression”
 from male to female addressees. Therefore, except in those cases where exter
­nal evidence is available, it may be preferable to leave the dating of the various
 verse epistles an open question.
3.
 
Grierson initiates the dismissive tradition with his monumental edition  
of
 
Donne’s poetic works from 1912. Commenting upon the poem addressed  
“To Mr. T. W.” that begins “All haile sweet Poet,” he quickly moves to inform
 the reader that the epithet “sweet” “must not be taken too seriously [because]
 Donne and his friends 
were
 . . . complimenting one another in the polite fash ­
ion of the day” (165). The same conventional note is struck some years later 
by Bald, who describes the poems as consisting “of little more than elaborate
 exchanges of compliment” (John 
Donne
 74). This interpretation leads natural ­
ly to a negative assessment of the verse letters’ aesthetic merit: the poems “are
 certainly the least mature of Donne’s,” at once “unconvincing” and a “conces
­sion to the sonneteering vogue” (75-6). The few subsequent critics to consider
 the poems generally follow Grierson and Bald unquestioningly, often using the
 very same language. For example, Storhoff writes, “The early epistles are . . .
 slight achievements when we consider the extent of Donne’s mature talents;
 dealing mainly with the writing of poetry, 
[they]
 . . . lack the profundity and  
artistic sophistication exhibited by his other works” (11). DeStefano repro
­duces the same position without acknowledging either Storhoff or Bald when
 she declares that the early verse letters are “conventionally complimentary on
 the subjects of friendship and poetry; they represent experiments . . . which
 foreshadow . . . the middle and late [epistles]” (79); and later: “what marks
 these epistles as lesser achievements is their conventionality, whimsy, and lack
 of logical rigor” (81).
4.
 
The popularity of the familiar letter resulted at least in part from the  
widespread influence of
 
Petrarch’s imitations of Cicero’s letters in this mode.  
For a summary of the ancient ideals of friendship and their influence and re
­inscription within the discourses of Renaissance humanism, see Weller.
5.
 
In one particularly telling example, addressed to Sir Henry Goodyear,  
Donne 
relates
 the positive benefits of masculine friendship upon the “under ­
standing” to heterosexual coupling and then goes on to apologize for not hav
­ing written at greater length, in a display of almost comic copiousness, for
 almost a page and half, before wryly concluding that “my whole letter is noth
­ing but a confession that I should and would write” (Selected Prose 125-6).
6.
 
As a result, Klawitter is forced  to urge his case in prose that is sometimes  
hyperbolic (“in no other group of verses by Donne 
can
 we follow so meteoric a  
path from hot to cool, light to dark, headiness to sobriety” [15]) and sometimes
 hollowly coercive (“there is 
an
 anxiety in the first poem to T. W. that we best  
accept as genuine” [7]). Ironically, in order to strengthen 
his
 case, Klawitter  
even closes down the possibility of homoerotic intent in 
any
 other  verse letters  
by
 




For example, Klawitter observes that in the Westmoreland manuscript  
certain lines have been “crossed out” in three of the four poems to T. W. This
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particular manuscript collection is often said to be in Rowland Woodwards
 
hand, a presumption that leads Klawitter to speculate that Rowland himself
 censored any tribute that seemed “too tawdry ... to pass along as any heritage
 of his brother” (Enigmatic Narrator 12). Klawitter records the relevant lines in
 his critical apparatus, along
 
with his opinion that the lines affected “are among  
the most compromising in the letters” (214). If 
we
 accept this “blue pencil”  
explanation, it would seem to confirm Klawitter’s claim that the poems 
were extremely personal documents, “not intended for a general public” (7); and this
 in turn would seem to support 
his
 more general assertion that Donne’s verse  
letters to Mr. T. W. have “more credibility as autobiographical material than
 [his] lyric verse” (3) because of their private nature. However, we do not have
 to endorse the notion that Woodward himself edited the Westmoreland man
­uscript 
(clearly
 the lines could have been crossed out by someone else at a later  
date); nor is it necessary to conclude that these acts of “excision” can be entire
­ly explained as the result of “compromising” content (after all, the question of
 what might be called “compromising” during this period is precisely the issue).
 But by giving these textual variants such
 
prominence, Klawitter  raises questions  




Even Empson’s comment, in all its plainspoken brevity, may display a  
desire to downplay
 
the significance of the exchange (Donne was not a  youthful  
“lad” at this time, after all, even if “Mr. T. W.” was). Klawitter deserves credit
 for bringing
 
this document forward  for critical scrutiny, although  his analysis of  
the poem is not without problems — entirely eliding its potential 
significance as a representation of
 
female same-sex relations, for example (T. W. also refers  
to the action of poetic muses rubbing together as “mistique tribadree”). This
 “
lesbian
” aspect of the text is considered (somewhat astonishingly, to the exclu ­
sion of any reference to male homoeroticism) in the only other (very brief) dis
­cussion of this poem of which I am aware, by Elizabeth D. Harvey (135).
9.
 
Other examples include “ To Mr. R. W.” (“Kindly ’I envy thy Songs ...”),  
“To Mr. S. B.” (“O thou which to search . . .”), and “To Mr. E. G.” (“Even as
 lame things . . .”).
10.
 
In using the phrase “typically Donnean,” I do not mean to presume  
Donne’s transhistorical self-similarity. Instead, I am examining the rhetorical
 processes whereby that subjectivity-effect is produced. The sense that these
 poems give us unmediated access to “Donne” is another consequence of the
 sheer repetition of the humble posture in these poems; the gesture itself
 becomes a sign of Donne’s self-consistency — his very “Donne-ness.” The
 transparently conventional device actually reinforces the notion that this is





For example, this interpretation of “The Relic” has been powerfully  
articulated by William Empson. Indeed, Empson
 
is responsible  for some of the  
most consistently brilliant arguments regarding Donne’s heretical metaphysics
 of earthly love; his invaluable contributions have recently been anthologized
 (see Empson, Essays). According to Empson, Donne’s blasphemies are more
 than isolated and hyperbolic “
sweet
 nothings”; they are in fact evidence of a  
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or spiritual love. Of course, it should be noted that Empson
'
s opinions, partic ­
ularly with regard to “The Relic,” have been dismissed as cranky by such
 authorities as Helen Gardner and John Carey. For a good summary of the
 debate, see Haffendon’s introduction, to Empson, Essays, especially 13-14.
12.
 
The predominant strain of traditional criticism has argued for some  
basic connection between life and art in Donne’s heteroerotic verse, often uti ­
lizing biography to date the composition of individual poems. See Haskin for




In other words, the most effective response to a traditional criticism  
that says, “Don’t worry about this language — it’s quite conventional” might
 not be to say in return,
 
“No, in this case it’s sincere,” but rather to insist  that the  
assertion of conventionality does not short-circuit further inquiry: “Yes, this
 language of affection does appear to be conventional. Now what does that
 mean?” Forrest Tyler Stevens makes a version of this simple
 
but profound point  
in a discussion of a case in many ways parallel to that of Donne’s verse letters
 to T. W., that of Erasmus’ letters to a younger scholar, Servatius Rogerus.
 These letters also contain numerous emotional and perhaps erotically charged
 passages. Stevens exercises admirable scholarly caution in his reading,
 acknowledging that the “true” nature of the relationship between Erasmus and
 Rogerus cannot 
be
 known (not, at least, if we insist on reducing the “truth” of  
any relationship to the question of whether or not genital contact took place);  
but, at the same time, Stevens calls the bluff of those interpreters who would
 dismiss the homoeroticism of the Servatius letters as “'simply’ conventional.”
 Importantly, Stevens does not dispute the formulaic quality of Erasmus’ letters
 (the conventionality of their potential homoeroticism is for him in some ways
 precisely the point) but he does reject any recourse to that conventionality or
 “literariness” that would result in the desexualization of these texts, “as if the lit
­erary 
were
 the agent which would police the propriety of sexual content and  
connotation” (125). Alan Stewart 
takes
 Stevens’ argument as one starting point  
for his own detailed study of the
 
relationships between sodomitical and human ­
ist discourse during the period.
14.
 
To complicate the public/private distinction further, it should be noted  
that as a genre drawing upon both ancient classical and recent humanist liter
­ary traditions, the verse letter
 
might even have  been  properly considered a more  





Although, after praising Alan Bray for underscoring the oppressive  
function of sodomitical discourse, Klawitter himself concludes with this very
 claim: “Not only was the period remarkably literary, it was also tolerant. . . .
 [W]e have every 




The same point also holds for another of Klawitter’s suggestions: that  
the T. W. poems in the Westmoreland manuscript were censored 
because
 of  
their “compromising” nature. Again, his assumption seems to be that a con
­temporary scribe or publisher could only
 
have been prompted to an act of cen ­
sorship by the presence of homoeroticism, and homoeroticism alone. But the
 problem embodied by a poem such as “Hast thee harsh verse” is not so much
33
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whether it is "compromising” or not, in the sense of whether it is “sincerely” or
 
“conventionally” homoerotic; rather the problem is that we as twentieth-centu
­ry
 
readers cannot know whether  what  we consider “compromising” would have  
been so considered by a sixteenth-century 
audience.17.
 
A version of this argument has been made by Jonathan Goldberg:
If. . . sodomy named sexual acts only in particularly stigmatizing contexts,
 
there is no reason not to believe that such acts went on all the time, unrec
­ognized as sodomy, called, among other things, friendship or patronage,
 and facilitated by the beds shared, for instance, by servants or students, by
 teachers and pupils, by kings and their minions or 
queens
 and their ladies.  
... Hence the unlikelihood that
 
those sexual acts called sodomy, when per ­
formed, would be recognized as sodomy, especially if, in other social con
­texts, they 
could




Sedgwick 's essay on the sonnets is full of extraordinary  insight; howev ­
er, it should be noted that her more well-known and influential argument
 regarding the dependence of patriarchal power structures upon homosocial
 bonds which are themselves forged in and through the exchange of women
 “between men” has been criticized as inadequate to the culture of Renaissance
 humanism. As Hutson has observed, many homosocial/erotic exchanges (and
 the difficulties of distinguishing the points along this continuum is exactly the
 point) between men during the period “tend to be, reflexively, about literature";
 that is, they tend to articulate themselves “as arising from the intimacy of shared reading and writing” (3). Indeed, the verse letters of Donne and T. W.
 are obviously at one level examples of the phenomena Hutson describes. Alan
 Stewart, building in part upon Hutsons work, has argued further that in fact
 “humanist rhetoric presents itself as implacably opposed to . . . [the] system of
 social perpetuation” that Sedgwick delineates (xxn. 11).
19.
 
By speaking of the poem in this way, I may be thought to be presum ­
ing the existence of a single “original” version of “Hast thee harsh verse” from
 which all other versions may be thought to 
deviate
 with varying degrees of  
accuracy. However, I 
do
 not intend to give any one version of the text such  
originary status; to the contrary, I am interested in the implications of the sim
­ple fact that so many
 
versions exist, especially insofar as these various versions  
may tell us something about the effects this poem may have had
 
— or may have  
been anticipated as having — upon seventeenth-century readers.
20.
 
The emphasis on equality  between friends can be traced back to Aris ­
totle’s insistence that the true friend is an “other self.” The classist notion that
 only “gentlemen” can be true friends has its roots in the de Amicitia of 
Cicero: “I am not now speaking of the friendships of ordinary
 
folk, or of ordinary peo ­
ple.” The disdain for vulgar friendship is perhaps clearer in the Latin, which





Margaret Maurer has also skillfully demonstrated  that  the humble  pose  
constitutes an “
early
 version of [Donne’s] emphasis on reciprocal friendship”  
(247), an emphasis she sees recurring, in different forms, throughout most of
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the verse letters to men, including the later “didactic” poems. Indeed, Maurer
 
only just stops short of describing the affective possibility that emerges from
 Donne’s use of the vocabulary of masculine friendship as an erotic cathexis. It
 remains throughout her essay as a possibility she is more willing to countenance
 than most other critics, as for instance when she writes that Donne’s letter to
 Wotton, “Sir, More than kisses,” “verges on complaint” (249).
22.
 
See Blank for the most  recent of many  attempts to draw out the social,  
sexual, and canonical implications of this putatively “
lesbian
” text. It may help  
to place my opening remarks a out the critical neglect of the 
early
 verse letters  
into some perspective to note that more articles have been published on “Sap
­pho to Philaenis” in the last fifteen years than on the entire body of the verse
 letters (a somewhat ironic statistic if we recall that “Sappho to Philaenis” was
 
actua
lly grouped with the verse letters in the 1635 edition of Donne’s poems,  
and only
 
placed among the “Songs and Sonnets” in this century, by Grierson).
23.
 
Moving beyond the circumscribed realm of the literary, Donne’s verse  
letters would appear to confirm Alan Stewart’s thesis that the topoi of friend
­
ship
 “are not only reflections of,  but also originary contributions to, novel social  
relations that are forged through and maintained by textual skills” (xxviii-xxix).
 The story I have attempted to tell here about “Hast thee harsh verse” indicates
 just how novel
 
— and therefore subject to misrecognition, both in the past and  
the present — these “social relations” were, as well as suggesting the necessity
 for further investigation into the interpretive possibilities created by the inter-
 section/blurring of humanist and sodomitical discourse during the period.
24.
 
This quotation comes from the jacket of A. J. Smith’s Penguin edition  
of Donne’s poems.
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A Burma Lady said to me at Darjeeling
 
you are just betwixt and between, one
 minute you have a fine time with the
 lowest cast next minute with the highest
 Hindoo, one minute you wear a
 
blue suit  
next minute a dress of 2 cent a yard crape
 then a little velvet dress with diamond
 ear rings how can we tell, one minute
 you stay in a hotel at $5.00 a day then go
 to a restaurant and have a 5 cent meal,
 youre betwixt and between.
One of the most unusual and most neglected Ameri
­
can travel narratives of the 1930s, Juanita Harrisons
 My Great, Wide, Beautiful World dramatizes the radi
­cal revamping of identity that both travel and travel
 writing engender. Harrison, a
 
working-class African  
American from Mississippi, wrote her text as a diary
 of her eight years of work and travel in over thirty
 European, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. A
 utopian record of her picaresque adventures and phi
­losophy of travel, the text reveals how Harrisons
 mobility made an asset of the markers of race that
 
were
 such a  liability in her southern birthplace. Har ­
rison used her racially ambiguous appearance to
 "pass,” not as a white American but as anything but
 — a partial list of such personae includes Japanese,
 French, Arabian, Cuban, Moorish, Indian, Jewish,
 Greek, and Californian. “Betwixt and between,” she
 also configured herself as a member of various 
socioe­conomic classes, which often determined how she
 was read ethnically. She asserted in her text, "I am
38
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willing to be what ever I can get the best treatments at being” (75). At the end
 
of her travels, in order to enter the American literary marketplace, Harrison was
 “willing to be” recodified in highly
 
racial terms, even as her actual text contests  
this codification.




working-class American women. Those female working-class travel texts  
that are widely known fall under the rubric of slave narratives or captivity nar
­ratives; formal coding of women's movement as “travel” is reserved for upper-
 or middle-class, not to mention white, activity. With the exception of The
 Autobiography of Box-Car
 
Bertha (itself challenged as the invention of its male  
amanuensis), first-person texts about working women traveling for pleasure or
 experience remain largely invisible. In contrast, texts chronicling the wander
­ings of white working-class men do hold a niche in 
an
 “institution of Ameri ­
can literature” that, to quote Marilyn Wesley’s paraphrase of Judith Fetterley,
 historically “has privileged stories of boys’ pursuit of freedom, reluctantly
 admitted novels whose business it is to negotiate the marriage of girls,’ and
 
largel
y omitted almost everything else” (Wesley xvii). Although it may not be 
the norm for men to enjoy adventure travel on a shoestring or roam the world
 financed
 
by odd jobs, such enjoyment stands as far from uncommon. Harry A.  
Franck avowed in 
his
 preface to A Vagabond Journey Around the World (1910)  
that “a man can girdle the 
globe
 without money, weapons, or baggage” (xv).  
Harrison’s text demonstrates that in the 
early
 twentieth century a woman could,  
too.
Harrison’s description of her very first destination confronts our class
 
assumptions about travel and women travel writers. 
She
 states, “the first look  
at London I liked it. It was a beautiful morning the maids in their neat blue
 dresses and white caps
 
was cleaning  the brass  whiting the door steps and scrub-  
ing the sidewalks” (4). This aestheticized portrait of servants contributing to
 the appealing quaintness of a foreign scene seems very familiar. As James Clif
­ford remarks, textually 
servants
 are often used to represent the “people” of a  
nation as well as cultural order and continuity (4). Yet in the next sentence,
 Harrison challenges the pleasure
 
we may h ve found in the scene she’s just cre ­
ated by continuing, “I promised myself when I Looked For a job not to get in
 a house with such work but instead a appartment.” As opposed to the unin
­vested observer, Harrison puts herself in the 
place
 of these women, reminding  
us that their
 
labor is not just aesthetic but actual, a function of historical choic ­
es available to, although not desired by, an outsider such as herself. Through
 such maneuvers, Harrison unmoors the traveler’s gaze.
Harrison further confronts readers’ expectations by joining Zora Neale
 
Hurston and other twentieth-century writers in a lesser known African-Amer
­ican literary tradition. Nellie Y. McKay describes this tradition as specific to
 black women, not men: a 
refusal
 to claim victimhood and thus write a black  
protest 
text;
 a desire to focus on individual development and possibility rather  
than racial identity and the state of “My People, My People,” to borrow
 Hurston’s exasperated term, thereby “free[ing] black autobiography from the
 ideological supremacy of race” (101).1 Harrison’s text thereby constitutes
an important addition to what is as yet a 
relatively
 small pool of discussed texts  
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(McKay focuses on Hurston, Marian Anderson, and Lorene Carey). It also
 
challenges the valorization of bourgeois aspiration so prominent in northern
 black middle-class society in the 1920s and 1930s (see Cripps 48).




writing, and the relationship between travel and race: she shows  
travel along with travel writing itself as dismantling race. Contributing to the
 rich literature of racial passing, she represents herself not as deceiving others as
 to her “true” identity, but as possessing multiple identities that vary according
 to her
 
literal and economic locations. Just as national boundaries appear to dis ­
solve before her, so do racial ones. With its portrayal of the race- and class-
 transformative power of travel, her text makes explicit what lies implicit in so
 many travel narratives: Harrison portrays international travel as engendering
 an economic fluidity that produces a fluidity of racial, ethnic, and/or national
 identifications, demonstrating how closely geographic, economic, and racial
 configurations are tied. In doing so, she undercuts prevailing perceptions of
 African-American women as static, bound by race in immobility.2 Henry
 Louis Gates, Jr. points out that although “race, as a meaningful criterion
 
with ­
in the biological sciences, has long been recognized to be a fiction,” it never
­theless is invoked daily (5). Questioning the belief that race is “natural,
 absolute, essential” (Gates 6), Harrison shows that through travel race can dis
­integrate in life as well as in 
theory.
For the most part composed in an on-the-scene present tense, My Great, Wide,
 
Beautiful World consists of approximately two hundred and twenty journal
 entries or letter excerpts highlighting new locations, jobs, and experiences as
 Harrison slowly circles the globe. She challenges the ideal of feminine vulner
­ability by using this same ideal to ease her travels: “I
 
being  a poor lonely woman  
of course that lonely look helps me a great deal but there 
never
 were one less  
lonely than I am” (282). Most of her entries describe the first three
 
years of her  
trip, 1927 to 1930, during which she traveled in Great Britain, western and
 eastern Europe, the Middle East, and India
 
while sequentially  holding numer ­
ous jobs. The text includes no entries dated between 1930 and 1934, the peri
­od in which Harrison worked in southern France (“the most gelories of all 
my life” [26]) to augment her funds while waiting for an opportune time to visit
 China. This period may also have been when she wrote or edited much of her
 
text
. The last sixth of the diary covers her final and most rapid year of travel in  
Germany, Scandinavia, Russia, China, Japan, the Philippines, and Hawaii.
Born in Columbus, Mississippi, in 1887, a period cited as the legal and
 
economic “Nadir” for African Americans (Alexander xv), Harrison quit school
 as a child to begin full-time domestic labor. At thirty, during the peak of the
 “Great Migration” of southern blacks, she left Mississippi and embarked on a
 peripatetic series of service jobs in Alabama, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York City, Florida, the Colorado Rockies, Los
 Angeles, Texas, Kansas, Canada, and Cuba.3 As time permitted, she also
 enrolled in YWCA or night-school classes that trained her in languages and as
 “an accomplished lady’s maid” (Morris ix). George and Myra Dickinson,
 employers in Los Angeles, invested her slowly accumulated savings to yield an
40
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the means to  leave  North America and begin traveling the world while sup ­
plementing her funds with intermittent employment as a maid, cook, compan
­ion, or nurse for households of various nationalities.
Shortly after leaving the United States, Harrison worked for an American
 
family in Paris who encouraged her to record her travels with a book in mind.
 The daughter of the family, Mildred Morris, eventually served as Harrison’s
 editor in selecting and arranging her writings. Harrison’s dedication of the
 book implies that her text was at least partially compiled from letters she had
 written to her Los Angeles sponsor: “To Mrs. Myra K. Dickinson: Your great
 kindness to me have made my
 
traveling much happier if You hadnt been inter ­
ested in me I never would have tryed to explain my trips also your True and
 Kindness encourage me and made me more anxious to tell you the way
 
I spent  
my time” (np).
Along with the official record of the Morrises as instigators of the text (as
 
recorded by Mildred Morris in her preface), this dedication, with the image of
 a benevolent Dickinson extending her interest and encouragement to an other
­wise reticent and even uncommunicative traveler, suggests that Harrison’s pub
­lication and even her writing itself 
were
 due primarily to the efforts of white  
patrons. In the actual text, though, Harrison tells a different story, one that
 highlights her own agency. 
She
 writes of the Morrises that “one of the Daugh ­
ters is a writer and the mother said my travellers should be put into a Book. I
 told her
 
I would come back [to Paris] after my trip to India and work for noth ­
ing if Miss
 
Mildred, the Daughter would help me” (16). She also describes  her ­
self looking 
up
 the Morrises on her return (243). It is impossible to know  how  
seriously the older Morris intended her words, but one can certainly 
envision her making the idle, admiring comment so often extended to travelers — “you
 should write a book!” — and her surprise that it should lead to Harrison
 camped on her doorstep bartering cooking and cleaning for her daughter’s edi
­torial skills. It’s not easy to refuse someone offering “free” manual labor and,
 typically, Harrison profits by exchanging her domestic desirability, along with
 her sexual desirability the sole commodity she wields, in exchange not 
for money but for other prizes. (And it’s interesting to note where literary pro
­duction fell in Harrison’s hierarchy: not
 
worth usurping a trip to India for.)
Harrison’s resistance to conventions of formal writing, coupled with her
 loosely organized, impressionistic style, may make her appear an unlikely
 writer. How did such a person ever come to write a book, must less publish it?
 Sidonie Smith addresses this question in arguing that as a
 genre,
 autobiography  
invites into print “culturally marginalized peoples . . . who are assigned inau
­thentic voices by the dominant culture” (62). Its flexibility and proliferation of
 forms, as well as the allure of telling one’s own story, make autobiography
 accessible and appealing. Yet more specifically, Harrison’s text also suggests
 that travel itself demands writing and that writing is 
an
 organic component of  
travel. For 
one,
 the simple logistics of travel immerse Harrison in a world of  
writing. She depends upon Fodor’s, YWCA directories, and tour guides to
 negotiate her way. She frequents public libraries and buys books, newspapers,
 and magazines that
 
focus on  the culture and  history of the places she visits. She 
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successfully sues by mail for compensation from a railroad accident. Being a
 
working traveler necessitates further participation in writing networks as she
 reads and places advertisements for jobs in English language 
newspapers
 and on  
employment agency bulletin boards; she also collects written references, not for
 utility but as souvenirs (“the memories of the
 
writer are sweet” [244]). Perhaps  
most important, her travels lead to extensive correspondence with patrons, past
 employers, and new friends, and she regularly collects parcels of letters.
This in turn suggests that travel and writing are more profoundly linked
 
than by practicality alone. As in the case of western American overland
 accounts, which constitute one of the largest body of writings by ordinary peo
­ple, the belief that one is engaged in “outlandish” experience, whether histori
­cal or personal, compels non-writers to write (see Fender). Once on the road,
 even those who previously wrote very little correspond with friends, family, and
 new travel acquaintances; they may also attend assiduously to journals. Harri
­sons dedication to Dickinson suggests how closely the pleasure of travel
 depends upon writing about it: “Your great
 
kindness to me have made my trav ­
eling
 
much  happier if You hadnt been  interested  in me  I never would  have tryed  
to explain my trips.” Writing, too, 
links
 home and travel. Referring to Indian  
workers moving to a nearby town, Harrison marvels, “they dont read or write
 so its
 
just like a person was dying no way of getting in touch with them” (65).  
As the narrative progresses, writing increasingly becomes a means for her to
 make connections between 
various
 places and her experiences there, as well as  
to relive past events. Writing may have served not only to reinvent identity but
 also to retain continuity.
Distracted by poor spelling and the like, the reader may initially miss the
 
compelling richness of Harrisons prose. Harrison manipulates language to
 make it perform in unlikely ways, and her 
fused
 sentences typically build  
towards climactic moments that
 
determine  their  end. To select just a few exam ­
ples:
I never go with a Lady because you must 
pay
 her carfare they like to stop  
and have a cup of tea another stop in the Publice House for a glass of beer
 and another at the W.C. and the time have pass and your little change.
(6)
I visited the Famous Painter Wiertz’s Musee the most and best of his pic
­
tures are such horrod thoughts.
(264)
the Moon is bright and the 
houses
 on the many mountains seem to be  
touching the sky the snow covered mountains are like pearl just below my
 cottage are a floor of white Clouds, the darkness of the tall
 
fir trees and tea  
plants on the mountain sides beside the 
snow
 white clouds far  below are to  
wonderful, up and down are the thousand of light as this is a City above
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We are now on the Sea or I do not know just how to say it as Holland are
 
the Sea itself. While the men 
were
 conquring the Sea they also made the  
parts that they conqued beautiful so nelected the style of their women.
(271-2)
a red room with cream curtains are pretty but when I awoke this morning
 
looked like I was in a great blaze no more red rooms.
(236)




 had a stuffed gosslin I dont know  if it is spelled right, but it is the  
geese’s babies Our Pleasant
 
but not very  hansom Captain name is Gosslin” (3).  
Her speculation here over whether her language is “right” constitutes a rare
 moment in the 
text.
 Considering her plethora of spelling errors, this single  
instance indicates just how
 
confident a writer she usually is, especially since she  
moves on to make a play on words. Indeed, in describing her response to the
 Taj Mahal, Harrison asserts that in the more significant matter of representa
­tion as opposed to protocol, her language use is superb. 
She
 opens by making  
the conventional gesture of so many travelers confronted with a celebrated
 spectacle: words fail
 
her. Signaling what a  good tourist she is in feeling appro ­
priately moved by the monument, she asserts, “it thrilled me through as the
 beauty cannot be painted” (133) and again, “it cannot be described eyes must
 see it” (134). Yet she continues, “
As
 we left [my companion] asked me how it  
impressed me. the night was getting dark the dew was falling heavy and I said,
 ‘I would just like to put a glass over it I feel I must
 
cover it over.’ He said ‘That’s  
beautiful’” (133). Recording praise of her words, Harrison suggests that even
 though the object itself remains beyond language, her accurate representation
 of emotional response offers indirect access.
As in this instance, Harrison is much more 
likely
 to discuss speech than  
writing. Unlike so many autobiographers, she does not dramatize her own
 
pro ­
duction of her text, which seems to proceed invisibly as a natural outgrowth of
 travel. She doesn’t participate in the text’s framing, either; her editor alone
 
pro ­
vides the supporting materials that include the preface, an occasional footnote,
 and 
an
 explanation for the gap in entries. Yet tellingly, in her very first entry  
Harrison suggests just how closely writing is bound to the project of travel:
A
 
beautiful June Morning. I arrived at 9 A.M. with my two suit cases the  
larger one with 2 blue dresses 
2
 white dresses and one black aprons caps and  
references. The smaller one with 
my
 dress up cloths, and 2 jars of sour  
cucumber pikles which is so good to keep from being sea sick. Our cabins
 looked good. I always want a upper berth I dont want anybody making it
 down on me. I went to the 1st and 2nd Class. Their towels looked more
 linnen so I took two, the soap smelt sweeter so I took 2 cakes. I went up
 to the writing room and the paper was the kind you love to touch so I took
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Just as she secures the upper berth and steals the linen and soap reserved for
 
the  
class above her, so does she steal the writing material with which she enjoys a
 sensuous relationship. This entry inaugurates the theme that runs throughout
 the text, that of getting away with something: tricking men, customs officials,
 and train workers; getting free food, 
cheap
 rooms, illicit entry to public enter ­
tainment, and so on. By writing, so too or so especially does Harrison get away
 with something, appropriating the materials of higher classes unmeant for her.
 And the use to which she puts the stolen paper amplifies her 
mischief.
 In her  
text, instead of writing on paper "properly” with rules of capitalization, punctu
­ation, and grammar intact, she blithely proceeds without regard to convention
 not only in form but in content, inventing a shifting self that fits none of her
 readers’ expectations and deters them from "making it down” on her. Travel
 leads not only to self-transformation but also to writing, which perhaps even
 more so than travel is itself, as African-American literary traditions attest, a
 means of transformation.4
Wherever Harrison sojourns she insists on a private room, declaring, “my
 
room is my personal self” (122). She refuses to let servants enter even to 
clean it, turns down appealing jobs if they entail shared quarters, and makes it a pol
­icy not to have “Lady Friends” because, unlike men, they would expect to be
 entertained in her room. Harrison's loving descriptions of many of her rooms
 are often more developed than those of the sights she visits, and she depicts
 herself spending blissful days alone in them, sometimes in bed. Such an
 embrace partially stems from the very public nature of
 
travel, which makes a  
room a more than usual retreat. Yet although Harrison never explicitly dis
­cusses the process of writing and certainly not its requirements, perhaps too it
 is this “room of her own” that enables her writing and so accounts for her zeal
­ous defense. A note of caution, though: Harrison challenges the critic who
 would
 
make too solemn an analysis of her relationship to writing through asser­
tions such as “when I think of the good things I 
can
 get to eat for what the  
stamp cost I just stick these letters in my case” (293).
Presumably due to Harrisons persistence and Morris’s publishing savvy,
 
Ellery Sedgwick agreed to include two excerpts of Harrison’s text in The
 Atlantic Monthly. Coming full circle, these appeared in the fall of 1935, about
 six months before Harrison completed the journey that itself was said to have
 been inspired by a magazine travel article.5 In 1936 Macmillan compiled Har
­rison’s accounts in full into My Great, Wide, Beautiful World, heralded by the
 announcement, “The clamorous demand for "More!’ which followed publica
­tion in Atlantic Monthly last Autumn of condensed portions, is now met with
 the complete diary” (see Publishers Weekly [25 April 1936]: 1670). The full text
 seemed also to have enjoyed demand for “More!” and went through nine edi
­tions in ten months. Introduced by Adele Logan Alexander, it was recently
 reprinted as part of a series edited 
by
 Gates and  Jennifer Burton on African-  
American women writers, 1910-1940.6
Even prior to the text’s incarnation in Gates’s and Burton’s series, My Great,
 
Wide, Beautiful World was packaged as a text written by an African-American
 woman in
 
that  editors,  publishers, and reviewers all  emphasized Harrison’s race.  
Perhaps most significantly, the decision to leave Harrison’s idiosyncratic
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spelling and grammar untouched reflects a desire to signal the extent of the
 
writer’s difference from a white, middle-class readership, along with the fram
­ing of her text
 
through an editori l voice that attests to its  veracity. In the pref ­
ace to both the Atlantic Monthly selections and the
 
book,  Morris reinforced this  
sense of difference by opening with a familiar scenario of black southern pover
­ty: "Juanita Harrison is an American colored woman. . . . Born in Mississippi,
 she had a few months of schooling
 
before she was ten. Then began an endless  
round of cooking, washing and ironing” (Morris ix). Following suit, advertise
­ments declared the text "the hilarious but penetrating diary of an American
 
negress
” and without exception, reviews named Harrison in their first para ­
graph as colored or negro.
The reminiscences of Sedgwick, arguably the pivotal 
figure
 in securing  
Harrison national distribution and fondly named by Harrison as her "unseen
 sweetheart” (quoted in "Juanita” 4), are dismayingly offensive. In 
his
 descrip ­
tion of Harrison, Sedgwick quite literally as well as metaphorically redomesti
­cates the threatening figure of an African-American woman unfixed by race,
 class, or geography. Dubbing Harrison the "Black Pearl among Servants,” he
 explains that his thoughts turn to her whenever he has troubles with his maid
 or cook. For Sedgwick, Harrisons achievements as a traveler or writer are
 wholly eclipsed 
by
 her achievements as a servant. He remembers her as instill ­
ing in white readers not envy for her bohemian freedom but jealousy of her
 domestic labor —
 
which when he met her lay untapped in a Waikiki paradise.  
Sedgwick paints a portrait of Harrison impossible to reconcile with the Harri
­son of the 
text:
As I approached her tent, there was a mighty commotion within. ""Sakes
 
alive!” I heard in a syrupy gurgle. ""I ain’t got a mortal thing on me.” But
 things were found, the tent flap parted, and out 
came
 Juanita, her teeth  
shining under a carmine bandana, her big eyes bright as 
blobs
 of Missis ­
sippi molasses. "Gord’s sake,” she cried, "did ever nigger see the 
like
 of  
this!” and she bent double under the weight of her laughter.
(215)
Clearly, Sedgwick cannot look beyond Harrison’s body, which he finds so
 
remarkable and insistent. Figured by 
sugar
 and topped by the stereotypical  
bandana, the body of 
Sedgwick
’s jolly Harrison dominates his account as he  
dwells on her unseen nudity, shiny teeth, bright head and eyes, and a voice and
 laughter so viscous as literally to weigh
 
her down. With  his invocation of ""Mis ­
sissippi 
molasses
” (distinct from the molasses of other states?), Sedgwick  
returns Harrison’s body, that of a world traveler who claimed California for
 
her  
past and Hawaii for her future and countless places in between, back to the
 South of her birth where, as the body of a black woman, he perceived it as
 belonging. In both her text and life Harrison dramatized her freedom and
 mobility, but in his official memoir of his professional life Sedgwick pins her
 fast, naming her a self-proclaimed "nigger.” Like Morris, Sedgwick here sup
­ports Robert Stepto’s contention that in African-American literature, ""artist
 and authenticator (editor, publisher, guarantor,
 
patron) [compete] for control of  
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a fiction — usually
 
the idea of history or of the artist’s personal history — that  
exists outside the artist’s text and functions primarily as 
an
 antagonistic force  
with regard to this text’s imaginative properties” (quoted in Raynaud, ‘“Rub
­bing”’ 56).
Yet despite the widespread representation and reception of Harrison as a
 
black woman, the text itself reveals that racially Harrison was difficult to name,
 repeatedly portraying the confusion that
 
the question of her identity generated.  
Morris’s preface first introduces Harrison as racially ambiguous. Although
 from the onset she calls Harrison simply a “colored
 
woman” and does not com ­
ment on the origins of her Spanish name, Morris provides a 
careful
 physical  
description that implies 
mixed
 blood: “fresh olive complexion, long hair braid ­
ed about her head” (xi). In context, Morris’s 
choice
 of verb is telling in her  
description of Harrison’s Mississippi childhood as “the sordid life that colored
 her 
early
 years,” suggesting that region and poverty themselves contribute to  
rendering a woman “colored.”
More important, Harrison herself disappoints the expectations set up by
 
others’ emphases on her race by forgoing defining herself as an African Amer
­ican — of 
any
 shade — and making her text a record of African-American  
experience. In this respect, My Great, Wide, Beautiful World is very different
 from the travel narratives of Harrison’s contemporaries, roughly speaking, such
 as James Weldon
 
Johnson’s fictional The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man,  
Zora Neale Hurston’s Dust Tracks on a Road, Eslanda Goode Robeson’s African
 Journey, or Fay McKeene Hershaw’s and Flaurience Sengstacke Collins’ Around
 the World with Hershaw and Collins, Harrison never articulates an African-
 American identity and, although she uses these terms to 
describe
 others, does  
not refer to herself as colored, negro, African, or black, much less as (according
 to Sedgwick) nigger. She does not 
claim
 a “people” or express interest in the  
past, present, or future of African Americans; she never discusses southern or
 American racism or suggests that she went abroad to escape it. Harrison’s text
 contains remarkably few references to life predating her travels, and her single
 allusion to past discrimination lies in her comment about Nice that “I always
 get a comfortable and Home like place to stay
 
for here you never think of your 
color” (21). Speaking more generally, leaving America, it
 
appears, enabled  Har ­
rison to cease to “think of [her] color” and to shuck the monochromatic racial
 identity of a young, unprivileged, uneducated African-American woman in Jim
 Crow Mississippi. Writing and publishing the text, itself a form of travel,
 allows her to continue the journey.
Most readers will perceive Harrison’s achievement of a cosmopolitanism
 
that few approach as a triumph over both race and gender prejudice. This for
­mer child laborer, very likely the descendent of slaves, claims the world and
 names it beautiful. Margo Culley remarks that Euro-American women auto
­biographers generally announce gender in their titles (Memories of a Catholic
 Girlhood, Wyoming Wife), In contrast, African-American women usually signal
 race, race and gender both (A Colored Woman in a Black World), or, more rarely,
 gender alone (Culley 7-8). There are only a few exceptions in which the title
 indicates neither; Hurston’s peripatetic Dust Tracks on a
 
Road is one and Harri ­
son’s, of course, another. The phrase “My
 
Great, Wide, Beautiful World” elides  
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these markers of identity in favor of proclaiming
 
the world Harrisons own. Yet  
whereas by doing so the book’s title dramatizes racial and gendered triumph,
 the actual text does not provide an overt narrative of it. Harrison describes
 events, but does not theorize them in regard to her own history or subjectivity.
What Harrison wants most to reflect upon is neither race nor herself but
 
travel. As the title suggests, My Great, Wide, Beautiful World is both a paean to
 the joys of travel
 
and a guide to traveling well. Taken as a whole, the text stands  
as an argument about
 
what constitutes a good traveler as opposed to a superfi ­
cial tourist. Harrison proposes that it is her own practice that renders “her”
 world so appealing. Even for those raised in a society where their labor is pos
­sessed by
 
others, traveling right leads to possession of their own. In contrast to  
the “race movies” of the black bourgeoisie that encouraged the formation of
 rural southerners into “Black Babbitts” (Cripps 
55),
 Harrison asserts that for  
those of 
any
 race, accruing material wealth, power, and professional status is an  
empty ambition. As she sums up at the end of the text, “Well you have bring
 out your moth ball smelling cloths and 
no
 doubt feel very pleased with the  
world
 
to be in a caged up Building looking out on others more caged  up. I have  
gone through the same and how greatful I am to myself” (318). In asserting
 the superiority of
 
her own choices and in offering readers a model of action,  
Harrison diverges from what is regarded as the norm for
 
“minority autobiogra ­
phy,” which David Van Leer states “asserts not one’s achievements but only
 one’s presence,” in contrast to the “narrative of individual
 
triumph” that charac ­
terizes traditional autobiography (166); Van Leer concludes, “as representatives
 of a victimized group, minority autobiographers do not stand as models or
 exemplars but only as counterexamples.” In refusing the stance of
 
“minority  
autobiographer,” Harrison refuses the identity of victim to claim that of victor.
The parallels between Harrison’s title and closing words and those of Dust
 
Tracks on a Road, published only five years apart, are striking. Asserting she’s
 “touched the four corners of the horizon,” Hurston concludes, “I do not wish
 to . . . [live] in a space whose boundaries are race and nation. Lord, give my
 poor stammering tongue at least one taste of the whole round world” (330-1).
 As participants in McKay’s black female tradition of non-victimage, these two
 African-American writers of rural
 
southern roots both choose to chronicle  their  
lives through literal and metaphorical travel. They also make similar strategic
 moves despite occupying such different authorial positions — Hurston as a
 highly educated professional writer and scholar, Harrison as a working domes
­tic and traveler. With her resistance to racial essentialism, the more 
prolific, public, and widely studied Hurston sheds 
l
ight on Harrison. At the same time,  
Harrison provides 
an
 essential context for Hurston, herself ften read as anom ­
alous and reputed “one of the most enigmatic and elusive figures in black
 American literary history” (Braxton 146).
In thinking about Harrison, it’s useful to turn to Sidonie Smith’s 
discussion 
of the ways in
 
which Hurston “sought to divert. . . the pressures of the confes ­
sional autobiographical mode” while “in the midst of a white culture that kept
 her
 
identities as black/woman at  the fore” (105,  125). Smith builds upon Clau ­
dine Raynaud’s discovery
 
and analysis of Hurston’s dealings with her white edi ­
tors, her sites of
 
resistance and concession in writing the autobiography they
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positions Hurston claims for  herself in Dust Tracks (a  partial  list includes “a  
destitute teenager, a confident member of
 
the literati, a wanderer, an artist, a  
collector of tales, a teller of 
tales,
 a child, a philosopher, a young girl, a woman,  
an American, a Negro, an individual, and an inhabitant of the globe”), Smith
 explains that Hurston “fills her narrative with allusions to ‘lies’ and dying’ as
 well as ‘specifying.’ Through this linkage of storytelling and lying, Hurston
 destabilizes the very grounds upon which readers can do the work of interpre
­tation she assigns them. She will not
 
let them fix  the autobiographical subject,  
‘Zora Neale Hurston,’ as a unified subject of autobiography” (124, 105). We
 don’t as yet have 
records
 of Harrison's dealing with her white editors and pub ­
lishers, but as I continue with her text, consider how Harrison, too, 
may
 have  
been
 
playing  the trickster  in order to satisfy both others and herself. The canny  
practices she depicts herself engaging in throughout the text, especially in
 regard to her series of travel “disguises,” suggests she was similarly canny in
 constructing her textual identity.
In analyzing her
 
“narrative of individual triumph” Harrison’s model of trav ­
el warrants discussion. In her book Harrison spells out the various tenets to
 which one 
needs
 to adhere in order to become a real traveler. Her philosophy  
is founded upon the conviction that the traveler must attempt to incorporate
 local attentiveness within global ambition, observing individual places closely
 even while ranging as widely as possible: “I spend a day in a town as though I
 was going to spend my life there this is for my own consciance” (75). In a less
 lofty 
vein,
 she suggests that successful travel entails getting for free even that  
which one could otherwise afford, in her case often from amorous males
 
whose  
expectations of sexual exchange the “manproof” Harrison disappoints. 
She makes clear that traveling well very much means eating well, too,
 
rarely neglect ­
ing to describe the foods that highlight new locales. It also means traveling
 light, both literally and metaphorically: she prefers to eschew suitcases and to
 carry her few possessions in her pockets, gloating that she is less encumbered
 than even a man; she makes it a principle to dislodge travel companions no
 matter how agreeable, since “when you find the Places alone you enjoy it bet
­ter” (6). Perhaps most significantly, she models traveling light as being unbur
­dened by loneliness, homesickness, nostalgia, or even a past.
In a sense, though, Harrison’s childhood and young adult past of incessant
 
labor is made present in the text by the intensity of the delight
 
with which she  
embraces leisure and her ability to 
choose
 when, where, and how much she  
wants to work — in contrast to the reality that in the US in the 1920s and
 1930s, for all but a privileged few “work was part of the definition of what it
 meant to be a black woman” (Hine 139). For Harrison abroad, work becomes
 a matter not just of making a living or accumulating travel funds but of learn
­ing about other cultures through close living. 
She
 shows even the job search as  
a way to explore new terrain, on arrival sallying forth “to enjoy some interviews”
 (27-8). Work also offers stability and simple relief from leisure, and Harrison
 demonstrates that staving off satiation through alternating travel with work
 augments the enjoyment of both. She portrays herself as 
an
 awesomely com ­
petent worker (“I can
 
teach a Spanish  maid more in a  minute than she can  teach  
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me in a week” [175]), implored by employer after employer to stay on, and
 
clearly takes pride in her skill and desirability. 
She
 doesn’t, however, show labor  
as having value in and of itself, and appears little interested in describing her
 day-to-day tasks. There’s nothing of the Protestant work ethic in her text: “I
 always get a job when I go out to get one but never feel 
any
 to glad no matter  
how
 
good it is. Its when I am ready  to give it up that I have the grand feeling”  
(253).
Most important, Harrison contends that to 
travel
 well one must concen ­
trate not on a country’s sights but on its people, through
 
working, playing, eat ­
ing, drinking, dancing, traveling, and flirting with them. Harrison attempts to
 pass as a native while on the road;
 
while stationary, she grows close to the fam ­
ily employing her. Unlike many travelers, she is committed to 
languages
 and  
studies Spanish, French, Italian, German, and Russian. At the same time, she
 declares that
 
lack  of a common language may facilitate true communication: “I  
like best to make signs. It would be better if people didnt ta k so much” (124).
Again, travel, not race, is Harrison’s primary interest. Yet although she does
 not tackle race explicitly in the ways that much African-American literature
 and discussions of African-American literary traditions have conditioned us to
 expect, her text emphasizes that her racial identity, or lack thereof, was a con
­stant factor in her travels. Throughout the text Harrison shows both how her
 dark but not obviously African looks made her racially and ethnically unread
­able, and how she used these looks to her advantage just as she used her status
 as a lone female. In the text’s preface, Morris notes that Harrison’s looks
 masked her age: “Her slight form, fresh olive complexion, long hair braided
 about her head, made her appear younger than her years” (xi). What Morris
 does not remark upon but what Harrison’s text clearly reveals is how racially
 
decept
ive these signs were as well. The hair and skin marked Harrison as not  
white but did not mark her as black, a gap others’ imaginations worked to fill.
 “Betwixt and between,” Harrison confounded people across the world as they
 griped, “how can we tell,” and scrambled to 
piece
 together clues.
Harrison replicates this confusion in her text itself, refusing to define her
 ethnic identity to the reader and instead emphasizing how she puzzled others.
 
She
 takes great pleasure in recording mistaken guesses, which pepper the book  
throughout. In Italy she notes that she was thought Chinese, Japanese, or
 Spanish; in Turkey, French; and in Spain, Argentinean or
 
Moorish. An Egypt ­
ian thought
 
her English, although approvingly “not the cold English type” (96).  
In Syria, she writes, “At Aleppo they thought I was Chinese. Here they think
 I am Aribian I have no trouble getting into every little nuck and corner” (65);
 in Hungary “they think I am Italian and am makeing believe when I say I am
 American I
 
just leave it to them” (53).
Harrison belies this last assertion, that she “just leave[s] it to them,”
 through demonstrating that she chose to be perceived as whatever best suited
 her ends. In Israel: “I have a very Oriental looking scarf I ware most of the
 time on my head everyone think I am Arabian but are puzzled to see me with
 such a short french dress and the first thing they ask my
 
Friend If I am Arabi ­
an then when I 
ware
 my little French cap they take me for Jewish. I am will ­
ing to be what ever I can get the best treatments at being” (75). The inverse of
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this last statement held true as well, in that Harrison was not willing
 
to be what  
would not
 
procure her good treatment. In Nice, for example, she declares "I no  
longer own up to be American but are a Cuban” (24), since “the French have
 not time for [the Americans and English] only to make them pay well for
 everything and I agree with the French.” In various European countries, she
 claimed not the South as her
 
home but Hollywood, which attracted the kind of  
attention unlikely to be 
offered
 Mississippi.
Harrisons ambiguous economic and racial appearance facilitated her trav
­els, in that her amenability towards both possessing and deploying a slippery
 persona allowed her to fulfill her desire to penetrate various cultures, “getting
 into every little nuck and corner,” without forfeiting
 
the privileges of the Amer ­
ican or European
 
traveler. Harrison actively manipulated her  appearance by her  
dress, as when she learned where not to wear a hat: “If I go out without a hat
 the Italians do not take any notice of me and always talk right along with me.
 But if I have on a hat they
 
call me a Chinese or Japanese. You can get along so  
good if you are not dressed
 
up” (38). In India, she explained, “I started through  
the quarters with my hat on but found I was out of 
place
 so went back and got  
my Vail then everything went lovely” (94). 
She
 took even greater efforts in  
Boulogne, where she boasted, “I looked so much like one of the Fishman
 
wives  
that even the coustom offices refused to look through my baggage, most of the
 women have long hair and dress it in two brads as I do all I laked
 
was ear rings  
I had 2 pairs in my case Mme. gave me. Well I put on my
 
correll ear rings and  
was a perfect Boulognesser” (14). Harrison’s disguises were good enough to
 work
 
too well, as when she looked so “auful casty” on an Indian train — “about  
as low cast as a European can look” (110) — that an upper-caste woman
 
want ­
ed  her ejected.
Traveling stamped Harrison as middle-class even as it exposed her as an
 outsider. Wearing a hat made her look like a rich Asian tourist, eschewing a
 veil
 
like a well-off western one; traveling sans braids and earring suggested that  
her
 
luggage concealed expensive goods in need of customs’ attention. Ironical ­
ly, although Harrison wasn’t “really” middle-class, she had to dress in costumes
 designed to deceive in order not to appear so. In native clothing, along
 
with a  
native identity, she regained the
 
working-class identity she already possessed in  
the United 
States. Resisting the category of “lady,” Harrison escaped the conscription of a
 lady’s travel experience. Her foreignness attracted the attention she enjoyed,
 yet her unprepossessing appearance precluded her from being targeted as a
 source of largess, as in Djibouti: “in just a few seconds after suluting a few
 women I has swams around me first they thought I came from Greece after a
 while they decide I was Chinese as many as 
could
 get to me I had to shake  
hand it was very pleasant, then a woman 
came
 up to beg and another let her  
know she were not to beg me” (161). Just as in England her identity as a ser
­vant prevented her from being regarded as a boorish American (“of course they
 always talk to me as a maid and not as an American” [26]), so in Asia
 
her socia­
bility and lack of affluence prevented her from being “begged.” As a traveler,
 for Harrison working-class status opened rather than closed doors. Of course,
 on occasion
 
being a lady  can be useful  too, and in India she successfully  applied
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for a job as “a nurse companion . . . open for a European lady only” (114-15).
 
As she explained, “I dont mind being a high cast but I want to be a low cast
 too” (110).
The preceding demonstrates that Harrisons physical appearance alone did
 
not account for the extent of the stir she caused; her class status was just as per-
 plexingly elusive as her ethnicity, perhaps even more so. As the surprise of an
 Israeli acquaintance indicates (“This young man have met wealthy American
 women travelling alone but I am the poorest girl that ever travelled alone” [74-
 5]), the difficulty in classifying Harrison resulted from the unreadable messages
 sent not only by her exotic looks and 
mixed
 dress but also by her unconven ­
tional behavior, Harrison
 
was a mass of contradictions: a single female travel ­
er of independent income who sporadically worked in service positions that she
 left as soon as she lost interest, she was neither an upper-class lady making her
 grand tour nor a working-class woman striving to make ends meet, nor was she
 an underclass “hobo” and even less a middle-class professional taking a well-
 earned vacation. At once servant and jetsetter, Harrison took equal pleasure in
 living high and low. With their nonindustrialized economies and favorable
 exchange rates (“My how powerful rich one can feel in India” [145]), the Mid
­dle East and Asia in particular allowed her to indulge both inclinations.
 Demonstrating both the range of her experiences and the vexation her plastic
­ity provoked, she recalls, “A Burma Lady said to me at Darjeeling you are just
 betwixt and between, one minute you
 
have a fine time with the  lowest cast next  
minute
 
with the highest Hindoo, one minute you wear a  blue suit next minute  
a dress of 2 cent a yard crape then a little velvet dress with diamond ear rings
 how can 
we
 tell, one minute you stay in a hotel at $5.00 a day then go to a  
restaurant and have a 5 cent meal, youre betwixt and between” (141).
Harrison unselfconsciously refers to herself as “European” as the proper
 
term to distinguish herself from the native inhabitants of Asian countries.
 European, American, and African-American 
travelers
 could all be classified by  
the umbrella t m “European,” since divisions between and within western
 nations became less important in the face of the more significant division
 between “natives” and the travelers among them. Yet although Asia is where
 Harrison conceives of herself most broadly — she is simply a European (or
 sometimes a Christian as opposed to a Hindu or Muslim) — it is also where
 she 
takes
 the most pleasure in noting nuances of race in other women. For  
example, she describes a group in Burma as making “a beautiful picture a few
 fair Europeans the Anglo Burmases girls in their cool short frocks some fair
 some light and some dark. the Burmases Ladies in their bright silk cloth
 wrapped around their suple bodys then short white waist bracelets of gold bare
 feet in sandles their black hair slick as an eil and like a black 
crown
 on their  
heads and their soft yellow skin” (150-1). Similarly, she remarks in Madras that
 “the Anglo-Indian Girls are . . . not as good looking down here as in Bombay
 and Calcutta, at Calcutta they dress good and pretty have the cleanest teeth
 and finger nails Bombay come next. Rangoon they have more pleasure and
 are lovely but not as good dressers and you can see a little trace of that Burma-
 Chinese blood so are not as good looking as the Indians Anglos. I have had
 much joy noticing the difference” (153-4). Speaking as a European, Harrison
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displaces discussions of her own “blood” onto these exotics, who cover such an
 
expanse of racial and class positioning. Even
 
while she attests to finding joy in  
the racial differences between other women, she 
never
 explicitly discusses her  
own racial makeup or even claims a 
racial
 identity. What she does instead is  
provide an endless succession of snapshots of how others saw her.
These snapshots resonate with the statement of a contemporary African-
 
American writer, Shirlee Taylor Haizlip: “I have been called Egyptian, Italian,
 Jewish, French, Iranian, Armenian, Syrian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek”
 (15). Yet unlike Harrison, Haizlip goes on to state, “I have also been called
 black and Peola and nigger and high yellow and bright.” Although Harrison
 repeatedly notes when she was mistakenly identified, what is one
 
to make of her  
silence about the presumably numerous instances in which she was recognized
 as African-American? As implied by her almost ethnographic comment, “now
 no
 
body can cook cabbage to beat the Irish of Cork not even  the American Col ­
ored Southerners” (8), in her text Harrison does not align herself with southern
 African Americans or with African Americans in general. She does not,
 though, name another group with whom she does align herself. From her nar
­
rati
ve alone, we cant know how Harrison “really” identified herself racially.  
What 
we
 do know is that she enjoyed her ambiguity and status as a world cit ­
izen.
The most precise 
way
 Harrison labels herself is as a nonracialized Cali ­
fornian. When greater specificity than “America” appeared necessary, she
 named not Mississippi but California 
or
 Los Angeles as her home. Once she  
left Columbus, at four years Harrisons sojourn in Los Angeles was her longest
 in North America; her friendship with the Dickinsons, with whom she
 remained in lifelong contact, may partially account for her ties to the state.7
 Certainly, a genuine sense of Californian identity seems to have driven her
 choice to name California as home, as 
revealed
 by stray comments such as, on 
visiting the American Cemetery in Paris, “I read the names on many [of the
 headstones] and it were one from every
 
state and many from Calif” (19), or, on  
discovering that a fellow traveler in Ireland was from Fresno, stating the fact to
 be a “joy to me” (11).
At
 
the same time, though, Harrison suggests that her choice was also moti ­
vated by a desire to shore up her personal image. California lent her recogni
­tion and prestige. Referring to a Spanish village she visited, she remarked
 “Elche have many 
flappers
 and all are Hollywood fans and all the Picture  
House show the Calif. Films I am glad I choosed Calif. for my home before I
 left as every 
one
 know it” (192). In particular, as with the Elche “flappers,”  
southern California appeared to facilitate sociability with other women: Har
­rison mentions of two English girls, “When I told them I was from Los Ange
­les they thought it just wonderful” (9) and adds later that in Zurich “[t]he Girls
 think it so lovely I am from far away California and all are so lovely to me” (46).
 Its racially stereotyped films notwithstanding, the land of Hollywood seems an
 appropriate imagined place of genesis for a woman who 
played
 herself in vari ­
ous roles across the world. Hollywood was also, as Michael Rogin notes,
 “important in making Americans, in giving people from diverse class, ethnic,
 and geographic origins a common imagined community” (14). By virtue of her
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home state, Harrison claimed a kind of Americanness immediately recognized
 
by
 those she met. By perceiving and avowing California as her own, perhaps  
Harrison attempted to elude being defined by race. Unlike Mississippi and the
 South, California does not suggest black-white polarization, and its movies dis
­seminate internationally a wholesale depiction of "America” that is available 
for claim even by those it excludes.
Although Harrison made conscious choices about how to present herself to
 
others, it does not appear that she tried to "pass” in the sense of actively work
­ing to deceive. Instead, adopting a "don’t ask don’t tell” philosophy, like Irene
 Redfield in Nella Larsen’s Passing
 
she passed occasionally and for convenience,  
allowing herself or helping herself to be regarded as whatever garnered her the  
"best
 
treatments.” There is one moment in the text, though, in which Harrison  
alludes to blackness as best kept hidden and signals her complicated relation
­
ship
 to her African ancestry. She records in Paris that
I went out to the Garden d’Acclimatation where they are haveing a expos
­
tion of Central Afircanes from the French part of Africa. I climbed over
 the fence and got in the native village where the Plate mouthed women are.
 a slip is cut just wide enough in the lip to fit around the rim of a wooden
 plate they can hardly talk with it only the women have the plates there is
 about ten of them and
 
they took a  fancy to me. I think they saw I had some  
of their blood I couldnt fool them. the yongest wife was during the Cook
­ing as I hung around the Camp 
fire
 she offered me some it was good and I  
would have accepted to save the price of my supper But the spit run out of
 her mouth on this plate and often droped into the pot. When I left I
 climbed over the fence again so it didnt cost me anything.
(19)
This passage is a dense configuration of Harrison’s simultaneous identification
 
and disidentification with these African women. Whereas Harrison may
 
have  
"fooled” so many others, a confrontation with Africans from Africa makes such
 deception impossible. This is not to say that the moment is an unhappy one
 for Harrison: on the contrary, since her blackness allows her to claim "some of
 their blood,” it contributes to Harrison’s pleasurable perception of herself as a
 cosmopolitan. Harrison suggests that the women’s recognition of their shared
 ancestry leads them to take "a fancy” to her, and she leaves open to speculation
 whether it contributes to her own attraction to them. She lingers by the fire,
 drawn both to the women and the food they cook, and in so doing transforms
 a domestic scene staged for entertainment into a real domestic scene affording
 real food and real sociability. By dodging the entrance fees, Harrison further
 transforms the interaction. Yet although
 
both appetite and canniness make her  
hunger for the food the women cook, she perceives it as contaminated by the
 saliva that spills from their
 
"Plate mouths.” Harrison portrays these mouths as  
deformities inhibiting both clear communication and cleanliness, and she notes
 that they are limited to women alone.
Harrison’s emphasis on the wall that contains the women well represents
 
the difference she perceives between her own experience and theirs, between
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that of a Californian and that of “Afircanes.” 
She
 is not disgusted or repelled  
by the women as individuals; nor does she seem disturbed by their display as a
 curiosity. She implicitly criticizes their treatment by both European and
 African cultures, however, in portraying the wall that cordons them off from
 the rest of French society
 
as binding  them, more literally, in the same way  as do  





 and interacting with people from all over the world. She manages to  
do so by exploiting gender conventions: attracting and manipulating malleable
 men and wielding the domestic skills that of necessity she acquired as a 
child. Whereas among the Africans one man has many wives, Harrison shows herself
 as having many men; like the African women she too labors domestically, but
 in her case only for her own profit, not for family or the pleasure of tourists.
To avoid paying, Harrison leaves the exhibition
 
by climbing the wall. Hav ­
ing departed Paris for the south of France, she regrets that she didn’t have time
 to throw over the wall to the women the warm coat she no longer needed. Her
 compassion reveals her feelings both of affinity and distance, as she represents
 racial identity as closely tied to the extent of one’s freedom and power. In con
­trast to the Africans on display as captured primitives, becoming a relatively
 wealthy and highly mobile traveler renders Harrison a “European,” 
one
 in a  
position to bestow alms. Conversely, Harrison deems a wealthy white Ameri
­can girl (with “show place” homes in Rhode Island and Santa Barbara) who is
 forced to obey the whims of her mother and mother’s lover, “just 
like
 a black  
slave” (28). As Gates asserts, “language use signifies the difference between
 cultures and their possession of power, spelling out the distance between sub
­ordinate and superordinate, between bondsman and lord in terms of their
 ‘race’” (6). Blackness becomes a matter not of bodies but of power.
It’s no coincidence that all of the “black” individuals Harrison describes are
 
women. Without engaging in similar musings about men, throughout the text
 she meditates upon the varying degrees of power and freedom that the women
 she meets possess. In keeping with the tight link between her own appearance
 and agency, she
 
is especially interested in  how visual markers codify status. Her  
interest intensifies when she leaves Europe for Asia and the Middle East and
 women’s actual bodies appear increasingly inscribed: veiled, tattooed, or ritu
­ally scarred faces; necks, arms, and legs loaded with jewelry; bound feet. In
 contrast to the apparently unfettered “pheasants” who abound in her text, Har
­rison suggests that high status for women results in a loss of freedom. She
 depicts Indian
 
women as particularly  constricted: “I have learned that the high  
castes would like very much to walk and save their Rickshaus fare 
like
 I do but  
of course their caste wont allow it. I 
enjoy
 teaseing the Girls and ask if they  
Wish to be free like me to go out in the street at any hour. . . . Now they wish
 to be like me” (101). Harrison suggests that as 
one
 who is cultureless, or rather  
partaking of the culture of the “nothing but a glob trotter” (294), her own free
­dom is unlimited. Yet her responses are not simple rejections of unfamiliar
 practices. Fascinated by the bound feet of
 
Chinese women, she suggests that  
they are not only aesthetically appealing but perhaps even appropriate: “the
 feet are just the size of 
your
 two fingers togather and they have little wooden  
sandles with high heels and walk only on the round heels and some have nice
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slender ankles not broken and they walk without a limp. Some are tall well
 
built women” (297). Harrison goes further
 
to show that  the seeming barbarism  
of the aesthetic practices western women encounter are matched by their own
 (142).
In discussing an African-American nurse whom she encounters in Rome,
 
Harrison comes close — certainly the closest that she ever does — to dis
­cussing her own transformation from an impoverished black child laboring in
 the rural Jim Crow South to a mobile, urban European woman effortlessly
 commanding more travel, adventures, jobs, friends, men, and delicacies than
 she can approach 
fully
 exploiting. Harrison enjoys whiling away the afternoon  
with the nurse, almost exactly her own age (although not the age she claimed
 for herself in the book), who has 
moved 




The last day in Rome I was
 
walking through their largest park I notice set ­
ting down on one of the lower 
Terices
 a colored nurce about 40 and weigh  
about 200 lbs. I went and ask her if she spoke English and laughed when
 she answered "I say I do” She was a
 
joly old Girl I spent the rest of the  
afternoon She think that the men are the most delightful of all men. She
 said it seem 
like
 a dream To her to have a Hansom Italian kissing Her hand.  
I hadnt give it much thought but when we got togather we sure did have a
 good time talking it over.. . . the Family .. . have 4 children she is so sweet
 and Gentle with them and they love her so.
(36)
As that of a black domestic worker, Harrisons 
experience
 in the United States  
would in many respects have resembled the other womans, her transient work
 habits and resistance to building enduring relationships with the families she
 served notwithstanding. However, in naming the other woman a “joly old Girl”
 and focusing on her age, weight, and close ties with the white children she
 cared for — in other words, in rendering the woman, despite her northern ori
­
gins,
 the southern mammy figure of American myth — Harrison reveals the  
expanse of difference she felt
 
between herself and the nurse. A similar sense of  
difference can be detected in her reference to the “55 colored nice fat Mamas”
 (253) visiting their sons’ graves in France, which recalls her depiction of Indi
­an workers at “a very high class bath place and only high class men come here
 they just like nice brown mamas rubbing them up” (122; emphasis added).
In her home 
country,
 more even than most African-American women, the  
nurse would have been perceived, due to her size, occupation, and disposition,
 as a maternally
 
sexualized figure, a provider of nurture rather than the object of  
courtly attention. Yet even this most "colored” of black women, one who unlike
 Harrison doesn’t have a "slight form, olive complexion” and hair to her waist,
 enjoys privileges abroad that in the US could barely be imagined. Despite the
 fact that, true to form, Harrison "hadnt give it much thought,” 
like
 “a dream” a  
change in geography has utterly transformed both her and the nurse’s social
 identity. This change is registered by the “delightful” way they are treated by
 the white men who woo them. Harrison was similarly struck in Nice
 
by “on  the
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Ball
 room floor Dark colord girls in their evening cloths dancing in the Arms  
of Hansom White Frenchmen" (22). On the dance floor, at least, even the
 darkest women interact with white men on equal terms.
In contrast, when Harrison in a figurative sense returned to the United
 
States by virtue of having her work published in the
 
American marketplace, she  
had to accept once again
 
being cast as the lowly dark other. She apparently was  
willing to pay this price in exchange for the pride and prestige of authorship
 and
 
its financial gains, and, perhaps most  important, for the opportunity to dis ­
seminate her own version of who she was. Alexander
 
worries whether “editors  
at
 
Macmillan . . . elect[ed] to publish Harrison’s book because it so clearly pro ­
claimed its uncelebrated black author as a primitive’: a lovable yet somewhat
 clownish Aunt Jemima or latter-day Uncle Remus, whose narrative was readily
 acceptable to white America as part of a traditional and popular black dialect
 genre” (xvii).8 Harrison’s reception as a Negress figured by “blobs of Mississip
­pi molasses” shows that to some extent Alexander’s fear is founded. Contem
­porary reviews of Harrison expressed not only sincere admiration for her
 courage, vitality, and sense of adventure but also racist condescension.
During the period in which Harrison wrote (as well as previously), many
 
African-American women writers used their texts to counter
 
animalistic stereo ­
types about black women. It would be interesting if we had a record of their
 reactions to Harrison’s text: did they greet it with dismay? Harrison does not
 concern herself with whether or not she buttresses racial stereotypes, and she
 seems unaware that her embodied text might reinforce essentialist readings.
 Without fear of criticism, she couples her interest in food and men to boast of
 how she scored chicken dinners, elaborate lunches, amber paste, and other del
­icacies from avid suitors; with her “snapy eye for
 
flirting” (309) she enjoyed dal ­
liance for its own sake, too. 
She
 repeatedly — even obsessively — features her  
appetites and the ways by which she gratified them, often showing how she
 used her racially marked but ambiguous appearance in order to multiply the
 experiences available to her.
In contrast, women writers associated with the Harlem Renaissance such as
 
Marita O. Bonner, Jessie Fauset, Georgia Douglas Johnson, and Anne Spencer
 reveal that their preoccupation with resisting racial stereotypes could constrict
 their worlds. To take one example, shortly before the start of Harrison’s jour
­
ney
 Bonner  published  “On Being Young — A Woman — and Colored.” Rem ­
iniscent of Harrison’s high-caste would-be walkers, Bonner expresses regret
 that the disapproval of the African-American middle-class community 
could render a black woman unable even
 
to travel alone from Washington  DC to New  
York without 
crossing
 the line of propriety. She writes that her anxious desire  
to deny the perception of African-American women as “only a gross collection
 of desires, all uncontrolled” caused her to censure her own behavior (quoted in
 Wall 4). Seen in comparison to Bonner, Harrison’s apparent lack of racial self
­consciousness or introspection in her world travels (“I hadnt give it much
 thought”) serves her
 
well. My intention here is neither to valorize nor censure  
Harrison in comparison to more socially aware and motivated African-Ameri
­can women writers. Rather, it is to show how very different Harrison’s text is
 from those of her better-known contemporaries in the way she works to make
 race a non-category even while revealing it as everywhere.
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In other words, Harrisons radically diasporan identity depends upon the
 
invention of a backdrop of stability, essentiality, and knowability for all of the
 “natives” she encounters: she displaces onto others the kind of ethnic or nation
­al essence that she cannot accept for herself. Harrison portrays throughout the
 ease with which she locates and comes to know other 
peoples
 — the French,  
Spanish, Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, and so on. Despite detailing a range of
 personalities, class positions, racial mixtures, and ethnic groups, and despite
 mapping expatriate and cosmopolitan communities, she presents 
each
 group as  
united through a clearly demarcated identity. The Spanish and French never
 remind her of Americans or Japanese, or even of Italians or Swiss. Certainly,
 no one resembles her own chameleonic self. Instead, Harrison represents the
 people she meets as the world’s “pure products,” to borrow William Carlos
 Williams’ phrase (quoted in Clifford 1).
Just as (the people she meets are “pure” and easily locatable, so is the world
 
through which she moves culturally constant, available to the traveler without
 the distraction of political and other changes. Although Harrison
 
portrays her ­
self visiting historical sites, in her text history itself takes 
place
 offstage. She 
occasionally hears reports of disaster 
or
 upheaval but marvels, “this time last  
year while I were at each place everything so peaceful” (251), or once in India,  
“Rioton was very bad last week and I payed so little atention” (113). The four-
 
year 
period in which history impinged on her travel  is simply  elided in her  text,  
represented only by the editorial comment, “Because of the unsettled condition
 in China Juanita determined not to complete her journey around the world at
 this time but returned to the south of
 
France where she remained until May  
1934” (265); after this insertion Harrison’s narrative resumes immediately with
­out comment. Harrison portrays a timeless universe in which world events are
 eclipsed by the always similar daily events of the traveler: moving on, finding
 a room and job, procuring food, entertainment, acquaintances, experiences.
 The scene 
changes,
 but the world doesn’t.
Citing Eric J. Leed, Marilyn Wesley asserts that modern travel “is marred
 by ‘the pervasive feeling that real travel... is no longer possible’” (39); likewise,
 James Clifford states, “One no longer leaves home confident of finding some
­thing radically new, another time or space” (14). Yet despite her very modern
 rewriting of self, Harrison is not driven by the sense that “real travel,” the new,
 the authentic, continually elude her grasp. Although she relies on an elaborate
 and commodified system of travel — money exchanges, guidebooks, commer
­cial tours — she never suggests this network stands as a veil between her and
 the experience of the real. Even one of the world’s most vaunted tourist attrac
­tions, the Taj Mahal, surpasses rather than fails to meet her expectations. She
 never laments that she has reached a place too late, after it has succumbed to
 western or standardized global culture; she is not driven to search out rough
 guides and roads less traveled; she does not rank the cultural verisimilitude of
 her experiences. Never disappointed, she greets moments of novelty and famil
­iarity alike with delight. Her travel 
experience
 can only create deep envy: not  
only of her mobility but even more of her endlessly repeated satisfaction. She
 fulfills again and again the traveler’s dream.
Travel presupposes a home that one travels away from and returns to, and
 
the discourse of travel often centers around an endorsement of home. In the
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case of the popular culture figure of the hobo, Wesley notes that “the vaunted
 
wanderlust and celebrated freedom of the vagrant lifestyle is countered
 
by actu ­
al domestic investment [and] sentimental attachment. . . . One of the likely
 sources for the derivation of the term hobo is ‘home-bound’” (80, 82). Harri
­sons emphasis on sexuality and sensuality affiliates her with blues singers and
 Hurston in a black
 
women’s tradition alternate to that of writers such as Bon ­
ner.9 She diverges from them, however, in eliding her childhood home and 
an American past in general. Harrison never returned to Mississippi or expressed
 desire to do so. Beyond a few wistful references to American turkey and
 Christmases, she reveals none of the nostalgia for the South or the US that 
one expects from 
any
 expatriate, let alone a traveler of eight years. As if  her life  
began only in Hoboken when she stepped on the ship to England, “happy that
 I had no one to cry for me,” her past, too, is startlingly absent from her 
text. 
She
 makes no references to family, friends, or events in the South previous to  
her travels.
As opposed to hearkening back
 
to a single originating home, in her utopi ­
an travel text Harrison asserts that homes abound, depending simply on the
 traveler’s adaptability: “I look so much Chinese am not at all out of Place” so
 therefore “every old Place is Home” (296); she is relieved to discover that she
 doesn’t miss past way stations because she
 
“can’t help but like the  last place best”  
(20). Yet her repeated assertions of the continual availability of home — “each
 home have a new beauty and a different comfort so I 
never
 long for one of the  
pass” (267) — are disrupted 
by
 a caustic comment that constitutes one of the  
few instances in which she alludes, however obliquely, to her life prior to trav
­el. Regarding a visit to a former residence in Seville, she states, “it was just like
 coming home not
 
that  I have ever  had a  home to return to but it must be some ­
thing like it” (221). Citing Theano S. Terkleni, Wesley asserts that “more than
 a location,” home “is a ‘culturally constructed’ and ‘historically contingent’
 means to identification” (13). Harrison’s past as an impoverished laborer dur­ing her first thirty years in Mississippi precluded not only the ownership of an
 actual American home but perhaps also the metaphorical home of a stable
 identity, acceptable to both others and herself, that could be located in Ameri
­ca.
In addition to a backdrop of authenticity, in the text Harrison’s perpetual
 
remaking appears to depend on a state of
 
perpetual consumption. Arguably,  
travel is in essence consumption — whether
 
of food, sights, experiences, or peo ­
ple. Harrison, however, depicts an extreme version of this kind of consumption
 as well as a more
 
intensely pleasurable one. Her omnivorousness is perhaps  best  
represented through the trope of
 
her meals, in all their endlessly unrepeating  
combinations: “I have enjoyed the trip I had a good lunch of boiled Chicken
 fried meat balls boiled eggs radishes french rolls fried sweet potatoes cocanuts
 sweets cakes oranges and a bottle of red wine” (209-10). We might speculate,
 though, that such consumption can exhaust as well as empower.
It was only through publication that Harrison portrayed herself as securing
 
a home on both fronts. Completing her eight-year trip around the world, she
 arrived
 
in Waikiki with the intention of settling. Highlighting the fact  that  her  
writing has bought her freedom from further household labor, she opens the
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her text, entitled “NOW,” with the statement, “that cheque from  
the Atlantic Monthly for my article gave joy” (315). She goes on to describe
 how having received
 
the money, she quit her job, custom designed her “first and  
only Home” (318) — a large furnished tent — and erected it on the front yard
 of
 
a Japanese family’s home. While there, Harrison plans to swim, cook, and  
learn to surf and hula dance.
Her 
choice
 of Hawaii for her future seems as significant as her choice of  
Hollywood
 
for  her past. Whereas she associates Hollywood with the films that  
impress other nations, it is in Hawaii that Harrison uses her own writing to
 establish a semi-private idyll. West even of California, Harrison remains just
 barely on American territory. Arguably the nation’s last western frontier,
 Hawaii was and continues to be a
 
region of great ethnic variety and mixing  that  
belies the American myth of race as either black or white (and it seems appro
­priate that Harrison arrived in Hawaii from the Far East as opposed to making
 the westering journey of American myth). Yet it is also on American ground
 that, for the first time in
 
the text, Harrison portrays herself besting  overt racism  
in a move that seems to refer to the unwritten subtext of American racism that
 underpins the rest
 
of her narrative: “When  I went  to the American YWCA  the  
Lady in charge of the Employment said why did you come here. I advise you
 to go back as the white People here want only Japanese help Well when I got
 through talking to her She thought very different as if any nation can keep me
 from getting a job and the Kind and Place and price I want” (311-12). Even
 as she shows herself persuading an individual woman, Harrison makes clear
 that the problem is rooted in “nation.” This passage is also the first instance in
 which she invokes “white People,” a term absent from the rest of her text as too
 general to be useful.
Dubbing Harrison a “mystery woman” in her introduction to the 1996
 
reprint of My Great, Wide, Beautiful World, Alexander expresses hope that Har
­rison’s “carefree existence continued” in Hawaii, worries that Pearl Harbor
 destroyed it, and speculates that she may have enjoyed “further odysseys” (xviii).
 As it turns out, she did. Passport records reveal that Harrison lived in Hawaii
 from 1935 to 1939, leaving before Pearl Harbor to begin a sojourn of over ten
 years in South America. From 1940 to 1942 she spent three to nine months
 apiece in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. She then returned to Argenti
­na, where she lived from 1943 to 1950. In 1950, she applied for a new passport
 in order to travel by train in Bolivia, answering “uncertain” to the query as to
 when she “intend[ed] to return to the United States to reside permanently.” At
 the age of 63, then, still single and childless, Harrison continued to travel
 actively. Her new passport photo belies her age, showing a serene, half-smil
­ing, broad-shouldered
 
woman of powerful physical appearance wearing a black  
ruffled dress decorated with a single flower. In contrast to Sedgwick’s remem
­brance of her as the “Black
 
Pearl among servants,” on the application Harrison  
names her occupation as “author.”10
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Harrisons text also can be read productively  through the lens of biracial  
literature discussed by Sollors.
2.
 
Referring to film, James A. Snead states, “One of the prime codes sur ­
rounding blacks on screen is an almost metaphysical stasis. The black, partic
­ularly the black woman, is seen as eternal, unchanging, unchangeable. (Recall
 Faulkner’s appendix to The Sound and the Fury. ‘They endured’)” (26).
3.
 
Due to incorrect information in the text’s preface, discussions of Harri ­
son inaccurately represent her as having been born in 1891, leaving Mississip ­
pi at sixteen, and beginning her international travels at thirty-six. Passport
 
records
 reveal, though, that Harrison was born in Columbus on December 26,  
1887 and lived
 
there  until 1917; she traveled around the world between the ages  
of forty and forty-eight, not thirty-six and forty-four. We can’t know if it was
 Harrison who led others to believe that she began her travels at the more
 romantic younger ages, or if her editors chose to represent her so. Harrison
 does suggest that she regularly claimed to be younger than she was: “the cal
­ender say I am another 
year
 old but 1927 find me the same age I was 15 years  
ago and I 
expect
 to be that same age at least 10 years more anyway” (18). Har ­
rison died in Honolulu in 1967 at the age of eighty.
4.
 
Gates states that the eighteenth-century birth of the black literary tra ­
dition depended upon the belief that
 
“the recording of an authentic black voice  
— a voice of 
deliverance
 from the deafening discursive silence which an 
enlightened Europe cited
 
to prove the absence of the African’s humanity — was  
the millennial instrument of transformation though which the African would
 become the European, the slave become the ex-slave, brute animal become the
 human being” (11-12).
5.
 
Morris asserts that as a child Harrison “lived with a bright vision of  
templed cities in foreign lands which she had seen pictured in the stray pages
 of a magazine” (ix).
6.
 
Alexander glosses the text’s primary themes before going on to compare  
Harrison’s journeys with those of Eslanda Goode Robeson and Odysseus. To
 date, Alexander’s brief and occasionally inaccurate introduction (she explains
 that intermittently for several years she “searched in vain for 
any
 record of Har ­
rison’s life other than that contained in the introduction to this singular opus
 and in her text itself” [xv]) remains the only published Harrison scholarship.
7.
 
Not only did Harrison dedicate her book to Myra Dickinson, she also  
listed George Dickinson, as opposed to a relative, in her 1950 passport appli
­cation as her emergency contact.
8.
 
Certainly, Sedgwick’s portrait of Harrison in Happy Profession suggests  
that at least in hindsight he perceived Harrison with this kind of racist conde
­scension. Nevertheless, 
his
 decision to pubfish Harrison’s text probably reflects  
less a desire to cater to racist stereotypes than his long-standing penchant for
 publishing the first-person accounts of iconoclastic traveling women with
 regional American origins. See Halverson.
9.
 
For a discussion of the differences between these traditions, see Wall 18.
10.
 
David Ginsburg enabled this study by  his assiduous tracking of Harri ­
son’s extratextual life, his search for her real date of birth impelled by the con-
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viction that she couldn’t have been born in the 
year
 of the Rabbit but must be  
a Tiger
 
like himself (as it turns out, she’s a Pig). Thanks also to Licia Calloway  
and
 
Patsy Yaeger for  commentary and guidance on  a series of drafts, and  to Julie  
Ellison for support throughout.
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Alice Is Not Hysterical Anymore:
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­porary women authors
 write about rape.
Joan Schenkar’s darkly comic theater inhabits the
 
juncture of history and revision. Blending “untram
­meled nastiness” (Diamond 99) with pathos and
 
rage,  
Schenkar’s plays defamiliarize the familiar, eliciting a
 “shudder of recognition” from spectators as she navi
­
gates
 the politics of gender, sexuality, violence, histo ­
ry, and language. In the play Signs of Life (1979),
 Schenkar creates an embroidery of characters based
 on nineteenth-century historical figures and juxta
­poses them in ways that foreground the misogyny of
 the Victorian era as well as contemporary hatred of
 women. Among those figures Schenkar draws upon
 for the
 
play are  the American showman P. T. Barnum,  
writer Henry James, his “hysterical” sister Alice,
 Joseph Merrick, more commonly known as “the Ele
­phant Man,” and Dr. Marion Sims, the famous gyne
­cologist. In the author’s note, Schenkar provides for
 the reader/spectator the factual information she is
 drawing on, although she calls the possibility of facts
 themselves into question in the same breath, collaps
­ing the historical, momentarily, into theater itself:
Art made from extreme situations can often find
 
its “facts” (i.e. the hinges upon which certain of
 its circumstances swing) in history. Thus, the
 Uterine Guillotine expertly wielded 
by
 Dr. Slop-  
er in Signs of  Life was invented and named  by  the  
founder of American gynecology, Dr. Marion
 Sims — a man who “performed” countless cli
­toridectomies and referred to himself
 
in writing  
as “the architect of the vagina.” Thus, too, Alice
 James’s “companion” really was Katherine Lorn-
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ing, Jane Merritt, the Elephant Woman, had a
 
male counterpart  in the nar ­
rative of the Elephant Man by Frederick Treves, and Henry James’s burn




The play is a departure from linear narrative, relying heavily on a series of
 
flashback scenes that periodically disrupt the present-time tea party between
 Dr. Sloper (a character based on Dr. Marion Sims and named after a character
 in James’s fiction), Henry James, and, 
later,
 P. T. Barnum. Schenkar’s play 
embeds enough factual information and recognizable people that, as Vivian
 Patraka suggests, “Her own version of history supplants the real one” (“Mass
 Culture” 
28).
 More importantly, perhaps, than changing the history books, 
Schenkar is engaged in the project of revising culturally constructed categories
 and beliefs such as deformity, hysteria, sexuality, woman, male authority, and
 patriarchal institutions such as the medical industry. In this essay I will locate
 specific sites in Schenkar’s play where the playwright revises or changes histo
­ry and where she challenges cultural fictions that pathologize all categories of
 otherness. Through
 
her exploration of nineteenth-century gender ideology and  
concepts of deformity, Schenkar reinvents, for example, the very category and
 definition of “freak” and challenges ideologies that attach disgust to women’s
 bodies. I focus in particular on how Schenkar both incorporates and revises the
 biographical histories of Joseph Merrick, Alice James, and Dr. Marion Sims as
 a means of making strange the pathologization of women, freaks, and hyster
­ics.
History, as Walter Benjamin notes, has been written by the winners in any
 
particular era. With this in mind, Schenkar’s Signs of Life approaches the past
 from a historical materialist viewpoint: “If one asks with whom the adherents
 of historicism actually empathize . . . the answer is 
inevitable:
 with the victor.  
. . . [A] historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as pos
­sible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain” (Benjamin
 257). A totalizing history 
can
 never produce anything other than falsehood.  
Writing about how Columbus’s acts of genocide have been subsumed and
 accepted as part of the price of progress, Howard Zinn argues that “the histo
­rian’s distortion is more than
 
just technical, it is ideological; it is released in a  
world of contending interests, where any chosen emphasis supports some kind
 of interest, whether economic or
 
political or racial or national or sexual” (9-10).  
Schenkar’s play not only intervenes repeatedly in historical occurrences but also
 interrogates the relationship between history and ideological belief systems. It
 is through the writing of this antagonistic, antihistorical position that Schenkar
 undermines the historical and ideological constructs produced by the makers of
 a patriarchal history. Throughout the play Schenkar plays with the suggestion
 of shared consciousness. The dissolving of boundaries between characters of
 the same gender in particular forges various collective identities. For example,
 Alice James and Jane Merritt share the same props and bedroom, while P. T.
 Barnum and Dr. Sloper echo 
each
 other’s words. This blurring effectively  
locates the familiar in seemingly disparate entities — Jane Merritt’s freakish
­ness becomes inextricable from Alice James’s hysteria.
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Related to Schenkar’s critique of categories that pathologize women and
 
people with disabilities is the 
way
 she renders spectators complicit in the  
pathologization of woman/freak/hysteric. As audience members
 
wait in line to  
purchase tickets and enter the theater, the character of P. T. Barnum mills
 around the theater’s entrance, announcing loudly that he is hawking tickets to
 a “freak show.” The result is that audience members are both constituted as
 voyeurs and made to feel disappointed when the “freaks” never appear:
Since 
we
 are constituted as the freak show audience for Signs of Life, and  
since the freak show is as live as theater is, our own voyeurism as theater
 goers is implicated in the construction of normality and what it represses.
(Patraka, “Notes” 31)
The allure of the freak show is dependent on the titillation posed by the
 
promise of deformity or 
freakishness;
 those spectators whose interest is piqued  
by Barnum’s promise to present something exotic will, through their complici
­ty with the definition of horror, be disappointed 
by
 the fact that the actors,  
including those who portray the supposed “freaks,” all have healthy bodies.
 Schenkar anticipates that such a disappointment might put audience members
 in 
an
 unreceptive mood, which is partly the point: “The scene should induce  
in those members of the audience who actually listened to Barnum’s spiel and
 therefore expected something salacious, a sharp feeling of disappointment. If
 it puts them in 
an
 unreceptive mood — so much the  better. The actors will  only  
have to work harder at seduction” (11).
In the character of Jane Merritt, Schenkar attacks the historical exploita
­
tion of the “elephant man,” Joseph Merrick, in the name of medicine, while
 calling into question categories of
 
freak and woman. At one point Schenkar  
suggests her own connectedness to her
 
fictional elephant woman, and the com ­
parison helps to collapse the distance between the nineteenth and twentieth
 centuries. As she has stated in interviews: “even though I 
speak
 through thou ­
sands of characters I am always displ cing my autobiography onto those his
­torical periods” (Diamond 103). Orphaned and forced to join a circus
 sideshow,
 
the London-born Joseph Merrick was immortalized  in the account  of  
Sir Frederick Treves, a doctor who accidentally wandered upon a “freak”
 sideshow
 
exhibit in London in the late 1800s and discovered the man he would  
later dub “the elephant man.” Treves’s initial impression of Merrick was one of
 condescension and horror: “[it
 
was] the most disgusting specimen of humani ­
ty I have ever seen . . . degraded, perverted, repellent, and loathsome” (quoted
 in Graham and Oehlschlaeger 32). The most obvious “re-vision” in Schenkar’s
 translation of the historical figure of the Elephant Man into the play’s Jane
 Merritt is the 
revision
 of gender. In recasting  the real-life Victorian male child  
born Joseph
 
Merrick in London as a “female child  born to Jane Elizabeth Mer ­
ritt of the city of New York,” Schenkar foregrounds the nineteenth-century
 gender ideology that linked women with pathology, pronouncing
 
women
inherently deformed by virtue of their genitalia: the assumption of
 
women’s special liability to mental sickness by way of her characteristic
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menstrual and reproductive functions pushed all
 
women close to the crim ­
inal category. . . . [T]o be a woman was a crime.
(Barker-Benfield 123)
As
 Vivian Patraka suggests, Schenkar’s revision from male to female deformity  
as expressed through the theatrical body of the Elephant Woman is a "cool”
 strategy for articulating
 
the inherent connections that deformity has with nine ­
teenth-century ideologies of gender: Jane Merrrit’s "entire body is deformed,
 with the exception of her
 
genitalia. In a pun on congenital deformity, Schenkar  
ironically suggests that all women are considered freaks and that their sexual
 organs are the locus of their abnormality” (“Notes” 67). The revision of gender
 foregrounds for the spectator the ways women are historically “deformed” by
 virtue of their biology. Woman and freak
 
have been so slyly  linked historically  
that Schenkar attempts to denaturalize the normality of
 
their relationship by  
foregrounding and exposing 
it. Peter Graham and Fritz Oehlschlaeger take Sir Frederick Treves to task for
 falsely constructing Merrick’s history and denying him both humanity and
 agency. Having established himself as the expert fit to shed light on this 
mys­terious anomaly of the human family, Treves proceeded arrogantly to define and
 distort Merrick’s identity. The authors suggest an element of the monomania-
 cal in Treves, who set out to remake his patient as though Merrick 
were
 “a  
ready-made Frankenstein monster to be nurtured and cultured into civility”
 (34). Once Treves overcame 
his
 disgust in the presence of Merrick, he assigned  
to his life a kind of classical, tragic significance rooted in the fact that Merrick
 was simultaneously grotesque and “human.” What Treves’s account both omits
 and contains is startling in its discrepancies. Graham and Oehlschlaeger make
 much of Treves’s 
refusal
 to call Merrick by his Christian name, Josep , and his 
decision instead to use “John”:
How, then, are we to understand his insistence on calling Merrick John?
 
Did that name fulfill a need for Treves that Joseph could 
not?
 Was Treves  
somehow compelled to rename Merrick, to place himself in the role of
 father — must Treves become the giver of the true name?
(54)
Schenkar plays with Treves’s decision to erase Merrick’s name in the play
 
through an imagined dialogue between Doctor Sloper and
 
Merritt’s mother. It  
is here that the playwright suggests that she and the fictional elephant woman
 are in fact one and the same person:
Doctor The name of the child was Jane Merritt. It was not until P. T.
 
Barnum discovered her, that 
she
 became known as  The Elephant Woman.  
MOTHER Joan, I named her Joan — after . . . someone.
(12)
Schenkar here curiously invokes her own name in the text, suggesting the pro
­
ject of “displacing autobiography onto . . . historical periods” and a strategy of
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blurring identity by casting herself among the deformed. Moreover, the shared
 
identities of Merritt and Alice James in the text suggests that Schenkar is cast
­ing herself as hysterical. Despite the mother’s insistence that the child’s name
 is Joan, Doctor Sloper — at once a reincarnation of Dr. Marion Sims, Treves,
 and James’s fictional Sloper, continues to call Joan 
"Jane.
” This basic erasure of  
Merritt/Merrick’s identity is consistent with the account in Graham and
 Oehlschlaeger of Treves’s paternalistic desire to recreate Merrick through his
 own interpretation. Later in the text of
 
the play the Doctor announces with  
clinical arrogance and certainty that "Jane, of course, was her name” (20).
Further exploration of the discrepancies between
 
Merrick’s life and Treves’s  
narrative reveal the 
revision
 of Merrick’s biography by Treves — including the  
story
 
regarding the genesis of his deformity. Treves does not make mention of  
Merrick’s account of 
his
 pregnant mother’s being kicked or traumatized by an  
elephant at a circus show. 
As
 a medical man, Treves no doubt found this expla ­
nation "absurd” (Graham and Oehlschlaeger 
41),
 but it does address a glaring  
gap in Merrick’s history nonetheless. Schenkar restores to a central location
 Merrick’s voice in the construction of his auto/biography — a further gesture
 toward 
revising
 Merrick not as a freak whose only parent was the doctors who  
housed him but as a human agent born of parents for
 
whom he felt love:
MOTHER 
She
 was born at a carnival. I was at a carnival. I was standing  
near an elephant. He turned towards me, I began to bleed . . . and she was
 born RIGHT THERE in the sawdust. (Takes a miniature of herself from
 her reticule and puts it in Jane’s good hand.) Try to keep this longer than




revision Schenkar makes from Treves’s account  is to reinsert  
the love Merrick felt for his mother into the text. F. C. Carr Gomm, a chair
­man of London’s Hospital committee during the time of Merrick’s stay there,
 recalled with certainty in 
his
 letters regarding Merrick a miniature portrait of  
his (Merrick’s) mother that he cherished and kept with him at all times. Treves,
 however, "omits all mention of her miniature portrait” (Graham and
 Oehlschlaeger 53) in his 
text.
 In the play, Schenkar essentially rewrites Mer ­
rick’s mother back into his life — something that history, through
 
Treves, was  
reluctant to do. Jane
 
Merritt is equipped with a miniature  portrait of her  moth ­
er
 
which she looks at constantly, even in the moment of her death.
The ambiguous circumstances of Merrick’s death provide evidence of what
 Schenkar exposes as Treves’s paternalistic relationship to his patient. Unable to
 see or accept Merrick as in possession of his own agency, Treves rules out com
­pletely the possibility
 
of suicide, concluding: "On  Merrick’s last night, he must  
have made the experiment of lying down to sleep. . . . [H]is death was due to
 the desire that dominated his life — the pathetic, but hopeless desire to be like
 other people” (quoted in Graham and Oehlschlaeger 59). Schenkar’s play
 stresses Treves’s historical arrogance and blindness, suggesting Merrick/Mer-
 ritt’s active participation
 
in  the choice between life and death. In the  final scene  
before her death, Jane considers, in what 
appears
 to be a contemplation of sui-
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cide, the painfully fragmented image of woman/freak she sees in the pic-
 
ture/mirror:
JANE (In her good hand she holds the small picture of her mother which
 
she looks into as though it were a mirror[.]) I am looking at my face in the
 mirror — a thing the doctor has forbidden — and I do not believe what I
 see. The sight of my own skin makes me scream. ... I cannot live a long
 time. I cannot hold this head up any longer.... No matter how often I look
 at myself, I still do not know what I really see.
(62)
Jane’s imagination subverts the doctor’s orders here — in 
real
 life Frederick  
Treves forbade Merrick
 
the use of mirrors in his hospital room. Jane, in an act  
that challenges the oppressively paternalistic doctor-patient relationship, cre
­ates a
 
forbidden mirror out of the photographic image of her mother. In oppo ­
sition to Treves’s theory that Merrick died in a "pathetic” gesture of attempted
 "normalcy,” Schenkar proposes that the source of pathos in Merrick/Merritt is
 actually the fragmentation and denial of a holistic self. In Signs of Life, Jane
 Merritt dies in a defiant proclamation of her own uniqueness, the suppression
 of which proved ultimately
 
unbearable.
Schenkar further undermines the historical accuracy of Treves’s account by
 collapsing
 
the identities of doctor and "showman.” While Treves makes a point  
of pathologizing
 
those who exploited Merrick in  their sideshow  act, he neglects  
to consider his own opportunistic exploitation of Merrick’s deformity. The
 doctor-patient relationship is denaturalized through this comparison to the
 freak show proprietor, as Schenkar points out the ways in which such a rela
­tionship lends itself to the abuse of power and to exploitation. The "showman”
 who discovers and
 
pimps the body  of Merrick/Merritt  is not an Englishman, as  
in the historical case of Merrick, but the American P. T. Barnum. Schenkar’s
 decision to stage Barnum as the showman seems to 
suggest
 the extent to which  
the historical treatment and oppression of freak/woman/other has been an
 American project; she thereby implicates her audience. Despite the fact that
 Barnum devoted an enormous amount of his life to the temperance movement,
 Schenkar creates a
 
Barnum who is drunk and  indulgent, and who absolves him ­
self of his role in the traffic of human beings: "BARNUM Damn the fool. I’
ll have 
his
 diploma. Doctors — licensed scoundrels!! That’s what they are . . .  
legal murderers!!” (29). In the text, the doctor and the showman emerge as two
 halves of a single oppressive agent. Both flourish under the grotesque power
 they wield:
DOCTOR How is the lip this morning?
JANE It
 
won’t stop bleeding. I don’t think you should cut it again.
DOCTOR Don’t be ridiculous, my dear. You know you’re much happier
 speaking.
JANE I spoke before. You couldn’t understand me. (Speaking over
 
the pain  
of examination) I’d like to read more of the Bronte sisters. Sometimes I
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DOCTOR (Not listening) What? Oh anything you 
like 
Jane. Shift your 
weight a little please.
(36-7)
This passage reveals what Graham and Oehlschlaeger identify as Treves’s con
­
tempt and condescension toward Merrick as the latter actively engaged in a
 revision of 
himself.
 Though he was born a working-class youth in London,  
Merrick’s illness situated him immediately amongst the wealthy and the edu
­cated. Merrick’s fascination with this culture eventually led to his conception
 of himself as a “gentleman.” Schenkar gives the Merritt of her text an appreci
­ation of fine literature that parallels Merrick’s fondness for such indulgences as
 a “silver-fitted dressing bag” (Graham and Oehlschlaeger 56) that included
 razors, silver brushes, and a cigarette case. As in
 
Treves’s account, the Doctor  
in Signs of Life is not impressed by his patient’s attempts at 
crossing
 class  
boundaries or in 
revising
 her origins.
Through the dialogue with history that the 
play
 invokes, Schenkar revises  
not only the specific historical construct of the Elephant Man/Joseph Merrrick
 but also the very categories of “normality” and “deformity.” 
As
 Patraka points  
out, freakishness and deformity are contextualized by audience expectations,
 and the very structure of the play “demonstrates to the audience the ways we
 create and dictate both normality and abnormality and how they are to 
be
 per ­
formed” (Patraka, “Notes” 66). Those spectators lured by Barnum’s promise of
 the grotesque are thwarted not only by the dearth of actual “freaks” on stage
 
but  
by  the playwright’s foregrounding of “freak” as a cultural concept. In the final  
scene before her death, Jane refers to her body as a “costume, a bad fit” (62) —
 a construction that seems incongruous with her conception of self. In another
 scene the “
freaks
” are taught to embody the characteristics collectively perceived  
by the culture to be specific to the strange and the deformed. This comedic
 framing of notions of abnormality against normality is what Schenkar defines
 as “a parody of all parodies” (quoted in Patraka, “Interview” 192):
WARDEN Now the first thing I want you to learn in this class is how to
 
look. You bettah know you all look
 
REAL disgusting. The lesson  is HOW  
TO LOOK.... [I]n freak
 
class there’s no reason to look down. Everybody  
in the world is already down on you.
(24)
In a subversion of
 
the category of “freak,” Schenkar gives voice to the muted  
voice of the “other.” In the freak class, it is the freaks who ultimately decon
­struct and denaturalize the world: “Dr. Sloper!! He’s 
no
 doctor. . . . He’s a  
ghoul... a grave robber ... a butcher.. . . He’s the . . . he’s . . . he’s . . . he’s the
 freak!!!!” (25).
The demonization of historically revered white male figures such as Dr.
 
Sloper/Sims/Treves and P. T. Barnum forces the spectator to reconceptualize
 and compare notions of
 
“freak,” “deformity,” “normality,” and “woman.” The  
performance of the freak show and the rehistoricizing of difference in relation









within the narrative of nineteenth-century gender ideology” (Patraka,  
“Mass Culture” 29). Thus the class in the workhouse in which freaks are
 instructed in lessons of abnormality and conventional freakishness necessarily
 suggests the Victorian and modern constructions of “woman.” The blurring of
 identity that
 
the set’s props reveal  leads to the drawing of parallels between ide ­
ologies of “woman” and of “freak.” Given nineteenth-century assumptions that
 located women’s pathology in relation to their genitalia, Schenkar foregrounds
 misogynistic attitudes through the use of metaphor and parody, reconstructing
 her own version of history in relation to woman, freak, and hysteric.
Alice
 
James, sister of novelist Henry and renowned psychologist William,  
grew up in a family where “to
 
be a James and a girl was a contradiction in  terms”  
(Strouse xiii). Though extremely intelligent and precocious, Alice struggled
 throughout her life to reconcile her talents with her father’s belief that women
 
were
 “personifications of virtue, innocent purity, and holy self-sacrifice who  
could dispense with interesting ideas” (xv). Unlike her worldly, successful
 brothers, Alice would suffer a lifelong condition of mental illness, diagnosed at
 various times as “hysteria, neurasthenia, spinal neurosis, spiritual crisis, and
 gout.” Despite a close relationship with his sister, Henry’s letters and memoir
 reveal a distinct tone of
 
impatience and condescension in matters of  intellect  
and illness: “Try not to be ill,” he urged in 1883, “that is all; for in that there is
 a failure” (quoted in Strouse x). While historical biographers have focused on
 the brother-sister relationship as intimate, if not emotionally incestuous,
 Schenkar’s theater subverts this version, casting a parasitic, jealous Henry
 against the formidable, defiant genius of Alice. In her biography of Alice
 James, Jean Strouse notes the anxiety that brother Henry felt with 
regards
to  
his sister’s most private writings and his terror, following her death, regarding
 the diary’s publication: “I am almost sick with terror. . . . [W]hat I should like
 to do ... would 
be
 to edit  this volume with a  few eliminations of text[,] ... give  
it to the world and then carefully burn with fire our own four [un-edited]
 copies” (322). Schenkar decisively foregrounds the historic fact of James’s dis
­pleasure with and ultimate destruction of his sister’s diary, making this act a
 central metaphor for the sibling rivalry that silenced and pathologized Alice
 and contextualized her illness in relation to her powerlessness: “Henry She
 wanted that journal published, you know. 
Released
 into the world from the  
miasmal swamp of her opinions. Naturally, I burnt it to a crisp” (16). In the
 play James seems to feel a literary competition with his sister because of the
 journal, which represents to him a manifestation of her independence from
 him. Ultimately, the historical James concluded that his sister’s strong will —
 something Schenkar symbolizes by means of the journal, was the
 
ultimate cause  
of her downfall. Falling prey to Victorian medical rhetoric that prescribed
 things such as the “resting cure” for women hysterics who read or wrote too
 much, Henry blamed Alice’s poor health on the intensity of her will:
[The diary] puts before me what I was tremendously conscious of
 
in her  
lifetime — that the extraordinary intensity of her will and personalityreal-
 ly would have made the equal, the reciprocal life of a “well” person . . .
 impossible for her, so that her disastrous, her tragic health was in a manner
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the only solution for her of the practical problem of life.
(Quoted in Strouse 284)
Schenkar’s Henry mouths a
 
revised version of this actual letter, this time adding  
a possessive pronoun as a means of emphasizing that Alice’s illness wasn’t sim
­ply a response to a life that 
anyone
 would find difficult but stemmed instead  
from a particular life led incorrectly
 
in its stubbornness:
HENRY I have always thought that Alice’s tragic health was, in a manner
 
of speaking, the only solution to the problem of her life.
DOCTOR The only solution we could accept, Mr. James.
(61)
Strouse’s biography of Alice
 
James is careful not to embrace a wholly les ­
bian reading of
 
her subject, insisting that James’s partnership with Katherine  
Loring was an example of the nineteenth century’s ubiquitous romantic female
 friendships: “Her loving, playful, even flirtatious language in letters to her
 friends is characteristic of nineteenth-century correspondence between women
 and should not be mis-read as literally sexual” (168). Schenkar’s version of the
 Loring-James partnership includes a sexual component: “Alice and Katherine
 on the bed, barely visible. The twining of their figures produces on the wall
 behind the bed an image like an elephant moving” (50). While at first this link
­ing of lesbian with the “freak” Merritt may seem 
like
 a portrait of lesbianism as  
monstrous, Ann Wilson suggests that “the image of the elephant is a complex
 image
 
which is associated frequently with the child’s experience of pre-Oedipal  
love” (84). Furthermore, the construct
 
of “freak” having been denaturalized and  
vilified for its oppressive characteristics, the linking of lesbian with freak can
 only
 
be interpreted as a celebratory connection.
On a universal level, Schenkar reconstructs the history of hysteria by ques
­tioning
 
the phallocentric authority of the medical  industry and by reversing  the  
gender of the hysteric. For example, as Dr. Sloper and Henry James sit in the
 genteel setting of a tea room discussing the grotesqueness of Jane Merritt and
 Alice James, the spectator realizes that the men are themselves hysterical.
DOCTOR My dear Mr. James. How 
can
 you compare your brilliant sister  
with my freak of nature? More tea?
HENRY No, no more thank you. My brilliant sister, dear 
doctor,
 spent  
twenty years in bed and
 
produced nothing more than a cancer of the breast.  
If that isn’t freakish . . .
(14-15)
Schenkar gradually reveals that the biscuits and tea that the men are consum
­
ing are in fact blood and bone. James’s initial disgust at discovering the con
­tent of what he is eating is forgotten with the Doctor’s patronizing toast:
Henry It tastes . . . ossified, it tastes . . . god help us ... it tastes 
like
 bone.
DOCTOR Impossible, Mr. James.
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 (A  rising  panic.) Dr. Sloper. There is blood in my cup. And there  
is bone in my
 
biscuit.
Doctor Just desserts, Mr. James.
HENRY (Calming.) Ahhh yes. Quite right, doctor.
DOCTOR (The toast.) The 
ladies,
 Mr. James.
HENRY (Remembering.) Ah yes, the ladies, Dr. Sloper.
(17)




 are depathologized from their historical status.  
Inscribing herself in the text, Schenkar identifies with Alice and raises the
 question, as Ann Wilson points out, “of the relation between writing by con
­temporary women, particularly women writing
 
for the theater, and a malady we  
primarily associate with the late nineteenth century’ (73). Hysteria in Signs of
 Life, then, is transformed from a “malady”
 
that afflicts the passive, pathologized  
form of woman, to an act that threatens to “disrupt the phallocentrism of the
 symbolic order.” Schenkar situates Alice’s attacks
 
within feminist  theater’s pro ­
ject of articulating the “spectacle.” As Liz Goodman has argued, it is around
 the term spectacle and around “women’s deliberate efforts to make spectacles
 of themselves’ that much of feminist theater is made possible” (quoted in Wag
­ner 228). In Signs of Life, Alice’s fits work to revise the balance of power
 between men and women — the fits shape her
 
brother’s actions, rendering him  
powerless before her will:
ALICE [T]he only 
way 
I could stir him up was to have an attack in a pub ­
lic place.
KATHERINE What a performer you are!!
(49)
Schenkar’s Alice is prone to 
fits
 in  which she delivers a “sentence” so grotesque  
and disturbing it incites horror in spectators who witness it. While the “sen
­tence” is never revealed by Schenkar, its status as spectacle in the play supports
 a reading of Alice James as a “frightening and rare presence — an unsocialized
 woman . . . who forces men to be passive in the face of her rage . . . and dese
­crates herself as the object of their desire, thereby mocking their sexuality”
 (Dolan 67).
The positioning of Dr. Marion Sims in a play whose project is to revise his
­
torical notions of woman and hysteric necessarily expands this revision to
 include the paradigm of the doctor-patient relationship and the historical rev
­
erence
 for white professional males. Juxtaposing Sims, the self-proclaimed  
“architect of the vagina,” with
 
the pathologized hysteric James, foregrounds the  
historical construction of woman as an enigma whose puzzle could be solved
 through proper excavation of the sexual organs. Sharing the popular nine
­teenth-century belief that a woman’s psychology was entirely determined by her
 biology, Sims embarked on a mission to explore unknown aspects of women’s
 reproductive organs
 
with a relentless determination that  Barker-Benfield  likens  
to “monomania” (93). Perceiving himself to be on a God-given mission, Sims
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constructed a small shack behind his house where he performed 
countless 
experiments upon three black female slaves, one of whom, according to Bark
­er-Benfield, endured no less than thirty operations in four years.
What Schenkar extracts from Sims’s life in creating the Sloper character is
 
both his hatred for women and his love of the theatrical, performative quality
 inherent in surgery. Barker-Benfield notes that Sims harbored a love of things
 theatrical all his life and that he “had met and
 
been fascinated  by P. T. Barnum”  
(100). In a reversal of the patient-as-hysteric paradigm, Schenkar pits
 Sims’s/Sloper’s
 
“hysteria” against the relative health of Alice and Merritt. Slop ­
er is not shy about discussing 
his
 maniacal obsession with women’s grotesque  
bodies. 
As
 he sits drinking blood and chewing on bones, the doctor’s relative  
insanity grows more apparent: “DOCTOR I’ve scooped out ovaries without
 question, extracted uteri without number. . .. [A]hh Mr. James the signs of life
 are closer to the bone than you imagine. And when you find them, there’s no
 stopping until you’re covered
 
with blood” (55-6). Schenkar sets this harrowing  
confession of mutilation against the historical fact of
 
Sims’s notion of himself  
as genius and savior, undermining the historical authority invested in doctors:
 “I feel that I am in the hands of god, that I have a high and
 
holy mission to per ­
form” (quoted in Barker-Benfield 109). The psychic/physical mutilation to
 which the doctor subjects his patients is ultimately pathologized and exposed.
 Retrieving the historically muted voice of the
 
patient, Schenkar revises the doc ­
tor-patient relationship: “ALICE I feel... I feel that one has a greater sense of
 intellectual degradation after an interview with a doctor than from any other
 human experience" (60). Situating the scientific in the performative, Schenkar
 undermines the supposed
 
truths on which the former is based: “I love the false ­
ness of science. I love how it’s no more appropriate than fashion predictions
 and how everything is always being 
reversed
 and denied in science. ... I love  
the artificial” (quoted in Diamond 105).
The pathology of historic “madmen” (Schenkar quoted in Diamond 110)
 
such as Sims who hide behind institutions of science, literature, and entertain
­ment gets exposed in Signs of Life. The perversion of facts in Schenkar’s plays
 is responsible for the retrieval and preservation of larger truths. While Dr.
 Marion Sims and Henry James never actually sat down to 
tea,
 their role as his ­
torical conspirators in the pathologization, mutilation, and suppression of
 women is made clear. The history constructed in Signs of Life is the result of
 the spectator’s negotiation of actual historical representations of woman, freak,
 hysteric, and so on, alongside the deconstruction (through Schenkar’s deliber
­ate perversion) of those representations. Ultimately, Signs of Life serves as a
 commentary on the falseness of history and an exposé of oppressive ideologies
 of gender and deformity that reached an agitated peak in Victorian society
 
yet  
still persist today. Given the omission of the voice of the other in the telling of
 history, all history is essentially in need of revision. By reimagining the bound
­aries between historical time periods and real and imaginary figures, Schenkar
 imposes her version of history upon the “real” one. Employing framing tech
­niques, Schenkar engages the spectator in an active dynamic of refusal and/or
 recognition, inviting us to compare the pathology of hysteria, femininity, and
 deformity, with that of medicine, showmanship, genius, and masculinity.
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 Chaucer Review, and
 Film & History.
Readers of the Canterbury Tales face its interpretive
 
challenges in a variety of forms, those inscribed with
­in the individual tales and the competitive tale
­telling framework, as well as those articulated by the
 critical tradition surrounding Chaucer’s 
work.
 But  
perhaps no more fundamental difficulty confronts
 potential interpreters than the poem’s incomplete,
 indeed sometimes missing, narratives. While the
 notion of completion is vexed with concerns of nar
­rative and
 
philosophical conclusiveness,  with the pre ­
cariousness of manuscript transmission, and
 
with the  
indeterminacy of authorial intention, I use the term
 here inclusively and generally to indicate those
 moments where the Chaucerian text suggests (by
 whatever means) that there is more to be told.1 For
 example, certain tales have been left in a state sug
­gesting Chaucer may not have finished with them.
 The Cook’s Tale breaks off
 
abruptly after fifty-eight  
lines. The Hengwrt scribe marginally notes, "Of this
 Cokes tale maked Chaucer na moore” (57v).2 The
 Squire’s Tale, perhaps interrupted by the Franklin,
 also ends awkwardly, 
two
 lines into its pars tertia. Yet  
these two much-cited instances are not anomalies.
 The Canterbury
 




work remained unfinished at  
the time of his death has troubled editors since
 William Caxton
 
first printed  it  in 1478. Considering  
the presentation of the poem more recently, Derek
 Pearsall writes, "The witness of the manuscripts is
 that the Canterbury Tales are unfinished, and that
 Chaucer left the work as a partly assembled kit with
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no directions. That is how, ideally, it should be presented, partly as a bound
 
book (with first and last fragments fixed) and partly as a set of
 
fragments in  
folders, with the incomplete information as to their nature and placement fully  
displayed” (Pearsall, Canterbury 23).3 Yet even this design, which would seem
 to offer the reader the most "accurate” picture of the poem’s incomplete state,
 does not go far enough. The “fixed” first and last fragments secure the bound
­aries of remarkably different works. In fragment one, Harry 
Bailly
 sets up the  
contest for “wel 
nyne
 and twenty” (1.24) pilgrims by requesting four tales from  
each, two going toward Canterbury and two on the return journey (1.792-4).  
However, when Bailly calls upon the Parson
 
in fragment  ten, he announces that  
all but one pilgrim has told his tale.
These two frameworks, while not mutually exclusive, require some kind of
 
explanation; there is none. The sequence of Bailly’s statements has had some
 interpretive effect on the 
shape
 attributed to the journey, but there is no real  
evidence that it should. For instance, in the epilogue to the Squire’s Tale, the
 host interrupts the Franklin’s “interruption” of the Squire in order to remind
 him of his agreement, “that ech of yow
 
moot tellen atte leste / A tale or two, or 
breken his biheste” (V.697-8). These elusive descriptions of the tale-telling
 plan dispersed throughout the links — from the elaborate plans of the Gener
­al Prologue,
 
to Baillys intermediate comment to the Franklin, to the host’s final  
assertion in the Parson’s Prologue that “now lakketh us no tales mo than oon”
 (X.16) — have been read as a progressive modification of Bailly’s overenthusi-
 astic plans. Such a reading assumes that Chaucer wrote or revised in serial
 order. Resisting that assumption, Charles A. Owen has offered a
 
counter-argu ­
ment proposing that Chaucer was at work
 
revising fragment one at the time of  
his death, and thus the four-tale-per-pilgrim plan is the revision of the earlier
 one-way, one-tale-per-pilgrim journey (10-47). In light of other contempora
­neous events in Chaucer’s life, this artistic expansion of the Canterbury Tales
 makes some sense. In December 1399, just a year before his death, Chaucer
 took out a 53-year lease on a tenement house in Westminster, “an unexpected
­ly long lease for a man nearly 60” (Pearsall, Life 275).4 Both acts of extension
 can be read as attempts to forestall an unwanted 
end.
 While Owen’s proposal  
remains tentative and Pearsall’s agreement even more so, we are certain that
 Chaucer did not write the tales in serial order, as many studies of the dates of
 composition attest.5 Witness, for example, the shift in the
 
Wife of Bath’s per ­
formance from what is now
 
the Shipman’s fabliau to the present Wife of Bath’s  
Prologue and Tale. The first tale Chaucer wrote for the Wife now heads frag
­ment seven while the expanded revision is found earlier, in fragment three.
 There is no 
reason,
 then, to assume that the plans of fragment one are any less  
definite than the ones in fragment ten, nor that revision of the plan logically
 relates to the pilgrims’ proximity to Canterbury.
Beyond the textual tradition of the Canterbury Tales, what the 
physical manuscripts can and cannot tell us about the state of the poem, we also have
 internal, “literary” problems and concerns about its form. There are those pil
­grims mentioned in the General Prologue for
 
whom we have no tales: the five  
guildsmen (Haberdasher, Carpenter, Upholsterer, Dyer, and Tapster), the
 Plowman, and the Knight’s Yeoman.6 Moreover, the entire poem motions
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toward an elaborately conceived yet unachieved framing narrative, which is
 
itself a story of competing narratives of pilgrimage and literary judgment. Yet
 both pilgrimage and contest frames remain incomplete. There is no arrival at
 Canterbury Cathedral, no sojourn into
 
the town, no return journey, and no con ­
clusion and judgment to the tale-telling contest with the supper at Bailly’s
 Tabard Inn “at oure aller cost” (I.799).7
Such missing pieces — whether the Squire’s pars tertia, the unwritten
 
Plowman’s Tale, or Bailly’s final judgment — must surely 
affect
 our ability to  
piece together the whole of  Chaucer’s poetic creation. But the range of such  
missing elements, the unlinked state of the ten extant fragments and the non
­subordination of framing devices, also raise less materialist and more abstract,
 poetic questions. How does 
one,
 indeed can one, interpret what isn’t there?  
And
 
what isn’t there forces us to ask how far we can discuss the meaning of the  
Canterbury Tales as a singular poem. That is, do we see one or many? Robert
 Jordan has noted such difficulty when he remarks, “Commentators have failed
 to recognize the extent to which the claim of the whole and that of the parts
 interfere with and disarm one another” (112). This problem is more generally
 apparent in the 
choice
 we face in referring to the Canterbury Tales in the singu ­
lar or in the plural. When we talk about the Canterbury Tales, should we say
 the Canterbury Tales “is” or the Canterbury Tales “
are
”?
There seems little w  can do about
 
the missing or partial pieces of the Can ­
terbury Tales short of a manuscript discovery. However, I want to 
suggest
 a way  
in
 
which  we might be more attentive to the various texts we have. Such atten ­
tion, paradoxically, will focus precisely on the missing pieces of Chaucer’s text,
 the absences so frustrating to Chaucer’s readers. Viewing the poem through
 these absences, as it were, amounts to a kind of concentration on 
precisely
 what  
Chaucer left us. But such attention will also call into question the ways in
 which the structure of the Canterbury Tales has been elaborated 
before.
 For  
even while recognizing that the poem has been left in a state of incompletion,
 many critics have still found enough evidence to argue for its structure. While
 this essay itself contributes to such an enterprise, it seeks to do so from a decid
­edly different
 
vantage point. In what follows I will do two things: first, I will 
discuss the structure of the Canterbury Tales (as a single
 
poem) through its miss ­
ing parts. I will ask, that is, how certain absences 
figure
 in the poem as well as  
how absence more generally and pervasively figures the poem itself. For what
 isn’t in the poem — yet what has left traces of a presence, real or imaginary,
 authorial or scribal — invades our thoughts about, and structures for us what
 is, the Canterbury Tales. And second, I would like to suggest how this 
play
 of  
absence and presence organizes the
 
internal narratives themselves, for what isn’t  
in the 
tales,
 I will show, determines to a great extent what is. To follow such a  
line of inquiry
 
will reveal how these partial tales (or non-tales) uncannily rep ­
resent the Canterbury Tales, how the implied but unstated has so much power
 in the poem.8 It
 
is precisely what  has been understated, or stated just under the  
text through implication, that controls the trajectory of Chaucer’s last poetic
 fiction.
Generally viewed and spoken of as a unified
 
poem, the Canterbury Tales  has  
benefited from a great deal of criticism devoted to the shape and substance of
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 In The Structure of the Canterbury Tales, Helen Cooper  
has produced the most extensive commentary on the subject, in which she
 claims that “the Canterbury Tales demands to be looked at whole; anything less
 will 
yield
 only partial and restricted results” (244). Such a comment, in its call  
for comprehensive analysis, may be read as representative of criticism that
 takes as its subject the “structure,” “unity,” or “idea” of the Canterbury
 
T les.9 Yet such  
structural criticism tends to find remarkably coherent “wholes” when address
­ing this particularly fragmentary poem. While criticism that attends to these
 totalizing concepts rarely fails to mention the gaps in Chaucer’s poem (the
 
bro ­
ken or missing stories, as well as the disjunction between fragments), it
 
is inter ­
esting to note how it mentions them primarily in order to dispose of them: the
 overarching concepts of “structure,” “unity,” and “idea” are always independent
 of these narrative absences.
Appearing to take the absences in the Canterbury Tales seriously, Donald
 
Howard calls attention to the importance of junctures (the pauses that make
 language intelligible). He writes, “The term is usefu
l
 if we are to talk about a  
literary structure whose units are tales. We need to look for the kinds of junc
­tures between the tales: they seem to be pauses’ or gaps or starting points, but
 if there is structure at all they are points where units are related” (211). How
­ever, Howard employs this concept from structural linguistics in order to level
 the junctures, 
by
 finding in them a particular meaning that effectively erases  
their presence. He reads, for example, the “headless junctures” (fragments that
 begin abruptly without headlinks) as intentional, arguing “that [Chaucer]
 meant the Wife’s, Physician’s, Shipman’s, and Second Nun’s performances to
 start without any words from the narrator, as if in medias res." Howard contin
­ues, interpreting the 
significance
 of these junctures: “To say Chaucer planned  
it this 
way
 is to say a great deal. Yet some instinct, some pleasure he found in  
these abrupt beginnings, might have kept him from supplying the links” (214).
 Howard 
fully
 admits the conjectural nature of this argument: “It is a conjec ­
ture, true; but so is anything else
 
we say about what Chaucer didn't write. And  
all
 
I am saying is that these headless junctures, which come at  key positions, are  
effective as they are” (215). The more significant phrase in this admission, a
 phrase that Howard did not emphasize, concerns the “key positions” of these
 headless junctures. His argument becomes entirely circular: they are of course
 “key” because of the “disruptive” 
tales
 they introduce “in medias res.” But the  
evidence for
 
the disruptive nature of these tales comes largely from their abrupt  
beginnings. I would gladly concede Howard’s point with the Wife of
 
Bath’s  
Prologue, which I would hazard as the foundation for his line of argument. The
 term “disruptive” 
fits
 no performance better. Yet it fits precisely because of the  
way the frame, missing at the headless juncture, is incorporated into her Pro ­
logue with the interruptions of the Pardoner and Friar, who make explicit,
 along with the Wife’s polemical rhetoric, the disruptive nature of her discourse.
 The Physician, Shipman, and Second Nun are thornier cases, and I remain
 unconvinced that they 
follow
 the Wife’s model. They must, however, occupy  
“key” positions because they form headless junctures, not vice versa. Thus,
 while Howard ostensibly places these absences center stage, he tellingly limits
 their function in order to locate determinate meaning there.
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Interestingly, Howard finds the unfinished Cook
'
s Tale and Squire’s Tale  
similarly meaningful. But for all his innovative discussion of junctures, he reads
 the endings of these tales quite conventionally. Like Cooper, Howard suggests
 that
 
the Cook’s Tale may have been too “scurrilous” to be  written or copied. Its  
breakage just as the Cook introduces the wife who “swyved for hir sustenance”
 (1.4422) suggests the ultimate commercialization of sexual desire. In Cooper’s
 words, “To overgo the physical crudity of the Miller’s and Reeve’s Tales, as the
 reference to
 
whoring suggests it might, the plot would need to be very  crude  —  
perhaps too much so for Chaucer’s taste” (120). And similar to many other
 readers, Howard thinks the Squire’s Tale finished
 
in  its present  condition. Such  
arguments find the Squire intentionally interrupted either for artistic purposes
 that leave the Squire wanting as a narrator or because Chaucer’s “sense of deco
­rum” prevented him from completing the Squire’s Tale, which suggests in its
 proleptic final lines a potential incest story.10
This conclusive interpretation of Chaucer’s fragments is by no means lim
­
ited to discussion of these two tales, however, nor to Howard’s work. Dolores
 Frese uses numerological analysis to suggest that the untold 
tales
 were never  
meant
 
to be written. She writes the most literal  defense of the poem as  we have  
it in Ellesmere, and her effort at
 
understanding the text as it has come down to  
us produces a reading of completeness and significance as is:
[F]ar from indicating an abandoned or imperfectly completed 
work, 
Chaucer’s company of narrators — whose careful
 
introduction in the “Gen ­
eral Prologue” may be variously construed as numbering twenty-eight,  
twenty-nine, thirty or thirty-one, and who perform a numerically fixed
 schedule of “Tales” whose total is twenty-four
 
— serves to supply  the Can ­
terbury Tales with a figuration that represents the hours of the day and the
 days of the month.
(7)
Frese not only enumerates the ways the General Prologue is various but also
 
finds a determinate meaning to such variety. But neither is this logic specific
 to numerological analysis. Many of Chaucer’s readers find this kind of incom
­pletion or contradiction Chaucer’s very intention. One only has to think of
 those previously mentioned 
critics
 arguing ever vigorously that the unfinished  
Cook’s Tale and the Squire’s Tale are, in fact, finished as they are (Braddy;
 Goodman; Peterson).
When unity is sought in the Canterbury Tales readers often look beyond
 
Chaucer to unifying and totalizing schemes located within his historical 
milieu. Attention to medieval literary theory or
 
genre has provided critics w th a whole  
of which the “fragmentarity” (to coin a needed term) of the Canterbury Tales is
 simply an emergent part. Judson Allen and Theresa Moritz, for example,
 employ commentaries on Ovid to structure a typology of four kinds of
 
tales.  
They reopen the question of
 
unity from the perspective of  “medieval poetics  
and the medieval literary
 
form [of] the story-collection [to find] organization ­
al principles recognized and used in the Middle Ages [that] have not been
 taken into account in modern efforts to understand the plan of Chaucer’s story
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array” (4-5). Alternately, Robert Jordan uses neo-Platonic aesthetic theory to
 
organize his ideas of “inorganic structure.” Most recently, William Rogers sees
 the tales linked through “dissatisfaction” between world views. Yet, as persua
­sive as any of these arguments might be, we should also note how driven they
 are by the fragmentary state of Chaucer’s poem, how the absences in the Can
­terbury Tales permit, by literally giving space to, the claims of such arguments.
 Larry Sklute has recognized this critical paradox in his explanation of
 Chaucer’s poetic skepticism
 
when he writes that the “principle of inconclusive ­
ness has even motivated the enormous critical drive to establish unity in the
 Canterbury Tales. The complicated diversity of themes and subjects without a
 clear architectonics, as in the Divine Comedy, challenges readers to order and
 organize meaning where Chaucer does not” (123). The “drive” exhibited in
 these analyses emerges not only from Chaucer’s withdrawal from positions of
 authority but also in response to the material absences in the poem. Witness
 further the 
way
 this “drive” encourages read rs (much  like the Ellesmere editor)  
to make these absences invisible.




 elaborated by each critic, the arguments proffered go so far as  
to assert that it would make no significant difference to our understanding of
 the poem if the absent narratives 
were
 there. Donald Howard says as much in  
his discussion of the abandonment of the “quitting” theme of fragment one  
through “degeneration,” when he claims, quite conveniently considering the
 state of the manuscripts, that it was entirely unnecessary for Chaucer to have
 gone further with the fragment: “the 
effect 
would likely have been the same if  
the Cook’s
 
Tale were complete” (247). And of the Squire’s Tale he claims, “ As 
with Sir Thapas, Chaucer did not need to finish the tale;
 
what he wrote accom ­
plishes what he needed to accomplish” (265). Yet Bailly’s interruption of  
Chaucer’s Tale of Sir Thopas (“Namoore of this, for Goddes dignitee”
 [VII.919]) is far more explicit than the situation at the end of the Squire’s Tale,
 where the Franklin begins what is clearly a link to his own tale: “In feith,
 Squier, thow hast thee wel yquit, / And gentilly” (V.673-4). His words, how
­ever, say nothing explicitly disruptive to the Squire.11 In attempting to find
 meaning in the poem as it has been left to us, Howard reduces the potential
 meanings of the Cook’s and Squire’s
 
Tales altogether. Both formulations elide  
the question of these absent narratives completely. Here, as one more example
 of this limiting
 




 have finished the Cook’s tale, or even the Squire’s tale.  
Within limits, he could have added other tales of
 
certain types to certain  
existing 
groups.
 . . . But reading The Canterbury Tales as I have read it does  
produce a definite structure that might allow us to use the
 
work as evidence  
for inferring how the historical Chaucer might have looked at the world.
(122; emphasis added)
Therefore, according to these critics, the structure that we have (through what
 
we
 have of Chaucer’s poem) offers readers not only enough of Chaucer’s plan  
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for an adequate interpretation of its structure, it also provides the limit of such
 
an interpretation: while Chaucer could have written more, it would make no
 difference to the way we read him. This, it seems to me, goes far
 
beyond a dis ­
cussion of what Chaucer wrote or
 
what we have of that  writing, which implic ­
itly admits to limitation, to making a virtue of necessity. However, if critics
 have looked beyond Chaucer to find a 
way
 to talk about the entire poem,  
Chaucer himself has already anticipated this move and has passed comment on
 such totalizing schemes.
I have presented these unifying arguments in a particular light,
 
I will admit.  
The statements of some critics, notably Helen Cooper, are more convincing in
 their original contexts than I have represented them here. But it is not simply
 my framing of
 
such concerns with unity for the fragmentary Canterbury Tales  
that potentially reduces these arguments to the absurd. The substitution (the
 addition of theoretical or generic concerns in the
 place
 of Chaucerian narrative)  
seems so incongruous 
because
 of the sometimes violent way  Chaucer plays with  
such totalizing gestures in the 
tales
 themselves. We might recall, for example,  
the
 
way the Monk’s Tale provides a negative example of the story  collection for  
the Canterbury Tales, or the way the Squire’s Tale overuses traditional methods
 of rhetorical amplification in
 
what might be read as its broad parody of models  
of poetic construction. While these examples are recalled by most of these
 readers, they are rarely brought to bear on the arguments put forward about the
 structure of the Tales. In The Structure of the Canterbury Tales, Helen Cooper
 has followed Donald Howard in comparing Chaucer’s poem to the form of the
 interlaced romance. And 
like
 the interlaced romance, she says, “the tales work  
not merely sequentially, but cumulatively” (71) with their developing but not
 constant thematic relations. Yet even as Cooper notes that the Canterbury Tales
 resembles a good interlaced romance, one that is always controlled by the
 author, she points to a bad one in the Canterbury Tales itself: the Squire’s Tale.
 Here a resonant problem arises when the model offered by critics to structure
 the Canterbury Tales is 
already
 called into question by the poem. Cooper her ­
self
 
points out how typical the Squire’s Tale is (in what reads as a wholesale  
condemnation of the genre): “the fact remains that most examples of the form
 are shapeless monsters of inordinate bulk. . . . The Squire’s Tale, like all the
 other 
tales,
 is a good one of its own particular kind; but Chaucer is implicitly  
passing aesthetic judgment on the whole genre” (146). Yet it 
never
 strikes  
Cooper as a contradiction that Chaucer both exemplifies and “passes judgment”
 on interlaced romance in the Canterbury Tales. Implicit in her comment is a
 division between the structure offered by the generic frame of the entire Tales
 and the forms of individual tales. Chaucer, however, appears to resist such easy
 distinctions between frame and inset narratives. One might think of the
 appearance of the Wife of Bath in both mimetic frame and fictional discourse
 of the Merchant’s Tale. Chaucer’s fictionalizing of himself as the naively
 enthusiastic narrator of the whole journey and of his work in the Introduction
 to the Man of Law’s Tale also makes uneasy this sharp distinction between
 “reality” (what Chaucer does) and fiction (what his characters do). That even
 inclusive genres like the interlaced romance or the story collection should pro
­
vide
 adequate ways of understanding his Tales appears compromised by the
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the forms to be attributed to his poem and the inter ­




The privileging of such material at the level of the frame — Cooper’s easy
 
division between structural frame and the form of individual tales — is oddly
 reminiscent of the authority
 
granted to the General Prologue in older dramat ­
ic readings. This privileging effect might be seen as a legacy of the dramatic
 principle12 —
 
for all of Chaucer’s indeterminacy, his withdrawal from positions  
of authority, we still grasp for a stable position from which to view the tales,
 even when 
we
 have discredited the autonomous existence of the pilgrims in the  
General
 
Prologue as an example of just that  kind of stability. Using a variety of  
structural arguments, then, criticism attempts to construct a cohesive narrative
 the poem markedly lacks. I do not mean to suggest that these structural argu
­ments are useless or untenable but that they are themselves incomplete in not
 telling, not realizing, the extent to which they
 
depend on particular and impor ­
tant absences in the Canterbury Tales.
There is a long history of erasing the gaps in the Canterbury Tales through
 
a willful blindness that produces over-coherent structural arguments. Com
­menting on such erasure in a recent essay concerned with “Poems Without
 Endings,” John Burrow has called attention to the ways in which readers have
 historically handled the narrative problems presented by the Cook and the
 Squire. After manuscript space was presumably left for the endings of
 
these  
tal es when they  should be found, later editors, such as Caxton,  wrote brief end ­
ings, knitt  up the dangling bit with a few lines; for instance, the Squire  
announces the suspension of his tale
 
until  the next  time he will be given oppor ­
tunity to speak. Similarly, the Cook wraps things up with a moral that then
 facilitates the transition to the interpolated Tale of Gamelyn. Burrow notes
 here the simple wish of early manuscript editors and scribes to suture the holes
 in the partial tales rather than the desire for 
any
 continuations of them. How ­
ever, Burrow
 
also draws attention to the modern predilection,  unseen before the  
twentieth century, toward reading meaning into these 
breakages,
 a tendency  
that he attributes to the post-romantic aversion to closure, a delight in what I
 have earlier termed fragmentarity. He summarizes the force of this thorough
­ly modern opinion in this way: “the poems in question are either complete or
 better off incomplete” (34). Yet I would like to suggest that either 
way
 of view­
ing the problem produces analogous results: whether closing up the holes per
­functorily, writing tales to fill them up, or making the break part of the poem
 itself by reading it as intentionally disrupted, the reading strategies behind such
 comments betray a desire for the poem to mask the gap on its pages, a desire
 not to see its empty spaces. As Burrow notes, the strategies for such writing
 can be historicized according
 
to the values placed on closure and fragmentation  
in different eras, but the desire not to acknowledge the empty page — which
 Burrow attributes to the possibility of mere accident — persists.
Behind the narrative discontinuities in the Canterbury Tales there are, of
 
course, physical gaps in the manuscript tradition of the tales’ transmission. It
 is a measure of the ease with which critics have dispensed with the gaps in the
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Canterbury Tales that even these physical disruptions are patched over by the
 
totalizing steamroller of Chaucer interpretation. But there are other ways to
 consider the absences of Chaucer’s poem, even from the point of manuscript
 study. Take, for example, the unended 
tales
 that Rogers and Burrow mention.  
Stephen Partridge, in a conference paper entitled “Evaluating the Manuscript
 Evidence of the Cook’s and Squire’s
 
Tales,” provides codicological evidence for  
the authority of the manuscript gaps following these two tales by noting “the
 existence in the early fifteenth-century copies of unusual gaps [that extend to
 the end of a quire] in a text generally copied across quire boundaries” (7).
 Because scribal behavior 
elsewhere
 in the manuscripts disguises or explains the  
lack of endings to various tales, 
we
 should not  consider the  large gaps t the end  
of the Cook’s Tale and Squire’s Tale scribal but authorial.13 What might it
 mean interpretively to consider the empty space following the Cook’s
 
Tale and  
Squire’s Tale as Chaucerian, to consider these tales not simply as poems with
­out conclusions, or as fragmented works — even intentionally so — but as
 poems with blank, and therefore, potential lines written into the page? This
 observation asks us to read the blank page in a way that 
marks
 its difference  
from an intentionally disrupted or censored tale (where there might be no lines
 between its end and what
 
follows). Is Chaucer encoding delay and deferral into  
the Canterbury Tales? Have our interests — or an adequate space for them —
 been anticipated in an unusually material 
way
 by the gaps at the end of the  
Cook’s Tale and Squire’s Tale? This is not to say that we should fill that gap,
 even though that is 
precisely
 what critical commentary  manages to accomplish,  
foreclosing other possibilities by answering rather than presenting the absence
 as an interpretive crux. Perhaps one needs to leave the gap there editorially,
 even to reconstruct it, if only for historical reasons.14 We should present this
 absence as part of the text (rather than as a lack of text) and to teach our stu
­dents how to read this absence rather than to dispose of it for them.
In
 
the face of all these efforts to the contrary, I want  to suggest that absence  
is, in 
fact,
 central to the Canterbury  Tales. It  need not be explained away,  for not  
only
 
do the absences in the poem produce our readings of the entire Canterbury  
Tales, they produce the tales themselves. It is no accident that discussions of
 the structure of the Canterbury Tales, by
 
definition, argue toward unifying prin ­
ciples. But this argument, I would suggest, functions as a textual effect of the
 poem. Because of the contingencies of the poem’s existence as a collection of
 fragments left in a state of mid-composition or perhaps, more simply, non-sub
­ordination, the poem continues to undo itself, and it is this force above all that
 these readings of the poem inevitably resist. This difference can be seen at
 every level of the Tales: 
for
 example, between the kinds of joints in fragment  
one (four tales linked dramatically through what might be generally termed
 social
 
competition) and  those  in  fragment  seven (six tales linked only in a loose ­
ly formalistic way through variation in tale types),15 a difference that shows us  
different poems. And the very assembly of the tales, I would suggest, is itself
 produced by violations of imposed orders, which leaves us with a sense that
 there is always something
 
missing from the Canterbury Tales. The  poem derives  
its own spontaneous power 
by
 staging its own transgression.
Fragment 
one,
 for obvious reasons, provides the most developed and artic ­
ulated instance of this transgression. The General
 
Prologue organizes the com-
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pilgrims — from its highest-ranking secular participant, the Knight,  
right down to the “cherles” — according to the memory of its pilgrim narrator,
 an order that will be violated immediately when the Host 
takes
 control and a  
number of pilgrims that will change when a panting Canon and his Yeoman
 ride up to the pilgrims at “Boghtoun under Blee” (VIII.556). This originary
 order of the narrator’s memory, however, is itself already 
called
 into question,  
since the narrator has apologized for not “set[ting] folk in hir degree” (1.744).
 Thus, the order of pilgrims as presented in the General Prologue originates as
 a violation of another order (“degree”) that has never been set, while it simul
­taneously presents a kind of descending (if not absolute) social order.16 Yet
 concerns with order and organization do not end with the narrator but contin
­ue within the pilgrims’ fictional world. The Host, who appears to have set up
 a straw-drawing scheme to elect the Knight as the first teller, attempts to
 impose an order according to social
 
rank and propriety, an order  that might  fol ­
low the “degree” not offered by the narrator in the General Prologue, though
 one imagines Bailly
 
to have social priorities different from those of the pilgrim  
Chaucer. The Miller then interrupts Harry Bailly’s plan with a thematically
 oriented
 
game of “quitting” — one that comically deflates the high ideals, social  
and literary, of the Knight’s Tale. But the Reeve, in a literalization of the quit
­ting metaphor, and arguably a misreading of the reference of the Miller’s Tale,
 savages the Miller for the personal insult he sees dramatically expressed there.
 The transgressive turn that fuels fragment one relies on absenting something:
 degree, social pretention, insult, et cetera (even if that something is only
 momentarily constructed), displacing it from a potential structure and the pos
­sibility of order in the poem.
So various are the absences fueling the poem, in fact, that 
each
 of them has  
sparked separate critical movements in the interpretation of the Canterbury
 Tales — the dramatic reading is, of course, the most recognizable of these. It
 emerges from the Reeve’s depiction and its motivating anger, even from Harry
 Bailly’s implied sleight of hand. But this process also occurs outside of frag
­ment one. For instance,
 
we might consider the allegorical interpretation of the  
Clerk’s Tale problematized in the Clerk’s Envoy, the danger of childlike under
­standing witnessed in the Prioress’s behavior yet advocated
 
by her Tale, and the  
impossibility of moralizing, separating fruit and chaff, in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.
 In spite of all these “warnings” in the Canterbury Tales, however, such allegoriz
­ing and moralizing tendencies have not been given up; the extensive influence
 of Robertsonian exegesis in the critical tradition attests to that.17 From these
 considerations 
we
 might think of criticism emerging from such transgressions,  
in 
fact,
 criticism as a transgression of Chaucer’s poetry. The power of the Can ­
terbury Tales originates, then, not from a revelation of what the tales are — in
 what way they should be read and related — but
 
from a disclosure of what they  
are not. Seen in this way, Chaucer
 
leaves us a poem with many encoded modes  
of reading, all of which, of course, are subverted, destabilized, and critiqued.
 This situation suggests that how we should read the poem is always different
 from the 
way
 the poem is being read at any given moment. Every mode of  
reading is proposed and rejected by the Canterbury Tales: Harry Bailly’s literal-
 izations, the allegorization 
offered
 and rescinded  by the Clerk in his Envoy, the  
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moralizations trumpeted and frustrated by the Nun’s Priest, the dramatic and
 
thematic modes presented in fragment one that I previously mentioned.
Contrary to the many attempts to discover the structure of the Canterbury
 
Tales (and the interpretive frame such a structure provides), I want to suggest
 that what we ultimately find in Chaucer’s work reads more like the deconstruc-
 ture of the Canterbury Tales. Because of the 
way
 that he simultaneously offers  
multiple structures that are only disabled, we perhaps cannot even discuss such
 a thing as the structure of the Canterbury Tales
 
unless to do so we participate in  
and merely repeat Chaucer’s structural illusion. Deconstruction has, of course,
 been brought to bear on the critical reading of
 
the Canterbury Tales before.18  
In Traugott Lawler’s words, “The Canterbury Tales is in some obvious ways a
 deconstructor’s 
dream:
 not only an unfinished and so indeterminate text, with  
lots of evident discontinuity
 
and self-contradiction, but a nonreferential or self-  
referential or
 
mediated text,  both because many tales ask us to focus as much on  
the teller as on the subject matter and because such outward references as it has
 point regularly not to reality but to more texts” (85-6). In pointing out the
 absent narratives in the texture of the Canterbury Tales, the absences on its sur
­face which concretize the contradictions and disjunctions to which deconstruc
­tion so infamously draws attention, I mean to suggest that the texts to which
 the Canterbury Tales refers are not simply those “behind” the Chaucerian tales
 (like sources) but are parts of the Chaucerian
 tales
 themselves. Deconstructure,  
as I have employed the term here, gives a name to a text that is not only open-
 ended, as Lawler’s description suggests,
 
but open-centered as well.19 Similar to  
Marshall Leicester’s definition of “structure as deconstruction,” my use of the
 term deconstructure “registers (by undoing it ... ) the constructed character of
 
any
 meaning whatever, by showing that meaning is never an immanent proper ­
ty of things but always a way of reading, something done to a text by human
 agents rather
 
than derived by them from it” (Leicester, “Structure” 244). With ­
in the Canterbury Tales Chaucer dramatizes human agents struggling to con
­struct those meanings over and again.
Not only are gaps to be found between tales or at the ends of tales, absent
 
narratives appear to be the foundations for some of the 
tales
 themselves (espe ­
cially the romances, stories, like the Canterbury tales, which are part of
 
some  
larger, inclusive narrative). Here 
we
 might think, for example, of the narrative  
of incest the Man of Law refuses to entertain but ends up unwittingly repeat
­ing, as Carolyn Dinshaw shows, in his tale of Constance (88-112). Similarly,
 the recursive Squire’s Tale doubles over its own material again and again in a
 search for the “origin” (and therefore end) of its own fiction that
 
remains always  
prior, always absent (Scala, “Canacee”). And finally, another version of this
 absent narrative is witnessed in the occluded and overdetermined narrative of





Elaine Tuttle Hansen. Turning  to the Knight’s Tale, I  will  here show in  
brief the importance of the narrative absence originating and structuring the
 tale.




 the events of the Knight’s Tale, a form of which is  
included in Chaucer’s source, Boccaccio’s Teseide. In one of the few passages
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that Chaucer probably added to 
his
 “Palamon and Arcite” in order to incorpo ­
rate it into the Canterbury fiction, the Knight explains:
And 
certes,
 if it nere to long to heere,
I wolde have toold yow fully the manere
 How wonnen was the regne of Femenye
 By Theseus and by his chivalrye;
But al that thyng I moot as now forbere.
(875-8; 885)
Read traditionally as Chaucer
'
s simple abbreviation of  his Boccaccian source,  
this narrative gesture has not been of much concern. Indeed, if anything, it
 
has  
been taken as a marker of its narrators measured and elegant style, the Knight’s
 discursive control, so well matched by Theseus’ political and social ordering
 
impul
ses. As Cooper has pointed out, once the story of Palamon and Arcite is  
incorporated into the Canterbury fiction and ascribed to the Knight, "the rea
­
son
 for th[e] abbreviation, which thematically is already entirely justified, can  
now 
be
 fathered on the story  competition” (64). But unlike Cooper’s notion of  
transparent justification, making visible such omissions and their
 
regular effects  
in the Knight’s Tale becomes especially important because of the kind of prior
­ity his tale has.
Indeed, Cooper
 
herself calls attention to the way in which the abbreviation,  
potentially a rather neutral narrative strategy, becomes a significant and signi
­fying gesture of
 
the Knight’s once his tale is placed in position — a position  
that sets in motion the Canterbury Tales as a whole. As the initial tale, the
 Knight’s story works as a particular kind of origin for the other narratives to
 follow, and Cooper spends an entire chapter of her book on the multivalent
 opening afforded by the Knight’s Tale (91-107). The authoritative position of
 the Knight’s Tale comes from both its initial placement in the Canterbury
 scheme as well as its larger thematic and philosophic aspirations. It deals with
 such issues as order and chaos, 
divine
 intelligence, fate and free will, “genti-  
lesse,” “sovereintee,” and “curteseye,” issues that return in the tales that follow
 (Cooper 65). Cooper also notes the ideal beginning offered by the Knight’s
 Tale stylistically: its formality marks it off from everyday speech and sets a
 rhetorical standard, while its motifs and imagery — the recurring topoi of
 female beauty, love gardens, and romantic rivalry — emerge as a source for the
 other pilgrim speakers (65). In some sense all the other Canterbury tales are
 already contained in the Knight’s Tale; in Cooper’s words,
What emerges most clearly from the Knight’s Tale by itself is the immen
­
sit
y of issues it raises. These themes are not complete in themselves, as plot  
motifs are, but are often presented as questions. Later stories take up the
 questions in different forms, or occasionally even suggest answers; but all
 such concerns open out from the first of the tales.
(91)
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 might also see other stories indicated in what the Knight so self-con ­
sciously or rhetorically
 
excludes from his narration. The Canterbury Tales orig ­
inates as much in what the Knight cannot say as in what he can.
One of the Knight’s decorous and masterful pauses over matter he 
will
 not  
relate concerns Emily’s bath before her prayer to Diana, and the Knight him
­self makes us aware of the narrative stakes of his 
decisions
 about what matter  
should and should not be narrated. He describes:
This Emelye, with herte debonaire,
 
Hir body wessh with water of a welle.
But how she dide hir ryte I dar nat 
telle,
But it be any thing in general;
And yet it
 
were a game to heeren al.
To hym that meneth wel it
 
were no charge;




The Knight’s gestures are easily glossed over as polite 
refusal
 to discuss Emily’s  
private ablutions. They 
may
 even function more critically as an allusion to  
Acteon’s fatal crime of witnessing Diana’s bath, which Emily will herself refer
­ence in her prayer to the goddess (“keepe me fro thy vengeaunce and thyn ire,
 / That Attheon aboughte cruelly” [I.2302-3]).20 The Knight’s politeness thus
 contains an implicit warning of the dangers of telling such a tale, for to repeat
 this tale threatens a repetition of what happens in the tale. But the Squire’s gloss
 on his father’s masterful discourse prompts us to read more closely, to read
 between the Knight’s program of telling “in general” — what
 
most  readers have  
taken to be his narrative strategies throughout the adaptation of this “Stat-
 
ian
”/Boccaccian tale — and the pleasurable “game” of hearing “al.” As the  
Knight pauses over
 
what he “dar nat telle” and displays his self-imposed narra ­
tive restraint, he alludes — albeit
 
unwittingly — to the game that will momen ­
tarily break free from 
his
 control with the forward charge of the Miller, who  
certainly “meneth wel” but in an entirely different sense, and with the freedom
 that the Miller will take (“at his
 
large”) and to which  he will take the tale-telling  
game beyond
 
the “general.” We might  say, then, that in  the kind of concern and  
decorum the Knight shows here in abbreviating and closing
 
off subjects for nar ­
ration, even when heeding the warnings of classical models, he only exposes 
an open terrain 
for
 the Canterbury Tales to be taken into.
The quitting game that organizes and produces fragment one originates
 with the Knight, in both 
his
 high style of narrative speaking and his subject  
matter, as well as his elevated social position, to which the Miller is only the
 first to respond. But the Knight’s influence is felt far beyond fragment one.
 The Knight interrupts the Monk’s seemingly endless tragedies; he preserves





by the Merchant’s, Franklin’s, and Wife of Bath’s Tales. Moreover, 
his rhetorical control has also been used as a yardstick for the other secular
 
tal
es, most  notably the Squire’s, which has  been viewed in comparison as a naive  
and inept performance. Recently, I have challenged this typical view of the tale,
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arguing that the Squire is in fact an archetypal narrator (“Canacee”). His tale
 
“thematizes over and over again, almost to the point of parody, that which gets
 left out in the act of narration, indeed, how narration is founded upon particu
­lar acts of exclusion” (35). Here I would like to turn my attention to the retro
­spective effects of the Squire’s Tale, that is, its influence on our perception of
 the Knight’s rhetorical order. As I have already mentioned, the Knight func
­tions as a Thesean analogue; his narrative control mimes Theseus’ political
 order. However, while Theseus’ power and prerogative have been called into
 question, especially by feminist critics interested in exploring the politics of
 romance, the Knight as narrator and narrative exemplar
 
for the Canterbury  Tales  
has suffered relatively little. The kind of feminist argument 
offered
 by Elaine  
Hansen, for instance, has significant structural implications for the 
way
 in  
which the Knight’s Tale operates and therefore for the way
 
the rest of the tales  
do as well.
Hansen shows how the Knight’s Tale, which seems
 
primarily to concern the  
relations of the two male cousins and Emily, actually repeats a story passed over
 in the Knight’s opening lines. She writes:
The tale actually begins not with the love triangle — Palamon, Arcite, and
 
Emily — but with another triad of
 
characters that has a different gender  
ratio, in which Emily
 
is the only common factor: Theseus, Hippolyta, and  
her “yonge suster Emelye” (871) on the way back to Athens after Theseus
 has conquered the Amazons and married their queen.
(216)
Hansen draws attention here to the Knight’s characteristic use of rhetorical
 
tropes such as occupatio, his elegant manner of crafting and controlling the
 long story he has drawn from “Stace.” Occupatio, readers of the Squire’s
 romance will recall, is precisely the trope the Squire relies so heavily upon and
 the one 
his
 critical readers have found so troubling. The Squire’s occupatios  
mark the places at which his story
 
seems to digress out of control. Reading the  
tales linearly amounts to reading the Knight as the exemplar for the Squire.
 But to glance backwards from the Squire’s Tale gives us a different perspective
 on the relation of these two performances. The Squire’s focus on rhetoric,
 indeed the
 
way in which it seems to confound him and stunt the progress of his  
romance, calls attention to the Knight’s literalizations and excisions. The
 Knight, Hansen writes, “speaks of what he will not, he says, have time to rep
­resent fully.” But as Hansen goes on to show, this statement is not simply one
 of necessary abbreviation. The Knight
 
repeats this absent narrative of feminine  
conquest in the very story that he tells. In
 
her words,  “the conquest of Femenye  
that we were told we were not going to hear about is actually reenacted inside
 the 
gates
 of Athens through the narrative strategies” of the Knight’s Tale (223).  
If the conquest of the Amazons cannot be encompassed within the Knight’s
 performance, the conquest of women remains the fundamental gesture and ide
­ological end of the Knight’s romancing.
At work here and latent in Hansen’s analytical discourse, I would suggest,
 
is the repression of a story that results in a structural repetition compulsion.
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The Knight’s omissions need not only be read in terms of gender, in terms of a
 
feminine difference that his 
chivalry
 and gentilesse both require and contain.  
In the very story told by the Knight, built upon its continual scenes of battle
 (lyrical, martial, courtly) for Emily and ideological struggle (in which Emily
 must be denied her one spoken desire to remain a
 
virgin devotee of Diana, the  
huntress), the reign of Femenye is conquered and reconquered in a variety of
 ways that ultimately
 
“repeat” — by acting out — the narrative repressed in the  
Knight’s elegant and stylized opening gestures.21
Indeed, analogous to this absent narrative repressed and then repeated by
 
the Knight’s Tale, Emily herself functions as something of a missing story.
 Many readers, and most recently Susan Crane, have called our attention to
 Emily’s curious (and curiously silent) position as heroine of the Knight’s
 romance. Crane emphasizes the contradictions surrounding Emily and her
 unmotivated actions in the tale.22 Her one speech, we will
 
recall, is a  plea to be  
removed from the love triangle involving her (1.2297-2330). The other inti
­mations of Emily’s “desire,” her friendly glance
 
toward a victorious Arcite (“And  
she agayn hym caste a freendlich ye / (For
 
wommen, as to speken in comune, /  
Thei folwen alle the favour of Fortune)” [2680-2]), her sorrow at 
his
 funeral  
(“And after that cam woful Emelye, / With fyr in honde, as was that tyme the
 gyse” [2910-11]), and her happy union with Palamon (“And Emelye hym
 loveth so tendrely” [3103]), are all narrated secondhand, mediated and project
­
ed 
by the decree of Theseus as is her  marriage at the tale’s end — “‘Suster,’ quod  
he, ‘this is my fùlle assent’” (3075). She functions as a kind of undecidable
 blankness that suggests, in Crane’s words, “her configuration as a ground of
 adventure for the male protagonists” (173). Yet, Emily’s function as that
 “ground” work is literalized in the Knight’s Tale in a 
way
 that brings Crane’s  
and Hansen’s observations together in a telling way. Emily’s absence from the
 romance written around her by Palamon and Arcite, and then by Theseus, is
 emblematized as such in the tale. This absence, I would suggest, not only facil
­itates the projection of these male characters’ desires by
 
turning Emily into the  
“ground of adventure” but also makes the narrative possible, turning Emily —
 the absence of Emily, really — into the grounds of discourse.
Specifically, as Palamon and Arcite take matters into their own hands, that
 
is, in their primary and unsanctioned (as yet by Theseus) battle for Emily, the
 Knight relates their positions on a material and ideological landscape with the
 following simile:
Right as the hunters in the regne of Trace,
That stondeth at the gappe with a spere,
Whan hunted is the leon or the bere,
And hereth hym come russhyng in the greves,
And breketh bothe bowes and the leves,
And thynketh, “Heere cometh my mortal enemy!
Withoute faille, he moot be deed, or I,
For outher I moot sleen hym at the gappe,
 
Or he moot sleen 
me,
 if that me myshappe.”
(1.1638-46)
90
Journal X, Vol. 4 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol4/iss2/8
186 Journal x
Each Theban hero stands before his 
adversary
 as a Thracian hunter before his  
prey, each locked in a zero-sum game in which “he moot be deed, or I.” The
 “gappe” is glossed in The Riverside Chaucer as “gap (toward which the game is
 driven)” (47). The “gappe” is at the same time an open and empty field and the
 place of battle, the goal “toward which the game is driven” and that which, by
 giving the game its telos, makes it possible. It is the empty and unoccupied
 space that allows the contest to take place. Like Emily, this empty field pro
­vides the grounds for the competition between men. For narratologically,
 Emily’s storylessness, her continual and oppressive silence, her contradictory
 “desire” and appearance (at least as the Knight tells it), offer a point of contest
 for Palamon and Arcite. Emily is quite literally the gap “toward which the
 game is driven” in the Knight’s Tale, the gap without
 
which the tale, as well as  
all the socially and psychologically significant stories it tells and performs,
 could not itself exist.
The ostensibly whole, gapless, and unfragmented Knight’s Tale may be
 
seen, then, as the 
(w)hole
 of the Canterbury Tales in little. As in that Tale, what  
I hope to have shown throughout this discussion is how the gaps and absences
 in Canterbury Tales are not only necessary but structurally central. The critics
 who notice these absences but resist their function in understanding the struc
­ture of the poem are quite literally
 
missing something. I want to suggest above  
all that to read the absences in the Canterbury Tales
 
is to read the poem (as well  
as to read the poems). The absences are constitutive of structure, and to inter
­pret the Tales so as to erase these gaps is in some sense to change materially the
 Canterbury Tales. It is equally important to see that even the “whole” parts
 making up the Canterbury Tales (such as the Knight’s Tale) are themselves
 structured by absences. Placing the Canterbury Tales over and against any uni
­
fying
 or totalizing model (generic, theoretical, literary) only shows us the way  
in which the poem anticipates and transgresses that model — sometimes
 repeatedly. Structure is always becoming unstructured or, so to speak, decon-
 structure. So it is crucial that we learn to read Chaucer where he was writing
 the Canterbury Tales, “at the gappe.”
Notes
I wish to thank Douglas Bruster, Lisa Freinkel, Stephen Partridge, and Mar
­
jorie Curry Woods for
 
their helpful suggestions on a number of earlier drafts of  
this essay, as well as the essay’s anonymous readers.
1.
 
With concern for the philosophic issue of conclusiveness see Sklute.  
Burrow offers an excellent overview of the textual situations accompanying
 Chaucer’s fragmentary and unfinished 
work. 2.
 
See the facsimile of the Hengwrt MS published by the Variorum  
Chaucer Project (Ruggiers). For a discussion of the manuscript hands in
 Hengwrt, see also Manly and Rickert 269, 274 and 
passim.
 All parenthetical  





It should also be remembered that although editors seem to have such  
decisions made for them by
 
their initial choice of base manuscript, readers are
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complicit in such decisions when they 
choose
 an edition or, when using the  
standard Riverside Chaucer, they 
choose




This association of events — extending his tenement lease and revising  
fragment one — is also made by Pearsall. Summarizing the reasons for
 Chaucers move to Westminster, he writes: “He was most probably in failing
 health, though I should 
like
 to believe he was in these months engaged in  
expanding the plan of The Canterbury Tales and adding the non-finishing
 touches to the Cook’s Tale rather than sinking into the penitential gloom that
 preceded the deathbed repentance that Thomas Gascoigne so predictably
 attributes to him” (Life 275).
5.
 
See The  Riverside Chaucer, explanatory notes (796-7).
6.
 
I leave in abeyance the question of the Prioress’  other two priests. While  
no manuscript contains any variant for the “preestes three” accompanying  
Madame Eglantyne on the pilgrimage, their existence has been contested. See





See Manly for a discussion of the Manciple’s Tale as a story for the  
return journey. See also the continuations of the Canterbury Tales, such as John




Such power has been previously noted in local discussions (though not  
in the large scale way I present here), as, for example, when Lee Patterson, fol
­lowing Paul Strohm, notes how the ethic of the pilgrimage is significantly
 silently expressed: “‘the social ethic of the pilgrimage’ is that of the silent
 guildsmen: ‘fraternity, expressed through vital and egalitarian social inter
­change, is the order of the day’” (323).
9.
 
Besides Cooper see, for example, Baldwin; Howard; Jordan; Owen;  
Payne, chapter 5; and Rogers.
10.
 
See, for example, Braddy; Goodman; Pearsall, “Squire”; and Peterson.
11.
 
In fact, while much of the evidence for the Franklin’s interruption of  
the Squire’s Tale, and hence the Squire’s Tale’s completion in its present condi
­tion, comes from the social interchange
 
read out of this link, we might note that  




Reading the General Prologue as a “key” to understanding the tales  
begins with Kittredge and ends with Lumiansky whose text ironizes every tale
 to the moral detriment of its “flawed” narrator.
13.
 
Speaking of the Cook’s Tale particularly, but in ways we can easily  
apply to the Squire’s Tale as well, Partridge “accounts] for the manuscript evi ­
dence which would argue on one hand, that Chaucer did not continue the tale
 or consider it complete as it stands and yet, on the other, that its survival in its
 present form is not accidental” (6). Partridge, citing Derek Pearsall, explains
 that the Canterbury Tales may have been written “in order to improve the
 chances for survival of a number of shorter pieces” to explain why Chaucer
 would have allowed fragment one to be copied for presentation even when the
 booklet acknowledges the provisional nature of the
 work.
 For Pearsall’s discus ­
sion of the issue, see Canterbury 4.
92





As Partridge notes, the leaves left blank to the end of the quire, in  
Ellesmere and Hengwrt for example, have since been removed.
15.
 




For a reading of the General Prologue as a deconstructive violation of  
estates literature see Leicester, “Structure,” especially 244-5.
17.
 
See Robertson, Prefaces and Essays. Recent publications registering the  
lingering influence of Robertsons work include Besserman; Hermann and
 Burke; Hill; Jeffrey; Keenan; and Olson.
18.
 
The usefulness of deconstruction in understanding Chaucers work  has  
been most 
fully
 discussed by Leicester.
19.
 
Interestingly, Howard’s discussion of the interlace structure is invested  
in a similarly “
open
” model; he explains, “the interlace often has no beginning  
or end or center, yet
 
is coherent” (220). However, with the Canterbury Tales  the  
beginning does not seem to be in 
any
 question. Howard uses such a formula ­
tion, likening the interlace to an “endless knot” (220) or a labyrinth (226), in
 order to free 
readers
 from linear reading constraints and to open the Tales to a  
variety of simultaneous nonlinear relationships. And indeed, while Howard
 notes the clear beginning of the Canterbury pilgrimage, he attributes this to
 “form” rather than structure.
20.
 
Slightly  earlier in the Knight’s Tale, the story of Acteon is itself depict ­
ed on the walls of the temple of Diana. The Knight says: “Ther 
saugh
 I  
Attheon an hert ymaked, / For vengeaunce that he saugh Diane al naked; / I
 saugh how that his houndes have hym caught / And freeten hym, for that they
 knewe hym naught” 
(1.2065-8).
 Crane also calls attention to the Knight’s  
refusal to narrate Emily’s bathing ritual and its relation to the Acteon story
 (176-7): “The prohibition
 
implicit in  'I dar nat telle’ and the transgressive  plea ­
sure in ‘it were a game to heeren al’ both recognize feminine separateness and
 adumbrate its violation” (177). That both Emily and the Knight align them
­selves with Acteon is an interesting association I cannot pursue here.
21.
 
I here draw on classical Freudian theory to delineate the relation of the  
compulsion to repeat with the concept of repression. For a fuller discussion of
 the use of the concepts of repression and repetition in literary
 
analysis see Rim-  
mon-Kenan and, in a specifically medieval literary context, Scala, “Wanting.”
22.
 
Crane argues for an affiliation between the Knight’s  Tale and romance  
that explains some of the illogicalities and ambiguities of
 
an otherwise classi ­
cally oriented and Boethian narrative. She writes, “Emelye is the most evident
 instance of a
 
multivoiced ambiguity that characterizes the Knight's  Tale and that  




Judson Boyce, and Theresa Anne Moritz. A  Distinction of Stories: The  
Medieval Unity of Chaucers Fair Chain of Narratives for Canterbury.
 Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1981.
Andrew, Malcolm, ed. A Variorum Edition of the Works of Geoffrey Chaucer. The
 
Canterbury Tales. Pt. 1, A and B. The General Prologue. Vol. 2. Norman:
 U of Oklahoma P, 1993.
93
Editors: Vol. 4, No. 2 (2000): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Elizabeth Scala 189
Astell, Ann. “Chaucer’s "Literature Group’ and the
 
Medieval Causes of Books.”  
ELH59 (1992): 269-87.
Baldwin, Ralph. The Unity of the Canterbury Tales. Anglistica 5. Copenhagen:
 
Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1955.
Besserman, Lawrence 
L.
 Chaucers Biblical Poetics. Norman: U of Oklahoma  
P, 1998.
Bowers, John M., ed. The Canterbury Tales: Fifteenth-Century Continuations
 
and Additions. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 1992.
Braddy, Haldeen. “The Genre of Chaucer’s Squire's Tale." Journal of English
 
and Germanic Philology 41 (1942): 279-90.
Burrow, J. A. “Poems Without Endings.” Studies in the 
Age
 of Chaucer 13  
(1991): 17-37.
Chaucer, Geoffrey. The Riverside Chaucer. Gen. ed. Larry D. Benson. Boston:
 
Houghton Mifflin, 1987.
Cooper, Helen. The Structure of the Canterbury Tales. London: Duckworth,
 
1983.





Sexual Poetics. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1989.
Frese, Dolores. An
 
Ars Legendi  for Chaucers Canterbury Tales: A Reconstructive  
Reading. Gainesville: U of Florida P, 1991.
Gaylord, Alan T. “'Sentence’ and 'Solaas’ in Fragment VII of
 
the Canterbury  
Tales: Harry 
Bailly
 as Horseback Editor.” PMLA 82 (1961): 226-35.
Goodman, Jennifer. “Chaucer’s Squire's Tale and the Rise of Chivalry.” Studies
 in the Age of Chaucer
 
5 (1979): 127-36.
Hansen, Elaine Tuttle. Chaucer and the Fictions of Gender. Berkeley: U of Cal
­ifornia P, 1992.
Hermann, John P., and John J. Burke, Jr., eds. Signs and Symbols in Chaucer's
 
Poetry. University: U of Alabama P, 1981.
Hill, John M. Chaucerian Belief: The Poetics of Reverence and
 
Delight. New  
Haven: Yale UP, 1991.
Howard, Donald. The Idea of the Canterbury Tales. Berkeley: U of California
 
P, 1976.
Jeffrey, David Lyle, ed. Chaucer and Scriptural Tradition. Ottawa: U of Ottawa
 
P, 1984.




Inorganic Structure. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1967.
Keenan, Hugh T, ed. Typology and English Medieval Literature. New York:
 AMS P, 1992.
Kittredge, George Lyman. Chaucer and His Poetry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
 
UP, 1915.
Lawler, Traugott. “Deconstructing the Canterbury Tales: Con.” Studies in the
 
Age of Chaucer: Proceedings 2 (1987): 83-91.
Leicester, H. Marshall, Jr. “"Oure tonges Difference': Textuality and Decon
­
struction in Chaucer.” Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers. Ed. Lau
­rie Finke and Martin Shichtman. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987. 15-26.
—. “Structure as Deconstruction: "Chaucer and Estates Satire’ in the General
94
Journal X, Vol. 4 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol4/iss2/8
190 Journal x
Prologue, or Reading Chaucer as a Prologue to the History
 
of Disenchant-  
ment.” Exemplaria 2 (1990): 241-61.
Lumiansky,
 R. M. Of Sondry Folk: The Dramatic Principle in the Canterbury  
Tales. Austin: U of Texas P, 1955.
Manly John Matthews. "Tales of the Homeward Journey.” Studies in Philolo
­
gy 28 (1931): 81-5.
, and Edith Rickert. The Text of the Canterbury Tales: Studied on the
 
Basis of  
all Known Manuscripts. Vol. 1. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1940.
Olson, Paul
 
A. The Canterbury Tales and the Good Society. Princeton: Prince ­
ton UP, 1986.
Owen, Charles A. Pilgrimage and Storytelling: The Dialectic of
 
“Ernest” and  
“Game.” Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1977.
Partridge, Stephen. "Evaluating the Manuscript Evidence of
 
the Cook’s and  
Squire’s Tales.” Unpublished essay.
Payne, Robert. The Key of Remembrance: A 
Study
 in Chaucers Poetics. New  
Haven: Yale UP, 1965.
Pearsall, Derek. The Canterbury Tales. 1985. New York: Routledge, 1993.
—. The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992.
—. "The Squire as Story-teller.” University of Toronto Quarterly 34 (1964): 82-
 
92.
Patterson, Lee. Chaucer and the Subject of History. Madison: U of Wisconsin
 
P, 1991.
Peterson, Joyce. "The Finished Fragment: A Reassessment of the Squire's
 
Tale.” Chaucer Review 5 (1970): 62-74.
Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. "Narration as Repetition: The Case of Gunther
 
Grass’s Cat and Mouse.” Discourse in Psychoanalysis and Literature. Ed.
 Rimmon-Kenan. London: Methuen, 1987. 176-87.
Robertson, D. W. Essays in Medieval Culture. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980.
—. A Preface to Chaucer. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1962.
Rogers, William. Upon the Ways: The Structure of the Canterbury Tales. Victo
­
ria, BC: U of Victoria P, 1986.
Ruggiers, Paul G., ed. The Canterbury
 
Tales. A Facsimile and Transcription of the  
Hengwrt Manuscript, with Variants from the Ellesmere Manuscript. Norman:
 U of Oklahoma P, 1979.
Scala, Elizabeth. "Canacee and the Chaucer Canon: Incest and Other
 
Unnar-  
ratables.” Chaucer Review 30 (1995): 15-39.
—. "The
 
Wanting Words of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: Narrative Past,  
Present, and Absent.” Exemplaria 6 (1994): 305-38.
Sklute, Larry. Virtue of
 
Necessity: Inconclusiveness and Narrative Form in  
Chaucer
'
s Poetry. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1984.
Strohm, Paul. "The Social and Literary Scene in England.” The Cambridge
 Chaucer Companion. Ed. Piero Boitani and Jill Mann. Cambridge: Cam
­bridge UP, 1986. 1-18.
95
Editors: Vol. 4, No. 2 (2000): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Why Biography?
Robert L. Mack
Robert L, Mack is a
 
Lecturer at the Univer
­sity of
 
Exeter. He has  
recently completed a
 biography of the eigh
­teenth-century poet
 Thomas Gray. He
 
has  
edited a number of
 eighteenth-century
 texts, including Horace
 Walpoles The Castle
 of Otranto and the
 Arabian Nights.
Why does writing make us chase the
 
writer? Why cant we leave well enough
 alone? Why aren’t the books enough? . . .
 What makes us randy for relics? Don’t we
 believe the words enough? Do we think
 the leavings of a life contain some ancil
­lary truth? When Robert Louis Steven
­son died, his business-minded Scottish
 nanny quietly began selling hair, which
 she claimed to have cut from the writer’s
 head forty years earlier. The believers, the
 seekers, the pursuers bought enough of it
 to stuff a sofa.
—Julian Barnes, Flaubert's Parrot
It sometimes strikes me as remarkable that a genera
­
tion of professional critics who otherwise remain
 close to preternaturally alive to the slightest develop
­ments and mutations
 
within any of the more fashion ­
able or yet-emerging "schools” of literary criticism
 and cultural theory tend still, when referring with
 typical condescension to the genre of literary biogra
­phy, to take for granted that the governing 
forms
 of  
such biographies are themselves of such inflexible
 custom as long since to have hardened into the stuff
 of immutable and dry-as-dust 
conventionality.
 Pick  
up a y literary biography, most of today's critics seem  
generally to assume, and however unique or specific
 the 
precise
 details of the particular "life” being relat ­
ed might necessarily be, the biographical narrative
 itself — both the story it has to tell and the manner
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in which it sets about telling
 
that story will perforce turn out to be much the  
same as that contained within the pages of 
any
 other comparable literary life.  
Whether the subject in question is Geoffrey Chaucer or Alexander Pope,
 Henry James or Virginia Woolf, the biographical formula, as it 
were,
 has  
already been set in stone; any reasonably informed reader of biographical criti
­cism will know pretty much
 
what to expect well before he or she has taken the  
trouble even to lift the latest such volume from its 
place
 on the shelf. Indeed,  
the pleasure to be found in the act of reading, in such instances, is assumed to
 consist in large part in the satisfied fulfillment of such comfortable, readerly
 expectations.
The formula itself is familiar, and can be laid out roughly as follows: the
 
family background of the subject is briefly set out for the reader, thus placing
 the individual in question with brisk 
efficiency
 within the context of his or her  
defining social, cultural, domestic, and psychological milieus. The events of
 childhood years are then narrated with a similar concision, following the bio
­graphical subject from home school or grammar school, as the case 
may
 be,  
through to the achievements of their university career or
 
to the commencement  
of early professional activity. The advancement of 
any 
life is then divided into  
a series of equally foresee ble “stages,” typically commencing with the “Early”
 years — productive of juvenalia and rebellion — on through the “Middle” years
 — the era of central, defining achievement and very often the accession of first
 fame and recognition — to, finally, the “Later” years — throughout which the
 subject is either lionized by his or her peers, or, alternatively, unaccountably
 neglected and left instead for posthumous resuscitation at the hands of a later,
 more shrewdly appreciative generation of scholars and critics.
Such, at least, is the basic itinerary. Along the 
way
 the reader can with rea ­
son expect to be treated to some hitherto unknown details regarding the life of
 the biographical subject. Such revelations (which in recent years have tended
 more often than not to disclose the nature of previously unacknowledged sexu
­al preferences and peculiarities) arguably act as a necessary corrective to what
 might otherwise appear to 
be
 the genre’s nearly irresistible impulse towards  
hagiography. As such, they often constitute a significant if not ostentatious
 gesture of dispassion — an earnest scholarly objectivity. Such potentially intru
­sive or unseemly disclosures, after all, look to reassure the modern reader that
 the life writer is not blind to — and would certainly never stoop to conceal —
 
any
 possibly questionable or indiscrete behavior on the part of his or her sub ­
ject. So, for example, can we find Richard Ellmann, in his 1988 biography of
 Oscar Wilde, taking care to underscore the significance of his subject’s (con
­jectured) contraction of syphilis while yet a student at Oxford as “
an
 event . . .  
that was to change his whole conception of himself” (92-3). So, too, does
 Phyllis Grosskurth go out of her way in her 1997 biography of Byron to note
 the “homo-erotic tinge” (48) of the poet’s Harrow friendships — a “tinge” the
 slightest mention of which, the reader is likely to recall, had been scrupulously
 avoided by Byron’s earlier and rather more reverential biographers, most
 notably Leslie Marchand. Likewise Benita Eisler, in her even more massive
 biography of the same poet, spends a significant amount of time setting the
 alliances of Byron and 
his
 friends within the “homoerotic underworld” of the
97
Editors: Vol. 4, No. 2 (2000): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Robert L. Mack 193
Harrow school, an environment in which “every form of transgressive sexuality,
 
from gang rape to sadomasochistic activity” (61), was openly indulged. In a
 similar manner, Andrew Motion, in his portrait of the twentieth-century poet
 Philip Larkin, though obviously and with good reason himself a fan of his sub
­ject’s poetry, makes no attempt to hide or otherwise to disguise 
any
 evidence of  
the often appalling depths of Larkins racism d xenophobia, or to avoid the
 ethical
 
questions raised by the  poet’s secret and sometimes complicated love tri ­
angles.
Increasingly as the twentieth century drew to its end, disclosing
 
some of the  
more unsavory or potentially scandalous elements of 
an
 author’s past was  
thought to constitute 
an
 essential component of the biographer’s task. Thus,  
for example, did Morton N. Cohen’s 1995 account of the life and writings of
 Lewis Carroll, in which Dodgson’s photography of nude children 
were described as “valuable examples of Charles’s photographic art” (168), pass con
­siderably less noticed than Michael Bakewell’s competing, 1996 Lewis Carroll,
 which ends one chapter section devoted to the same subject with the ominous
 pronouncement that “Dodgson’s obsession with taking pictures of little girls
 scantily clad or ‘in Eve’s original dress’ was threatening to become dangerous”
 (169). This having been said, it
 
perhaps comes as no real surprise that even the  
most professedly revelatory biographies have tended in recent years to ask the
 same predictable questions of their subjects. Was he a suppressed pedophile?
 Was he sexist? Was she a lesbian? 
Was
 he impotent, or did he sire an illegiti ­
mate child? Did she secretly marry X or Y? Or was it Z? The more sensa
­tional the answers to such questions, it goes without saying, the better for
 almost all concerned (the biographical subject, in each case, perhaps him- or
 herself alone excluded).
The extent
 
to which an  increasing number of more recent biographies have  
set about baffling even the most conventional expectations of biography as a  
genre, however, is so great as no longer to be ignored. If biography remains
 among the more obviously pleasurable reading material of a wide range of indi
­viduals (and it does; Paula Backscheider reminds us that biography is “the last
 literary
 
genre to be read by a very wide cross section of people [and defies] the  
usual marketing categories based on age, sex, occupation, education, race, and
 class” [xiii]),
 
then  today’s practitioners have  pushed  the traditional limits of bio ­
graphical inquiry so far as finally to tip the genre into something of an all-out
 crisis. Even the most seemingly unassailable of conventions in biography —
 the chronological imperative of the
 
biographical  narrative, for  example (its need  
first and foremost to tell a life story) or the pretense on the part of the life
­writer to some degree of objective, historical distance from his or her subject —
 would appear
 
in recent years to have fallen by the wayside. No longer, it seems,  
will any self-respecting biographer even pretend to offer the straightforward or
 objective trajectory of any creative life.
Such change has been in the offing for some time now. Unapologetically
 
creative works such as Julian Barnes’s 1984 Flaubert's Parrot, after all, had
 looked to demonstrate just how elusive any proposed biographical subject truly
 was, and, in so doing, quite brilliantly drew attention to the treacherous and
 shifting sands on which the prospective biographer sets out to build the struc
­
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ture of his or her narrative. Victoria Glendenning once asked: “Is the story of
 
your life what happens to you, or what you feel happens to you, or what
 observers see happening to you?” (“Lies and 
Silences
” 51); the three separate  
and highly contradictory chronologies Barnes offered
 his
 readers for the outline  
of Flaubert’s life dramatically highlighted the differences between each of these
 possible approaches. The American novelist Stephen Millhauser, whose 1996
 mock-biography, Martin
 
Dressier: The Tale  of an American  Dreamer,  was to gar ­
ner major critical acclaim, had already, years earlier, dissected the conventions
 of the genre in 
his
 shrewdly perceptive send-up Edwin Mullhouse: The Life and  
Death of an American Writer, 1943-1954. 
Likewise,
 Peter Ackroyd, who began  
his own career with fictional retellings of the lives of writers such as Thomas
 Chatterton and Oscar Wilde, and who also wrote a rather
 
more straightforward  
account of T. S. Eliot, had begun more systematically to break the mold of tra
­ditional biographical telling with his massive 1990 volume, Dickens. Eschew
­ing the teleology which readers had merely taken for granted in earlier and
 designedly authoritative accounts of the novelist’s life (including those of, say,
 Charles Forster, Edgar Johnson, and Christopher Hibbert), Ackroyd made a
 point of punctuating his own version of Dickens’
 
life with a variety of non-bio-  
graphical explorations and interludes. These included dreams (“I have,” he
 confessed with some slight disappointment at one point in the volume, “only
 dreamt once of Charles Dickens” [1059]), mock “interviews” with his subject,
 near-hallucinatory encounters with Dickens’ fictional characters, moments of
 self-examination and critique masquerading as completed, post-publication
 questionnaires (for instance, answering queries such as “Why did you decide to
 write the book in the first place?” or “And did you like Dickens at the end of
 it?” [895-6]), as well as an historically impossible, round-table discussion
 among Ackroyd’s own biographical obsessions, namely, Chatterton, Wilde,
 Eliot and Dickens — a session that is introduced into the text as “a true con
­versation between imagined selves” (427). The cumulative effect of all these
 interludes and asides to the reader was, finally, radically to destabilize the
 genre’s pretensions to historicity and
 
truth-telling. “How could you  understand  
me when I do not even understand myself,” the spectral Dickens angrily asks
 the author at one
 
point  in the narrative. “The  biographer ...” begins his inter ­
locutor hesitantly. “Oh, biographers,” Ackroyd’s Dickens explodes in disgust,
 “biographers are simply novelists without imagination!” (754).




 subject, as well as deconstructing the biographical form — exposing its  
necessary fictions and laying bare its conventional techniques — has since
 
been  
followed with a vengeance. This would in many respects appear to be a good
 thing. At the very least, biographers can now lay claim to a much greater
 degree of freedom than ever before with regard to the manner in which they
 chose to expose or portray the 
life
 and work of their subjects. Glendenning’s  
recent account of the admittedly elusive Jonathan Swift, for instance, professes
 from the start to be less a conventional biography than a written “portrait” of
 the great Irish satirist — a “character” owing at least as much to the traditions
 of Theophrastus (whose own Characters presented the lives of thirty Athenian
 “types”) as to those established in eighteenth-century England by the likes of
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Samuel Johnson and James Boswell. Although not forsaking the organizing
 
principle of chronology altogether, Glendenning’s Jonathan Swift makes much
 of its recurrent "thematic” arguments as well, "beginning at the beginning, cir
­cling a little, gradually zeroing in on the man himself, until the central ques
­tions about him can finally be confronted in close-up” (13). Hermoine Lee’s
 impressive 1996 biography of Virginia Woolf adopted a similar approach to its
 subject, pausing within the 
basic
 narrative frame provided by Woolf 's life to  
revisit central categories and ideas (for instance, "Houses,” "Madness,” "War,”
 "Money and Fame,” et cetera). Pointedly marrying personal insight with bio
­graphical evidence — candidly situating speculative interpretation and conjec
­ture within the contextualizing gloss of any pertinent cultural history — Lee
 seemed intent on proving the assertion once made by Woolf in one of her own
 works ("The Journal of Mistress Joan
 
Martyn”) that  "imagination can have his ­
torical authority” (quoted in Lee 17). Reminding her readers toward the end
 of her volume that Woolf had herself been
 
"intensely  aware from her own read ­
ing
 
and  theorising of biography, of how lives are changed in retrospect, and  how  
life-stories need to be retold” (769), Lee goes to some pains to underscore the
 fact that, in her role as biographer, she has done her best to approach the ret
­rospective writing of Woolf’s life in
 
precisely the manner in which Woolf might  
herself have approached 
it. Lee’s approach to writing Woolf’s life is obviously and necessarily unique.
 Yet by far the most compelling and influential biographies written in recent
 years have sought in some similar manner to highlight rather than to obscure
 the practical breakdown of many of the more traditional or (increasingly) old-
 fashioned biographical formulae. 
Some
 have foregrounded the inescapably  
fraught and often deeply personal nature of the relationship that binds the
 writer of biography, on the one hand, to the life of 
his
 or her designated sub ­
ject, on the other. Toward the end of 
his
 overwhelming, five-volume explo­
rat on of the life and writings of George Bernard Shaw, the
 
biographer Michael  
Holroyd belatedly professed
 
his hope that he  has not "specifically identified [his  
own] opinions and prejudices with Shaw’s” (Shaw 82). "My deepest involve
­ment,” Holroyd protests at one point in the depths of his fourth volume, "is
 with biography itself
 
and its never-ending love-affair with human nature, and  
my 
aim
 has been to come a little nearer a  biographical ideal described by  Hugh  
Kingsmill as ‘the complete sympathy of complete detachment’” (83). The
 degree to which Holroyd must nevertheless have felt himself at times to have
 been a voyeuristic trespasser within the sacred demesne of another man’s most
 private and inner life is suggested by the manner in
 
which he modestly proffers  
his own, more recent attempt at (significantly) autobiography,
 
Basil Street Blues,  
as — again pace Kingsmill — little more than "a passport for traveling into the
 lives of others” (303).
Are such passports, then, to be demanded of all would-be biographers? Is
 
such a seemingly transparent and self-confessional visa in fact the documenta
­tion any writer ought to be required to produce in exchange for the right to
 explore (arguably to exploit) and calculatedly to represent the otherwise
 inscrutable history of another human being? Perhaps, though other
 
life writers  
go to even
 
greater lengths than Holroyd  to emphasize the very distances —  cul-
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tural, historical, psychological — that separate them from their subjects and,
 
though they rather obviously work to devise ways of bridging such gaps, make
 no excuses for the laborious effort of bridge-building itself. Increasingly fash
­ionable in recent years has been what might be described as the biography-as-
 cultural-encyclopedia approach to life writing. Bard Gooch’s 1993 chronicle
 City Poet: The Life and Times of Frank O'Hara might stand as something of
 
a  
model for this sort of account. Gooch opens his volume with an extended
 description of O’Hara’s Long Island funeral in July, 1966, in
 
which he recounts  
the eulogy delivered on that occasion by the painter Larry Rivers. “Rivers,”
 Gooch writes,
began describing O’Hara as he looked when he had visited him a 
few
 days  
earlier at Bayview General Hospital in Mastic Beach, Long Island, where
 O’Hara had survived for almost two days after his accident. The more
 Rivers went on, the more groans came from the mourners. Some yelled
 “Stop! Stop!” “He was purple wherever his skin showed through the white
 hospital gown,” Rivers continued. “He was a quarter larger than usual.
 Every few inches there was some sewing composed of dark blue thread.
 
Some
 stitching was straight and three or four inches long, others were  
longer and semicircular. The 
lids
 of both eyes were bluish black. It was  
hard to see 
his
 beautiful blue eyes which receded a little into his head. He  
breathed
 
with quick gasps. There  was a tube in one of his nostrils down to  
his stomach. . . . His leg bone was broken and splintered and pierced the
 skin. Every 
rib
 was cracked. A third of his liver was wiped out by the  
impact.”




Rivers’ eulogy for O’Hara, however appropriate or inappropriate it may have
 
been to the occasion of its delivery, encapsulates the kind of invasive scrutiny
 that characterizes so many
 
recent  biographies. Any lingering notion that there  
may have been aspects of the subject’s “private” 
life
 which ought properly to  
have remained the exclusive, discursive property of surviving friends and fami
­ly has been totally
 
and unceremoniously  abandoned. And should some readers, 
like the mourners at O’Hara’s funeral that summer, feel the impulse to cry
 “Stop! Stop!” — well, they can simply put down the book and stop reading.
 Gasping in outrage (a response that we are meant to understand to have been a
 betrayal only of an offended, provincial decorum) is no longer an option.
Yet one might well argue that Gooch’s own account of the life of O’Hara
 
itself falls short of the mark, at least to the extent to which any literary biogra
­phy
 
should finally leave its readers  with some better  understanding of the man ­
ner in which the lived 
experience
 of the biographical subject informed his or  
her work. In Gooch’s case, some critics contended, O’Hara’s creative
 
writing is  
perhaps too often referred to, itself, as documentary evidence in support of the
 “life,” and the amount of detail threatens to overwhelm the subject altogether.
 Joan Acocella, reviewing the volume in The New Yorker, complained that in
 Gooch’s account O’Hara is not 
allowed
 even to “walk across Harvard Square  
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without [the reader] being told what product is being advertised on the bill
­
board overhead” (77). This remains the case throughout the book. Narrating
 the events surrounding the death of O’Hara’s father, for example, Gooch not
 only informs the reader of such details as the name of the undertakers who laid
 out the body (Thomas Reilly &
 
Sons), but tells us where the firm was based as  
well (Westboro). When it comes to O’Hara’s own funeral, 
we
 learn the name  
of the firm (Yardley & Williams), their location (Sag
 
Harbor, Long Island), the  
size of the grave (four plot), the make of the coffin (standard), the decoration
 with which it is adorned (white roses and ivy), and the nature of the supports
 on which it rested (metal poles).
This having been said, the encyclopedic approach to life-writing seems on
 
many occasions to yield effective and at times absolutely dazzling results. Jenny
 Ugelow, in her weighty analysis of the graphic satirist William Hogarth (a vol
­ume that is pointedly and appropriately subtitled “A Life and a World”), man
­ages deftly to combine a social history of
 
the period in question, on the one  
hand,
 
with a portrait of the biographical subject, on the other, in such a  way so  
as not to leave her readers feeling that the thoroughgoing cultural background
 has in any way
 
obscured the individual life, but, rather, that it  has proved indis ­
pensable to the proper illumination of that life. Ian McIntyre effects a similar
 balancing
 
act in his recent Garrick — a comparably hefty account of the life and  
career of the great eighteenth-century actor and theatrical manager — at once
 assimilating and retailing a tremendous amount of personal correspondence,
 
play
 texts, and theater records, while at the same time ensuring that the vital  
exuberance of
 
Garrick’s personality is felt even at a distance of over two hun ­
dred years. 
Likewise,
 the central subject of Simon Schama’s 750-page study  
Rembrandt's Eyes may not make his entrance into the text which bears his name
 until page 202, but, as more than one 
reviewer
 pointed out, to accuse Schama  
himself of such sins as “
an
 over-inclusive imagination, an irrepressible appetite  
for human life and a fondness for enlivening vulgarity is only, in the end, to
 accuse him of having a Rembrandt-esque sensibility” — which, given the con
­text, “can hardly be counted a disadvantage” (Graham-Dixon A2). Signifi
­cantly, and much like Uglow’s Hogarth and McIntyre’s Garrick, Schama’s
 Rembrandt is finally a biographical subject infused with life — illumined from
 within — by its author’s own commitment to meaning. Attempting at one
 point to 
sum




he will always speak across the centuries to those for whom art might be
 
something other than then quest for ideal 
forms;
 to the unnumbered  
legions of damaged humanity who recognize, instinctively and with grati
­tude, Rembrandt’s vision of our fallen race,
 
with all  its flaws and infirmities  
squarely on view, as a proper subject for picturing, and, more important, as
 worthy of love, of saving grace.
(Quoted in Graham-Dixon A2)
As
 Andrew Graham-Dixon has written of such prose:
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The author of that sentence is clearly 
no
 subscriber to the arid post-struc ­
turalist academic dogma which holds that every statement should be
 framed with ironic self
 
doubt. . . . Schama has not been cowed out of his  
emotions, his morals, and his beliefs — and that is the best reason of all to
 applaud [his] 
book. (A2)
Yet another successful biography of this type is Jeremy Wilson’s close to awe
­
inspiring, 1989 volume Lawrence of
 
Arabia: The Authorized Biography of  T . E. 
Lawrence. Arguing that “the diversity of Lawrence’s activities and interests”
 had prevented anything but “piecemeal academic research” (6) into his subject’s
 life, Wilson himself, when writing 
his
 book, took advantage of his unprece ­
dented access to British government documents relating Lawrence’s role in
 such events as the Arab Revolt to present the first truly integrated portrait of
 his multifaceted but still elusive subject.
To be sure, there are other methods of retaining the
 
vitality so necessary to  
effective biographical writing — other ways of
 
instilling the life subject with  
(for lack of
 
a better word) humanity. Some biographers attempt to approach  
their subjects from 
an
 oblique angle, donning various narrative disguises, as it  
were, and looking to catch the central individuals of their studies in their most
 private and unguarded moments. A
 
change in  perspective can work wonders in  
biography; 
any
 reader who has encountered a work such as Nancy Milford’s  
striking 1970 life of
 
Zelda Fitzgerald on the heels of Andrew Turnbull’s Scott  
Fitzgerald or Arthur
 
Mizener’s The Far Side of Paradise will be able to testify  to  
the force such change can give. Dava Sobel, whose compelling account of the
 carpenter John Harrington’s attempts to invent a marine chronometer so as to
 establish a means of exact longitudinal reckoning turned out to be one of the
 most surprising best-sellers of the late 1990s, attempted in her next book to
 explore some of the lesser-known and
 
personal  repercussions resulting  from the  
1633 trial for heresy by the Roman Inquisition of the Italian scientist Galileo
 Galilei. Historians have for centuries told and retold the story of the
 astronomer’s stubborn defiance of the Church’s 1616 decree that banned as
 heresy the discussion — much less 
any
 possible defense — of th  Cop rnican  
theory that
 
the earth and the other planets orbited the sun. Galileo’s arrest and  
the suppression of
 
his theories and observations by his opponents within the  
Church was packaged for many years as a rather simple parable that pitted the
 forward-looking forces of science and experimentation against the irrationality
 and intractable dogma of medieval theologians; more recently, much has been
 made of Galileo’s own unwavering faith in revealed religion and of his convic
­tion that nature and revelation could 
never
 really contradict each other. Sobel  
is the first, however, to attempt to retell Galileo’s story as 
seen
 through the eyes  
of his eldest daughter, a young woman
 
who had been placed at an early age in  
a convent in Florence, where she took the name of Maria Celeste. A total of
 one hundred and
 
twenty-four letters written by Maria Celeste to her father  sur ­
vive, although all of 
his
 correspondence in answer to her was later destroyed.  
By so approaching the narrative of the scientist’s later years from within the
 
confines
 and concerns of the convent, Sobel not only sheds new light on the  
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depth of Galileo’s religious convictions but introduces a new sensibility — a
 
touch of “feminine human interest” (Duffy 13), in the words of
 
one critic —  
into his story. Nor is Galileo the only historical 
figure
 to benefit  from the fresh  
insight provided
 
by  such unusual perspectives. Mary S. Lovell’s A Rage to Live:  
A Biography of Richard and Isabel Burton entirely rewrites the complexly inter
­twined lives of her two subjects. Relying on hitherto unknown or unexamined
 sources (most notably
 
“seven boxes of unclassified material belonging to Isabel  
Burton” [xiv] in the Wiltshire Record Office), Lovell provides her reader with
 masses of new information — information that demands that 
we
 completely  
revise our understanding and assessment of both the nature of the Burtons’ per
­sonal relationships and the significance of Sir Richard’s various achievements as
 a writer, explorer, and preeminently
 
“eminent” Victorian.
The new biographical freedom, it goes without saying, has not been limit
­
ed
 to the retailers of strictly “literary” lives. Edmund Morris, who, after writ ­
ing a prize-winning work on Theodore 
Roosevelt,
 was chosen in 1983 to be the  
“authorized” biographer of Ronald Reagan, decided that
 
the  best way to under ­
stand his subject was to imagine himself as a precise, historical contemporary
 of Reagan’s. Accordingly, he inserted himself in the biographical narrative,
 including for good measure a wide selection of fictional friends and family
 whose tales run concurrent to that of the future president. Morris’s book is a
 fascinating creation. At the very least, he could have found no subject better
 suited to such an approach than Reagan himself— the actor-turned-politician
 whose achievements and persistent popularity remain oddly insubstantial.
 Morris’s own ambivalence toward Reagan, however, is hinted at
 
in his prologue.  
“What is this mysterious yearning of biographer toward subject,” he asks, “so
 akin to a coup de foudre in its insistence? Yet so fundamentally different from
 love in its detachment?” (xix-xx). But the generic wreckage from which Mor
­ris’s biography attempts to rise is too thoroughgoing to allow its narrative to
 stand unchallenged; once the frame has been so thoroughly broken — once a
 blatant and self-confessed fiction is permitted to assume an equal place in the
 biographical narrative — the life story itself is rendered hopelessly subjective
 and irrelevant. Dutch: A Memoir of
 
Ronald Reagan is in many respects an exper ­
iment in applied theory gone terribly, terribly wrong.
But what, finally, have the literary theorists and cultural historians them
­
selves had to say about all these developments? Such critics, as I have already
 asserted, would appear to have been slow to turn their attention to the genre at
 all. Volumes such as Sean Burke’s 1992 study The 
Death
 and Return of the  
Author (revised in 1998) promise in their titles to address the inadequacies of
 the poststructural celebrations of the “death of the author”
 
but have little to say  
with regard to the writing of biography per se. Only as the twentieth century
 drew to its close did some postmodern critics begin actively to regroup in 
an attempt to redirect the kinds of questions asked both of biographers (insofar as
 they constitute a
 
particular  breed of literary critics in general) and of biography  
itself as a genre. Admittedly, there are times when they appear to be 
excitedly engaged in a process akin to that of rediscovering the wheel. Nevertheless,
 their efforts have brought to bear on the subject of “pure” biography a number
 of issues — most dramatically questions concerning race, class, gender, and sex-
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uality which had too often
 
been suppressed by those life writers whose  work  
preceded what some have begun to call the "Moment of Theory” (that is, the
 period that facilitated and then followed the initial, institutional application of
 the work
 
of critics such as Barthes, Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida). The field of  
biography
 
and the scope of biographical research, it might be argued, have con ­
sequently been "opened up” in a manner
 
which few writers of an earlier gener ­
ation — a generation which tended often to dismiss the claims of interpretive
 biography as indefensible — could possibly have anticipated. “Traditional
 forms of self-telling,” in the words of the critics and editors Mary Rhiel and
 David Suchoff (2), demand to be re-examined in light of this paradigmatic
 shift. “Feminist and multi-cultural contributions ... to the rethinking of biog
­raphy,” they observe,
demonstrate that the production of meaning
 
in  biographical form is a  pow ­
erful force in reshaping cultural memory. We no longer 
view
 the present as  
the end point
 
of an agreed-upon narrativ  of progress, a view of history that  
fueled traditional biography’s emphasis on great men and great deeds. . . .
 [W]ith multi-culturalism comes an insistence that biography had limited
 the fullness of our culture’s memory, but biography can also become a
 means of challenging and recasting that memory. The life-text is, like his
­tory, open-ended.
(3)
One might, of course, rather easily challenge some of the more elementary
 
notions embedded in such a revaluation; at the very least, most members of the
 previous generation would no doubt themselves be stunned to have been cred
­ited at 
any
 time with such a monolithic consensus regarding the teleology of  
history, or with such uniformity of opinion in the attributed assessment of the
 determining role of “great men” in human culture and affairs. And precisely
 why serviceable terms 
like
 “biography” and “autobiography” need to be replaced  
by such unapologetically clumsy neologisms as “life writing” or, even worse,
 “self-telling” remains unclear. Yet the central
 
point of such comments possess ­
es a certain validity. The myriad approaches borne of an historical moment
 such as ours not only open the doors to a hitherto untapped plurality of bio
­graphical subjects but effectively expand the range of biographical research and
 responsibility. Now more than ever, biographies are perceived to be just as
 much about cultural history as they are about individual lives. Nor is this
 enlarged perception of generic provenance the only important change. Further
 complicating the task of
 
the literary biographer in the late twentieth century  
have been ethical disputes to some 
degree
 made possible only by certain  
unprecedented technological advances (such as the furor over Diane Wood
 Middlebrook’s use of taped psychotherapy sessions in her 1991 biography of the
 American poet Anne Sexton), protracted legal battles over the lived life as
 “intellectual property” (most spectacularly Linda Wagner Martin’s sordid wran
­gle with Ted Hughes and his sister Olwyn over the narrative of the life and
 death of Sylvia Plath, or the American novelist J. D. Salinger’s several attempts
 to
 
block the exposure and commodification of his own life “story”), and —  mo t  
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dangerously explosive — questions concerning the moral (ir)responsibility of
 
aesthetically or politically motivated
 
reconfigurations of the lives of well-known  
historical figures 
(such
 as the  American director Oliver Stone’s near-sociopath ­
ic 
film,
 JFK, or Spike Lee’s similarly skewed interpretation of the life of Mal ­
colm X). And, again, the waters have been muddied even further by lingering
 concerns over issues of decorum, propriety, or even the much derided notion of
 “common decency.” The American novelist John Updike, at least, has lashed
 out at what he has termed the “
Judas
 school” of biographical writing, the prod ­
ucts of which constitute the memoirs or recollections of former intimates of any
 given biographical subject, and which seem invariably to dwell on the most
 salacious or unsavory aspects of that subject’s life (such as British actress Claire
 Bloom’s retelling of her relationship with Philip Roth). “
Biography,
” as the  
writer
 
Brenda Maddox succinctly observes, “is a touchy subject these days” (47).
Practicing biographers, again, appear only rarely to have taken it upon
 themselves more accurately to define the parameters or even the fundamental
 purpose of their chosen field of enquiry (the biographer Paula Backscheider’s
 very recent Reflections on Biography is a welcome survey of the subject). Life
 writers, when they 
do
 attempt to define their “art,” tend to sound suspiciously  
like the character of Imlac in Samuel Johnson’s Rasselas, describing the neces
­sary accomplishments of the poet; one is tempted to respond to these enthusi
­astic fits with the cry, “Enough! Thou has convinced me that no human being
 can ever be a biographer!” What is it, finally, that the biographers themselves
 set out to accomplish? By what standard(s) might one measure the compara
­tive success or failure of 
any
 written life? The plural of “anecdote” — as I so  
often and with reference to the status of textual evidence reiterate to my stu
­dents — is not “data”; yet, in some matters, the intuitions and convictions at
 which we arrive in the course of
 
our own, anecdotal experiences as individual  
readers are all we have to work with. The novelist Henry James once cautioned
 his readers: “To live over people’s lives is nothing
 unless
 we live over their per ­
ceptions, live over th  growth, the change, the varying intensity of the same —
 since it was by those things they themselves lived” (quoted in Oates v). The
 methodology
 
implied by James in this quietly remarkable statement (at least to  
the extent that he appears to be articulating the essential nature of that pecu
­liar intimacy that ought ideally to connect the life of the biographical subject,
 on the one hand, with the life of the reader of biography, on the other) might
 at first 
glance
 be dismissed by many readers as fundamentally irrational and  
scandalously intuitive, to say nothing of theoretically unsophisticated ad
 extremum. The nature of both the psychic and the textual connections that
 James would appear to be asking his readers to 
effect
 with the past are patent ­
ly obscure and untenable, are they not? Surely James’s intuition of the vital
 identification between reader and subject is somehow overstated; surely the
 degree of fluidity demanded of personal and historical identity by such a vision
 lies well beyond the powers of 
any
 reader or (for that matter) beyond the tal ­
ents of any writer. James seems to be insisting that both reader and writer
 engage in a complicity of biographical construction, the ahistorical and near
­schizophrenic intensity of which is not only elusive and perhaps unattainable,
 but very close to inconceivable. Such an effort of “negative capability,” to use a
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familiar term slightly out
 
of context, seems no less likely than any other  method  
of interpretation to reward even the most passionate and dedicated of its prac
­titioners with — to use James’s own word — "nothing” for their pains.
Or does it? I think 
we
 can count on the fact that James himself was suffi­
ciently aware of the epistemological hubris inherent within the terms of such a
 fragile and ambitiously speculative dialectic of biographical meaning. By much
 the same token, however, he
 
was arguably far more sophisticated than any sub ­
sequent critic of the genre has been in his unflinchingly honest assessment of
 the peculiar capacity for empathy and intuition demanded of 
any
 successful  
biographer. In the course of my own research on the life of the eighteenth-cen
­tury poet Thomas Gray, I grew increasingly convinced that the deceptively
 straightforward remarks of Henry James, quoted above, in fact encapsulate an
 
acute
ly perceptive vision of both the essential nature and the profound depth of  
what might be 
called
 the “ subjective” or “personal” relationship which should  
ideally characterize the reader’s active and emotional engagement with 
any
 given  
biographical
 
subject. Indeed,  the peculiar intensity of textu l intimacy that typ ­
ically emerges from within the triangular relationship connecting subject,
 author, and reader in the task of life writing — an intimacy that must confi
­dently compel all three toward the successful and harmonious construction of
 biographical meaning — is of such a quality as might, alone, sufficiently serve
 to distinguish the genre from most other forms of narrative writing. The long
 and powerful resonance of any truly compelling biography — the lingering
 echoes of its portraiture
 
— might stand  in a similar manner as a generally effec ­
tive measure of the quality of a particular
 
work. The most engaging and influ ­
ential literary biographies appear deliberately and almost without exception to
 strike a note of sustained understanding and identification between their read
­ers and their historical subjects. “The truest biographies,” as Ackroyd has
 observed simply, “are those that are most engaging and inventive” (“Biography”
 4). Moreover, as Ackroyd further points out, “Biography and fiction are both
 concerned with human narrative; they require a central character and a coher
­ent plot, as well as a strong engagement with 
place
 and motive to drive the  
developing story.” He concludes: “it is possible to envisage the moment
 
when  
biography and fiction — or history and fiction, to put it more grandly — cease
 to be separate and identifiable forms of narrative but mingle and interpenetrate
 one another.” Ackroyd’s remarks echo the American novelist Bernard Mala-
 mud’s rather more celebrated observation, in 
his
 1979 Dublin's Lives'. “The past  
exudes legend: one can’t
 
make pure clay out  of time’s mud. There is no life that  
can be recaptured wholly; as it was. Which is to say that all biography ulti
­mately is fiction” (quoted in Maddox 47). The problem with many modern
 biographies, as still another successful writer of literary lives — Jay Parini —
 has contended along
 
much  the same lines, is that too few biographers transcend  
the mere facts and narratives of their subjects’ Eves, to achieve a glimpse of the
 mythos — the “true story” — of which such facts and narratives form only the
 outward appearance or phenomenon (Lehmann-Haupt B8). Biography, as
 Pirini’s insight implies, is at heart a risky 
business;
 only those writers who are  
brave or foolhardy enough to hazard their subjects on the table of their own
 imaginations — only those confident enough to stake their claims to biograph
­
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ical truth in the intertextual marketplace of all narrative and
 
ideas — only those  
few stand to profit in the playing. The mere chroniclers — the mere compilers
 of dates and incidents — venture nothing in the game, and so lose all.
James’s concise observations on the genre suggest that he, too, was unusu
­
ally alive to the decisive role so often played by the near-fictional element of
 sympathetic identification in the comparative success or failure of
 
any written  
life; the novelist clearly recognized the forceful intensity of readerly involve
­ment — of
 
emotional effort — demanded by good biographical writing. My  
own 
experience
 suggests that it is only by openly and boldly accepting the  
immense imaginative challenges implicit in James’s definitional observation
 that 
we
 can  hope to make any  significant progress in the task of biography; that  
it is only by and through the inescapable processes of our own, several attempts
 as embodied readers to (as James puts it) “live over” the 
life
 of the biographical  
subject that we can ever expect to gauge the distance of that life — or begin to
 measure the unique experience and achievement of its history —
 
from our own.  
It is only by means of the intensity of
 
such engagement that we can arrive at  
some better appreciation of the individual participation of any life within the
 pattern of our own; and it is only by
 
the light of such commitment that can we  
assess the continually changing significance of that life within our culture and
 so, perhaps, finally, achieve some sense of its transformative role in the larger
 world we all inescapably
 
perpetuate and share.
James was no less perceptive when he chose to address some of the ques
­tions raised by the writing of biography — when he chose to dramatize some
 of the forces to which the writer of biography is subjected — in the form of
 ghost stories. In 
one
 such tale, “The Real Right Thing” (first published in  
1900), a writer named George Withermore is approached by the widow of a
 well-known author, Ashton Doyne, soon after her husband’s death, to compile
 a biography of Doyne. Withermore is encouraged to work on the book in the
 evenings in the room that had only recently served as his subject’s study (“It’s
 here that we’re with him,” Mrs. Doyne declares passionately). But he is soon
 assailed by doubts regarding his enterprise. “How did he know, without more
 thought, he might begin to ask himself, that the book was, on the whole, to be
 desired? What warrant had he ever
 
received from Ashton Doyne himself for so  
direct and, as it were, so familiar an approach?” “Great was the art of biogra
­phy,” Withermore reasons, “but there were lives and lives, there were subjects
 and subjects” (115). The biographer soon discovers, however, that he is being
 led by the biographical 
subject
 himself. “More than once,” James writes,
when, taking down a book from a shelf and finding in it 
marks
 of Doyne’s  
pencil, he got drawn on and lost, he had heard documents on the table
 behind him gently shifted and stirred, had literally, on 
his
 return, found  
some letter he had mislaid pushed again into view, some
 
wilderness cleared  
by the opening of an old journal at the very date he wanted. How should
 he
 
have gone so, on occasion, to the special box  or  drawer, out  of fifty recep ­
tacles, that would help him, had not his mysterious assistant happened, in
 fine prevision, to tilt its lid, or to pull it half open, in just the manner that
 would catch his eye? - in spite, after all, of the fact of lapses and intervals
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of which, could one have really looked, one would have seen somebody
 
standing before the fire a
 
trifle detached and over-erect — somebody fixing  
one the least bit harder than in life.
(118-9)
Describing a similar moment of life retrospection in 
his
 own Autobiography,  
James no less accurately
 
described such an experience from the point of view of  
the ghost itself:
To look back at all is to meet the apparitional and to find in its ghostly face
 
the silent stare of an appeal. When I fix it, the hovering shadow ... it
 
fixes  
me back and seems the less lost.
(45)
As the critic Tony Tanner has observed, “The ghosts enrich James, and James,
 




or critic who has made even  the most tentative of advances into  
the territory of another writer’s 
life
 will recognize the subtle but often close to  
tactile pressure of psychic contact — sometimes facilitating, more often inhibit
­ing — which signals the real commencement of the biographical journey. We
 push against the author, unearthing secrets and disinterring desires, and the
 author, you can depend upon it, pushes back. It is something of a dirty secret
 among biographers that almost any life writer worth 
his
 or her salt — almost  
any, that is, who has even begun to do the job well
 
— will him- or herself have  
more than one ghost story to tell. That
 
having been said, these are not easy sto ­
ries to tell; they are not easy, that is, unless one is actually looking forward to
 being treated like a pariah by one’s skeptical and
 
intellectual colleagues. Be that  
as it may, and
 
having only recently completed  my biography of Gray,  I’ d be lying  
to myself if I didn’t admit that I know what it’s like to 
feel
 the ghostly  hand of  
the biographical subject
 
on my shoulder — that I know what it’s like to feel him  
breathing down my neck, to find him turning the pages of his own notebooks
 over
 
when I wasn’t looking, or to sense the vague but unmistakable impression  
that it is he who has taken care to hide a particular 
piece
 of evidence out of  
sight, or to keep a certain fact from view. I’d be lying
 
to myself if I didn’t admit  
that I know what it’s like, for
 
lack of any better way to describe it, to talk to the  
past — to be haunted by ghosts.
The process by which any biographer 
makes
 contact with the dead is a  
gradual one. “The lives of 
real
 people, unlike those of fictional characters,” as  
the writer Sebastian 
Faulks,
 in the preface to his own triple biography of the  
short lives of three English prodigies, The Fatal 
Englishman,
 has observed,  
“seem to exert a small but constant outward force away from order” (xiv); per
­haps it is the biographer’s own attempt to assert some kind of structure or
 design
 
in the face of this centrifugal force — to attempt “as gently  and as truth ­
fully as possible,” in Faulks’s words, “to shape the events of their  lives into some  
comprehensible pattern” — that provokes the spectral presence of the bio
­graphical subject in turn to assert its claims in some even more powerful or
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provocative form. I only know that the metaphorical language of ghosts and
 
spirits and hauntings provides a startlingly vivid and accurate vocabulary 
by which one can at least begin to address and describe — if not demonstrate and
 explain — the sort of discomfiting
 
psychic journey which seems to form one of  
the necessary conditions for effective life writing.
I had already been pursuing my work on Thomas Gray for some time
 
when  
my encounters with the poet began to assume some more palpable 
shape
 than  
the familiar frisson of pleasure and fear which had regularly accompanied what
 I can only describe as our increasing proximity of spirit. I might return to my
 desk in the British Library reading room, for example, or to my seat in one of
 the Cambridge college libraries, to find that the pages of a manuscript note
­book which I had been turning over for hours had indeed fluttered open, in 
my absence, to the facing that contained 
precisely
 the reference or information for  
which I had so long been searching. My hunches regarding just where a par
­ticular source or reference might be located within Gray’s own writing or with
 reference to certain books that might have been available to him were begin
­ning to be uncannily, consistently correct. Although it may smack of hubris to
 say it, I can’t help but feel, when I look back on these experiences now, that I
 had begun in some fundamental way to think like Thomas Gray — my mind,
 at least,
 
had begun to run the increasingly well-worn and  familiar grooves of the  
most clearly articulated legacies of his accustomed train of thought. Describ
­ing
 
the tenor of the peculiar relationship that develops between biographer and  
subject, Nancy Milford has written: “I had somewhat innocently — if a pas
­sionate curiosity
 
about another’s life is ever innocent — entered into something  
I neither could nor would put down for six years, and in that quest the direc
­tion of my life was changed” (xiii). Milford’s observation rings true for many
 life writers; the reciprocal quest of biography not only determines the story of
 the biographical subject but changes the life of the writer as well.
Some distinctly odd things started to happen, however. On one occasion,
 
I had traveled north to visit the country just outside Durham, where Gray had
in 
his
 middle years spent much time at the Old Park estate of his friend  
Thomas Wharton. Although Old Park itself had long since disappeared, I still
 thought it advisable to reconstruct from my own 
experience
 of the landscape  
some sense of what the area might have looked like in the middle of the eigh
­teenth century. Taking a break
 
from this self-imposed task of reconstruction, I  
took the opportunity of being in the neighborhood to revisit Durham’s 
glorious cathedral. I had been walking within the cathedral
 
precincts for ab t an hour,  
and found my mind returning constantly to 
precisely
 the issue of how I might  
describ  the contact I felt I had  been making with the past. Though I had been  
paying scant attention to much of what was around me — not reading the tes
­taments along the aisles or moving among the stones with 
any
 particular itin ­
erary — I was all of a sudden seized with a compelling need to know whose
 memorial I was at that moment standing on. The stone read only, clearly: T.
 GRAY. This was not, as I of course knew, the poet’s tomb, but
 
I leapt from the  
slab as if the soles of my shoes had been set alight. To this day I 
can
 in no way  
account for
 
the compulsion that I felt had willed me to examine an artefact that  
would otherwise have completely escaped my attention.
110
Journal X, Vol. 4 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol4/iss2/8
206 Journal x
There were other, seemingly “ghostly” incidents. One of the most conse
­
quential of these occurred in the course of a weekend visit to Houghton Hall
 
in  
Norfolk. Designed originally by the great English Palladian architect Colen
 Campbell in 1722 and completed (with alterations
 
by James Gibbs and Thomas  
Ripley) only in 1735, Houghton is arguably one of the grandest country hous
­es in England. It was built at the behest of Sir Robert Walpole, and was meant
 to stand as a proud and stolidly
 
irrefutable testament to the immensity of Wal ­
pole’s own achievement as the country’s first prime minister. Although derid
­ed in Walpole’s lifetime as the ostentatious work of a parvenu, Houghton has
 well withstood
 
the test of time; compared, at least, with the sprawling and over-  
turreteted vulgarity of comparable structures such as Blenheim Palace near
 Woodstock, the more compact and solemnly-grounded simplicity of Walpole’s
 Norfolk home can easily hold its own.
As a biographer of Thomas Gray, I has some compelling if not absolutely
 
essential reasons for undertaking a visit to Houghton. Horace Walpole — Sir
 Robert’s fourth son —
 
had since his earliest childhood been one of Gray’s clos ­
est friends. Together they had attended Eton College, where they memorably
 joined forces with two other like-minded boys (Richard West and Thomas
 Ashton) to form a “Quadruple Alliance” of
 
the imagination against both the  
authority of their masters and the casual tyranny of their school fellows. Both
 spent their later adolescent years at Cambridge (Gray at Peterhouse, Walpole at
 King’s College) and when the latter undertook the Grand Tour after leaving
 university, he invited Gray to travel with him as 
his
 companion. A violent  
quarrel while in Italy seemed to have
 
put an end to their  friendship in 1741,  but  
the two men were eventually
 
reconciled a few years later and remained in close  
contact until Gray’s death
 
in 1771. It is enough to say that  any biographer hop ­
ing to understand Gray and his work had better cultivate a pretty thorough
 understanding of Walpole as well.
As a young man, Horace Walpole had himself
 
spent only limited time at  
Houghton. We know from his surviving correspondence that he had been very
 much impressed by the first visit he paid to his father at the property in the
 summer of 1736, and that he was likewise acutely aware of the 
significance which connected the building and grounds at Houghton with the personal
 achievement of Walpole’s ministry (“As fine as [Houghton] is,” Horace wrote
 to 
his
 father that July, “I shou’d not have felt half the satisfaction, if it had not  
been
 
your doing” [Walpole 5]);  we know too that during the three years imme ­
diately preceding 
Sir
 Robert’s death in March, 1745, he divided his time  
between the Norfolk estate and the Walpole home in Arlington Street, Lon
­don. Gray, interestingly, was himself to see Houghton only once in his life, and
 even then his visit was undertaken not as a personal guest of Walpole (whose
 uncle, Lord Orford, had inherited the estate on the death of the old minister)
 but as a public visitor to the property in September, 1766.
Thanks to the generosity of Houghton’s current owner, the marquis of
 
Cholmondoley, I was invited
 
with a friend to spend a weekend at the property  
in the summer of 1998. I had by that time pretty much finished my original
 research on the Gray biography, and was attempting as best I might to tie up
 
any
 remaining loose ends in the narrative of the poet’s life. Only one relative ­
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ly minor but, to my mind, significant stumbling block remained to be over
­
come, and I in no way expected to discover the means of overcoming it at
 Houghton. I suggested 
early
 in my study that one of the authors whose work  
Gray had probably first encountered in the classroom at Eton — the Roman
 poet Decimus Magnus Ausonius (AD 310-395) — was to exert a profound
 influence on his own methods of reference and parodic allusion in his mature
 poetry Ausonius, and the technique of the poetic “cento” for which he was
 most famous, seemed to me to have played a defining 
role
 in Gray 's education  
as a poet, but I could nowher  point to any direct connection that linked the
 two in the years when Gray was yet a student at Eton or at Cambridge. The
 surviving Eton curriculum from the period makes no mention of Ausonius’
 centos, and although we  know that Ausonius’ work was familiar to writers in  the period (Pope’s “Windsor Forest” includes several passages that explicitly
 echo the Roman poet’s work, and he is recollected also in Sir
 
John Denham’s  
“Cooper’s Hill” and John Gay’s “Rural Sports”), and although we know, too,
 that Gray would later number a copy of
 
the hefty 1670 edition of Ausonius’  
works among the books in 
his
 own library, there was no more solid evidence  
that he had himself been particularly aware of Ausonius’ work by the time he
 first began writing English verse at university.
While at Houghton
 
I was given  the free run of Sir Robert Walpole’s  library.  
With the exception only of the electricity by means of which it is now lit, the
 room would appear to look exactly as it did in the eighteenth century. All four
 walls are lined with books from Walpole’s own collection in sumptuous, origi
­nal leather bindings. I was permitted to work at the minister’s own desk, situ
­ated in front of the library’s south-facing window (his chair, when I first saw
 the room, was pushed slightly away from the desk, giving the impression that
 the Great Man had himself only just stepped from 
his
 place, and might at any  
moment return). Not surprisingly,
 
I took full advantage of the opportunity. On  
the Saturday evening of my visit, I had already been reading at the desk for sev
­eral hours when I looked up to notice that the daylight had faded from the sky
 outside almost entirely. Beyond
 
the  library windows, along the lawn that edged  
below to the parish church and to the tiny hamlet that shared the name of
 Houghton, and within the sward that stretched to the east into the heart of the
 property’s parkland, a herd of white deer foraged comfortably in the gloaming.
 A lone white stag — its antlers gilded 
by
 the last rays of sunset — struck a pho ­
tographic pose in the twilight. I had made no great discoveries that afternoon,
 but I felt immensely privileged even to have had the opportunity of
 
sitting in  
Sir Robert Walpole’s place, of recreating the experience of 
his
 library as he him ­
self might have known it. Describing precisely such an experience in “The Real
 Right Thing,” James had
 
written: “I sit in his chair, I turn his books, I use his  
pens, I stir his fire, exactly as if, learning he would presently be back from a
 walk, I had come up here contentedly to wait. It’s delightful
 
-  but it’s strange”  
(117).
My time there was coming to an end, and I reached out to gather together
 
some of the volumes through which I had been browsing (among them Richard
 Bentley’s stunningly illustrated edition of Gray’s Poems, and Houghton’s own
 original copy of the
 
Aedes Walpolianae, Horace Walpole’s detailed catalogue of
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his father’s paintings), as if to absorb some of their presence through sheer force
 
of osmosis. It was then that I
 
felt my attention drawn to one of the lower book ­
shelves, near the window, and more specifically to a pile of heavy volumes on
 which
 
I seemed not  to have bestowed much attention in my initial survey of the  
library. I was compelled to move nearer. I crouched down closer
 
to the  leather ­
bound tomes 
and,
 crooking my head to one side, recognized that they indeed  
constituted various catalogues of the collection. 
As
 I moved to lift the mound  
of books from its place in the case, a single sheet of paper fluttered down from
 the top of the pile; it quivered lightly in the air, flying uncertainly back and
 forth, until it had settled on the carpet directly in front of me. Resting the
 heavy books on the edge of the shelf, I leaned over and peered at the paper. It
 was indeed a list of books, and it was very, very old — nearly as old as the
 library itself. On it was written in an eighteenth-century hand, a list of books
 that the young Horace Walpole (referred to in the document — that
 
had clear ­
ly been addressed to Sir Robert himself— as “your son”) had  been permitted to  
carry from the library to his rooms at King’s College, Cambridge,
 
probably after  
his first v it to the property in the summer of 1736. Prominently entered  
among the more obvious titles which might be included in such a list was the
 collected Works of Ausonius. Horace Walpole had himself
 
taken the volume  
from Houghton to university, and Gray — a frequent visitor to his friend’s
 rooms at King’s — could not help but have known it intimately. Not having
 deliberately
 
looked for it, I had found my missing, textual link at last.
Now, don’t get
 
me wrong. I don’t necessarily mean to suggest  that the actu ­
al “spirits” of Robert Walpole or his son, sensing 
my
 anxiety, had somehow or  
other compelled e to notice the previously overlooked pile of tomes, or that
 the ghost of my biographical subject himself had exerted his presence in such a
 
way
 as to draw those same volumes to my notice. The  loose sheet of paper itself  
was no lost or — quite frankly, in any other case — particularly valuable docu
­ment (when I commented on what I had found later in the evening to
 Houghton’s owner, he recognized the manuscript leaf to which I referred
 immediately, and with nothing more than a pleasant recollection of the little
 insight it offered into the genial domestic contact that must have existed
 between Sir Robert and his son). But how 
can
 I explain or even explain away  
the eerie feeling of contact — of communication — that nevertheless formed
 part of the spirit and the reward of the recovery of such biographical evidence?
 How can I convey to any other individual the 
curious
 sensation that for one 
slight moment, at least, the structures of time and place seemed to collapse and
 fold in upon themselves?
The true master of the ghost story in the English tradition, M. R. James,
 
memorably centers one of his best and most artful tales — the wonderfully
 creepy “Oh,
 
Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad” — around the figure of a  
Cambridge Professor of Ontography (the fictional discipline is a typically fine
 Jamesian touch) named Parkins. Provoked 
early
 in the narrative to express his 
views regarding the fashionable, late-Victorian vogue for the subject of ghosts
 and “hauntings,” Professor Parkins lectures one of his colleagues impatiently:
I freely own that I do not 
like
 careless talk about what you call ghosts. A  
man in my position . . . cannot, I find, be too careful about appearing to
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sanction the current belief on such subjects. ... I hold that any semblance,
 
any appearance of concession to the view that such things might exist is
 equivalent to a renunciation of all that I hold most sacred.
(59)




 of the next Cambridge Long Vacation, his views on “certain points”  
of the matter are by the end of his story
 
rather “less clear cut than they  used to  
be” (77). It is typical of such narratives that skeptics such as Parkins are invari
­ably convinced by their experiences that something, though they may 
never entirely know exactly what, exists beyond the realm of human intelligence and
 explanation — that those who come at first to scoff will, inevitably, remain
 behind to pray. I can only confess, finally, to a similar acceptance that the para
­meters by which
 
biographical research is bound are slightly different than those  
that determine other types of scholarly or critical inquiry. I can only suggest,
 too, if you’re interested, that you try it some time for yourself. Just whistle for
 the past — and brace yourself for
 
whatever happens to come your way.
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